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Sommario

FOCUS SUL CONFLITTO UCRAINO

MARCO LOMBARDI
Russia-Ucraina: oltre la Guerra Ibrida,
verso il Techno-Cognitive Warfare 7

STEFANO MARINELLI
War and Crimes against Peace: Avenues to Prosecute
Russia's Aggression of Ukraine 21

DANIELE MARIA BARONE
Russia-Ukraine conflict: digital assets chronicles in times of war 33

FEDERICO BORGONOVO
Azov Battalion: Extreme Right-Wing Militarization
and Hybrid Warfare 53

MARCO ZALIANI
The importance of the Cyber battleground
in the Russo-Ukrainian war 61

LUCA CINCIRIPINI
The hybrid response of the EU and NATO
to the Russia-Ukraine conflict 69

NAVIGARE SCENARI IBRIDI: PROSPETTIVE

GIACOMO BUONCOMPAGNI
L'Amore Altruistico in tempi di guerra e pandemia..... 79

DAISY MARCOLONGO
Gestione dell'emergenza Covid-19: dalla teoria all'analisi.
Il caso Bergamo 91

FEDERICO PRIZZI Il Cultural Intelligence e la Negoziazione Operativa nelle Aree di Crisi	107
RENE D. KANAYAMA Events in Kazakhstan’s Almaty of January 2022 – Grass-root Revolt or Terrorism Inspired Insurgency?.....	123
ALI FISHER – NICO PRUCHA “Working and Waiting”: The Salafi-Jihadi movement on Telegram in 2021.....	149

The hybrid response of the EU and NATO to the Russia-Ukraine conflict

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Abstract

The ongoing conflict between Russia and Ukraine embodies the main features of hybrid warfare. Alongside the military dimension, the use of propaganda tools, disinformation campaigns and cyber-attacks has fully emerged so far, as well as the multiplicity of state and non-state actors involved. Faced with this complexity, the European Union (EU) and NATO, unable to make full use of the military instrument to contain the consequences of the conflict, have put in place a multidimensional response. Up to now, it has been articulated in the use of both hard and soft power tools that have transversally involved different sectors. On the one hand, therefore, there was the supply of military equipment to the Ukrainian front. On the other hand, lawfare instruments such as economic sanctions have been put in place, as well as trade, financial and energy measures aimed at isolating Russia from the rest of the international community. Considering the factors that have long been observed in the field of international security studies, the future context will be increasingly dominated by hybrid warfare and the need for various actors to avoid open military clashes. The response of the EU and NATO to the Russian-Ukrainian crisis could, on the one hand, highlight the difficulties of the two organizations in fully transforming themselves into global players in the framework of international security and defence. On the other hand, could be a first step toward the exercise of a potentially replicable hybrid power in the management of future crises.

Keywords

Ukraine, Russia, EU, NATO, hybrid warfare

1. Introduction

The military action undertaken by Russia with the invasion of Ukraine on February 24, 2022, represents only the final step in a conflict that began as early as 2014 at the time of the annexation of Crimea and the creation of the separatist republics of Donetsk and Luhansk. In the context of this long phase, the confrontation remained stagnant but persistent, alternating low-intensity military skirmishes with other forms of conflict performing on other levels. Precisely this multidimensionality allows us to observe what is happening in Ukraine not only under the military lens but also by appreciating the implications on the cyber, information and propaganda level. On these fronts, the conflict has never really ended or stopped in the last years, and recent military action represents only the apex of a confrontation that has progressed over time, albeit in less overt and media-relevant forms. In this context, therefore, the current conflict can be referred to as a real hybrid conflict, of which it follows the main characteristics that have been outlined by the existing literature.¹ Faced with this threat, the response of the two main European defence organizations, the European Union (EU) and NATO, involved the exercise of hybrid power, that is, a mixture of economic sanctions, military supplies, and the use of tools of soft power aimed at countering Russian action.² The complexity of the Western response, and the exercise of a power that can be defined as hybrid, follow the existing literature about the growing international economic and institutional interdependence which amplifies the use of *soft power*.³ Even if this interconnection does not eliminate conflicts, it aims at least to distance them from the military sphere. This fits in the wake of existing studies on the nature of the EU as a *civilian*⁴ or *normative power*,⁵ or as an actor more focused on the use of diplomatic and legal tools, or in shaping the conception of “normal” in international relations, rather than on the use of military force. This appeal was also favoured and promoted by the inability to fully use the classic military instrument, both because Ukraine is not a member state in either organization and to prevent further escalation of the conflict on a large scale.

¹ Giegerich, B. (2016). Hybrid Warfare and the Changing Character of Conflict. *Connections*, 15(2), 65-72.

² <https://www.epc.eu/en/Publications/EU-hybrid-power-to-face-the-Russian-threat~462ecc>

³ Nye, Joseph S. “Soft Power.” *Foreign Policy*, no. 80 (1990): 153-171.

⁴ Duchêne, Francois. 1973. “The European Community and the uncertainties of interdependence” in *A Nation Writ Large? Foreign Policy Problems before the European Community*. Max Kohnstamm and Wolfgang Hager, eds., pp. 1-22.

⁵ Manners, Ian. 2002. “Normative Power Europe: A Contradiction in Terms?” *Journal of Common Market Studies* 40(2): pp. 235-258.

Furthermore, to make the picture even more complex, there are numerous players, both state and non-state actors, who increase the fragmentation of the conflict, making it more difficult for Western countries and institutions to develop an articulated and coherent response strategy. This, therefore, helps to understand the premises of the choices made up to now by the EU and NATO,⁶ unable to resort to military actions against Russia and oriented towards a mosaic of measures about the *hard* and *soft power* spheres.⁷ This hybrid response may on the one hand signal the difficulty of the EU and NATO to position themselves as global actors in the field of security and defence, given the reluctance to deploy military actions even in the face of a direct attack such as the Russian one. On the other hand, it could signal a new direction in conflict management, both considering the growing proliferation of hybrid warfare and considering the difficulty, increasingly encountered in the future, of easily resorting to the military instrument.

2. The EU response

The measures taken by the EU to respond to the Russian attack have so far been multidimensional, aimed at hitting Moscow on the economic, financial, and commercial front, including for the first time the direct sale of weapons to Ukraine and therefore taking steps also on the military level. In addition to the measures launched by the EU, there are also a series of decisions taken by European companies and institutions in the cultural, artistic and sports fields aimed at punishing Russian athletes or artists to increase the country's international isolation. Although these cases do not directly concern the EU, they in any case indicate the complexity of the response implemented at the institutional level on the European continent, mixing *hard* and *soft power* tools.⁸

At the institutional level, up to now, the various member countries have managed to find a compromise between the different national sensitivities towards both Russia and the issues inherent to common defence and the so-called *strategic sovereignty* of the EU. This balance has made it possible to offer a unitary and coherent response in terms of measures taken, even if the first difficulties in coordinating a cohesive energy policy in the face of reductions in imports of gas and raw materials from Russia are already reported.⁹

What has emerged so far, in any case, is a huge recourse to the instrument of law and *lawfare* in reaction to the Russian attack. The same economic

⁶ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/23/economic-war-russia-sanctions-bailouts-west-g7-nato/>

⁷ <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-60125659>

⁸ <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/ukraine/2022-03-18/new-economic-containment>

⁹ <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2022-03-22/toll-economic-war>

sanctions imposed on companies and individuals are justified based on Russia's violation of international obligations. In this way, the law is used on the one hand as a foundation for the adoption of measures in response to military action, and on the other hand, as a weapon to be wielded in the context of a hybrid conflict. The impossibility for the EU to resort to military action against Russia, therefore, leaves room for various kinds of measures justified employing purely legal arguments. Up to now, they have involved various sectors in which they have operated transversally, affecting both companies linked to the Kremlin in various economic fields, and individuals deemed close to Putin's closest circle of power. The glue that makes it possible to give coherence to this plurality of decisions, at least according to the vision of Brussels, is the ability to pursue a single goal, namely that of striking Russia, weakening not only the economic and financial sphere but also the military campaign itself. Thus, once again, the multidimensionality of hybrid conflicts emerges, where the military and non-military spheres (commercial, legal, diplomatic, economic, etc.) merge, making the various facets of *hybrid warfare* indistinguishable, where everything becomes a potential tool and terrain of contention and competition.

Specifically, among the measures taken by the EU, it is possible to mention, among others, travel restrictions, freezing of assets, prohibition of commercial operations with certain companies or in the Russian energy sector. Among the various sanctions imposed, some have also taken on a strong symbolic impact, such as the ouster from the Swift system of seven Russian banks (Bank Otkritie, Novikombank, Promsvyazbank, Bank Rossiya, Sovcombank, Vnesheconombank (VEB) and VTB Bank). This measure will have the effect of disconnecting the financial institutions involved from the international financial system, compromising their ability to operate worldwide. In addition to these measures, the EU has also imposed a ban on investing and/or participating in future projects co-financed by the Russian Direct Investment Fund, as well as selling, supplying, transferring, or exporting euro banknotes to Russia or natural and legal persons in Russia.¹⁰

Russia's international isolation seems to have been undertaken also to avoid possible campaigns of influence in Western societies. This emerges from the choice to impose sanctions on media such as Russia Today and Sputnik, accused of spreading fake news and Kremlin propaganda, which are defined by the European authorities as being placed under the direct or indirect control of the authorities of the Russian Federation. These last measures are part of the strategy of countering Moscow's offensive on the widest possi-

¹⁰ <https://www.consilium.europa.eu/it/policies/sanctions/restrictive-measures-ukraine-crisis/history-restrictive-measures-ukraine-crisis/>

ble scale which, following the model of *hybrid warfare*, aims to combine the military dimension with wise use of the communication sphere. The communication plan has represented, especially following the invasion of Crimea in 2014, a crucial and successful battleground so far for Russia, which has been investing for years in actions aimed at undermining the Western liberal order. To achieve this goal, the propaganda and communication aspect is of crucial importance, to undermine the Western international order from within by corroding the bond of trust between civil society and political institutions.

3. NATO's response

NATO's reaction to Russian military action has been more confined to the military sphere, also considering the nature of the organization.¹¹ However, there was also the choice of Member States to act in favour of Ukraine on the financial and humanitarian levels, in addition to significant military supplies and logistical and intelligence support.¹² Over the weeks, both in public statements and in international meetings, there has been growing coordination in the response between the EU and NATO, in a renewed attempt to promote an effective unity of the transatlantic community after the tensions of recent years.¹³ However, NATO remains a military alliance devoted to the collective defence of its member states that in recent years has taken important steps in terms of strategic conceptualization of the hybrid threat, and the identification of possible responses. This has led to an enlargement of the military sphere which is now integrated by infrastructures destined to confront each other on the terrain of *hybrid warfare*, especially in the cyber sphere. In the specific case, the impossibility of resorting to art. 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty due to Ukraine's non-participation in NATO, prevented recourse to the deployment of the military instrument directly in the ongoing conflict. This was offset by the huge increase in military force deployed along the eastern flank of the Alliance,¹⁴ or in countries such as Poland, Hungary, Romania, and the Baltic Republics.¹⁵ Although equipped with a lower range of tools than the EU has, given the structural and purpose diversity of the two organizations, NATO has also offered a hybrid response aimed at integrating with the various packages of measures and sanctions already imposed by the EU.

¹¹ <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2022/mar/23/nato-countries-to-give-ukraine-kit-to-protect-against-chemical-and-nuclear-attacks>

¹² https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/news_192476.htm?utm_source=linkedin&utm_medium=sme&utm_id=220227%2Bukraine%2Bnato%2Bsupport

¹³ https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_193719.htm

¹⁴ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/24/nato-russia-war-deploy-new-battle-groups-eastern-europe/>

¹⁵ <https://www.nytimes.com/2022/03/02/world/europe/nato-weapons-ukraine-russia.html>

The supply of military equipment to Ukraine,¹⁶ in fact, makes it possible to avoid a formal entry into the ongoing conflict, an event that would have no basis in the Treaties or support from public opinion but allows for the pursuit of strategic objectives in a less blatant but equally substantial form.

4. Future developments

The ongoing conflict in Ukraine is one of the new forms of conflict defined as hybrid in the light of the multidimensionality through which it is developing. As previously stated, it does not consist only of a military component, the most evident external form of the conflict, but also of a communicative and cybersphere that has been supporting Russian military actions, or the Moscow proxies, in Ukraine since 2014. Against this background, the response put in place by the main Western defence organizations, namely NATO and the EU, consisted of the exercise of a sort of hybrid power, a mixture of measures operating on several levels (economic, commercial, financial, legal, military as well as soft power tools) aimed at countering Russian military action and forcing Putin to change his initial objectives. The implementation of these actions is due both to formal reasons (i.e. the non-participation of Ukraine in both organizations), as well as political and strategic, due to the growing reluctance of Western societies to resort to war for the huge costs and fear of possible escalation. The path taken may indicate, in a future perspective, two antithetical yet relevant elements.

On the one hand, it may indicate, once again, the inability of the two organizations to rethink themselves in the changed European threat framework and to project themselves as global players in the international security scenario. These difficulties would confirm the troubling restructuring of the European security architecture, whose governance has been limited for years by the difficulty of identifying a division of responsibilities between the EU and NATO. This is both considering the basic misunderstanding about the role that the EU and European countries should play about the United States (and therefore NATO) and for the different national preferences within the EU between Atlanticist countries and those who push in the direction of greater European strategic sovereignty.¹⁷ Following this interpretation, therefore, the implementation of sanctioning measures such as those adopted so far would be yet another proof of the obstacles that hinder the definitive

¹⁶ <https://www.euronews.com/my-europe/2022/03/24/chemical-weapons-nato-to-provide-ukraine-with-equipment-to-counter-russian-threat>

¹⁷ <https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/03/24/war-ukraine-russia-eu-defense-military-nato-europe/>

projection of the EU and NATO on the stage of international security and defence, through a coherent and punctual division of tasks.

On the other hand, on the contrary, the work carried out so far by the two institutions could signal a model that could potentially be replicated in the future in the event of new conflicts. As indicated by a substantial part of the academic and political debate in the field of security studies, the future scenario will be that of a gradual and constant increase in the hybridization of the conflict. This will imply, over time, that the military instrument will be significantly less used due to its economic and social costs to favour hidden and covert forms of conducting hostilities. Considering this process, the countries of the transatlantic community will be increasingly pushed to identify new tools to respond to the actions coming from hostile actors and the crises arising in its neighbourhood, whose destabilization seems destined to increase. The developments of the current conflict will therefore be of extreme importance to evaluate the effectiveness of these tools as well as to evaluate their possible replicability in any future theatres of conflict.

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