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Security, resilience and migration: a sociological analysis. Lessons learned from the Federal Republic of Germany

BARBARA LUCINI¹

Executive

This paper analyses the effects and the social impacts of the current migration waves in Europe, with a specific focus on the German situation and the relations between Pegida movement – Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West and AfD - Alternative fuer Deutschland – political party.

Specifically, this piece of writing is the first to take a systematic approach from a sociological perspective to investigate what happened in Germany in the last few crucial months, where specific evidence of the role of the sociological framework have been demonstrated.

The aim of this analysis is the legitimacy and the importance of social resilience at both methodological and operative levels, considering the interdependences that this concept has with the more general sociological framework and the migration issues.

The paper ends with an insight of the future of the migrants policies in Germany and the definition of the two sociological categories “resilience in transition and temporary resilience”.

In questi ultimi decenni, l'Europa sta affrontando una crisi umanitaria senza precedenti, testimoniata dalla sempre più visibile ondata migratoria e la pressione esistente ai confini degli Stati membri dell'Unione europea.

Una situazione cronica di caos si è andata sempre più delineando, in considerazione delle vulnerabilità di governance delle istituzioni attuali e dell'inefficacia delle politiche europee e internazionali rivolte alla possibile risoluzione dei conflitti in Medio Oriente, delle politiche sulla sicurezza e alla lotta al terrorismo, delle politiche migratorie per la regolazione dell'accoglienza e dei flussi in ingresso.

Fino ad oggi il panorama è stato caratterizzato da una collezione di dati ed informazioni, che provenivano essenzialmente da fonti statistiche o giornalistiche: alcuni psicologi o attivisti sostenitori dei diritti umani hanno focalizzato l'attenzione sulle modalità di risposta resiliente da parte dei migranti, ma poco è stato analizzato in termini di una più generale resilienza

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istituzionale e sociale, che si concentri su un versante ovvero le modalità di risposta e gestione della situazione da parte delle comunità ospitanti e delle autorità locali.

Questa analisi avrà quindi come elemento cardine il ruolo della resilienza in Germania, uno dei Paesi europei dove le recenti ondate migratorie sembrano avere messo in crisi l'intero sistema sociale.

In particolare, la resilienza non verrà considerata unicamente nelle sue accezioni più positive, ma considerando anche finalità negative e distruttive quando per esempio il concetto viene utilizzato in funzione di aggregazione e polarizzazione estremiste, come per esempio lo sviluppo di partiti di estrema destra come AfD o NPD e movimenti politici come Pegida.

Nello specifico, alcune situazioni verranno considerate per le loro similarità: i fatti occorsi in Germania durante la vigilia di Capodanno a Colonia e in altre cittadine dove si sono verificati atti simili; l'attuale situazione migratoria e le conseguenze della crisi umanitaria in Germania; l'avanzare del partito AfD Alternative für Deutschland e del movimento di estrema destra Pegida - Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes.

Questo studio è quindi finalizzato alla presentazione e legittimazione della sociologia dei movimenti collettivi e di un più generale approccio sociologico, come lente interpretativa di fenomeni sociali, che per la loro complessità e interdipendenze stanno sfuggendo ad una efficace gestione e governance da parte delle istituzioni sia nazionali sia europee, non dimenticando il valore aggiunto espresso dalla relazione con i più ampi concetti di resilience in transition and temporary resilience considerati come drivers teorici e operativi, per una efficace e possibile gestione del fenomeno migratorio.

Keywords

Security, resilience, migration, sociology, social movements

1. Introduction

Over the last 15 years, many experts, journalists, academics and public opinion have focussed their attention on the continuing migration waves and their societal impact on the host communities and societies.

It is important to note that we were not aware of the effects and the implications that these types of social movements were causing, the challenges arising from this phenomenon for the future and the resilience of the people involved in these social dynamics.

In the last few years, there have been important social and cultural changes in all the European cities and the societies committed to manage the humanitarian crisis and emergency.

What emerges from a primary social and communicative analysis is the lack of preparedness in order to manage this emergency both at legislative, institutional and social levels.

The host communities were completely unready to deal with the human and social needs demanded from the migrant people. This is also understand-

able looking at the behaviour of the population and the emergence of illegal trafficking at national borders.

This situation has often been analysed using statistical data and through a legislative lens, underestimating the fundamental role that sociology – specifically the sociology of social movements – and its theoretical frameworks play in understanding the evolving societies where we live and the operative implications for a resilient response to the migration issues.

For this primary reason, this piece of writing is the first to take a systematic approach to investigate what happened in Germany in the last few crucial months, the rise of the Pegida movement and the AfD political party, where specific evidence of the role of the sociological framework have been demonstrated.

Furthermore, this analysis intends to legitimate the importance of social resilience at both methodological and operative levels, considering the interdependences that this concept has with the more general sociological framework.

The German events and organisations considered in the following analysis can be categorized by the similarities below:

1. the presence of migrants with mixed social identities and “*undetermined*” social roles such as refugees, illegal migrants, asylum seekers and economic migrants: for the most part, all have been collectively described as social threats, connecting them to the broader feeling of urban insecurity;
2. a persistent state of critical emergency due to the conditions of the migrants and the ineffectiveness of the displacement, relocation and response practices to the needs of the migrants themselves;
3. an unclear emergency management plan according to the principles of disaster resilience, crowd management and crowd control;
4. the presence of social tensions among migrants, public authorities and the local population.

These four sociological drivers are conceived to be the categories for a social analysis of the humanitarian crisis in Europe with a focus on Germany and the research questions will be: how can we consider resilience within this context? How can the public institutions communicate resilience in a context of a humanitarian crisis?

Taking into account this theoretical framework in order to conduct an effective analysis of this phenomenon and its institutional and social impacts, we have to focus on the possibility of evaluation and the improvement of the resilience for communities and societies suffering the immigration waves.

This analysis will make a resilience and vulnerability assessment of the migration issues possible, considering the social categories mentioned before

and its development within an integrated socio-resilience approach to the current situation in Germany.

2. Security, resilience and migration: a contradictory relationship. The current situation in Germany

There have been some crucial events in Germany recently as they have faced the issue of migration, security and resilience.

In particular, the focus is on the sex attacks perpetrated on hundreds of women, during New Year's Eve, in Cologne, by migrants.

The dramatic facts can be considered one of the most important turning points for Germany during the immigration crisis and what is most interesting to note is the varied representations and self-perceptions given by German people, the public authorities and the European Commission².

In particular, in this context, it seems clear that there is an underestimation of the power of social perception and its practical and concrete implications for the daily life of the people involved.

This is one of the crucial points that the federal government of Angela Merkel have had to deal with, as demonstrated by the recent regional elections and its winners, such as the AfD (Alternative fuer Deutschland) party: Germany is living through a fragile time considering the current social and political instability as well as the extraordinary events of migration waves³: “[The] net migration of foreign people amounted to 1.14 million. This is the highest net immigration of foreigners ever recorded in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany” (DeStatis Statistisches Bundesamt)

From this point of view, we are witnessing the fragmentation and vulnerability of a nation which is trying to deal with a social phenomenon, completely underestimated from the very beginning and, in this context, it seems that the national economic situation and the strength of the industrial sectors do not protect the nation against the social tensions and the immigrant crisis⁴, as stated by Die Zeit in an article “*Der Verlust der Mitte Deutschland geht es wirtschaftlich bestens, aber das Land ist zerrissen wie selten zuvor: Hypermoral von links, blanke Gewalt von rechts. Was ist da passiert*” that is “*the loss of the centre, meaning that the political and social equilibrium is disappearing and*

² <http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/europe/germany/12130843/EU-leaders-No-link-between-Cologne-sex-attacks-and-migrant-crisis.html>.

³ https://www.destatis.de/DE/PresseService/Presse/Pressemitteilungen/2016/03/PD16_105_12421.html;jsessionid=D0319712659C3576A91F52A8765D7DBF.cae3.

⁴ <http://www.zeit.de/2016/04/deutschland-wirtschaft-linke-diskurs-mitte-rechte>.

the national economy seems to be unable to cope with the morality of the parties of the Left and the brutality of the parties on the Right".

Furthermore, the motto of AfD is "Mut zur Wahrheit"⁵ or "The Strength of Truth" which sustained winning by the Afd in three BundesLaenders: Rheinland – Pfalz; Sachsen – Anhalt; Baden – Wuerttemberg; which are three crucial Laenders due to their geographical positions, historical, cultural and social backgrounds.

A second turning point can be considered; the event of *Weiberfastnacht* in Germany, specifically in Cologne during the traditional Carnival week, where a different approach to security was considered and the city of Cologne (as for many other cities) was secured.

In spite of the new security practices, it seems that a girl was sexually abused: this crime can be framed within the cultural meaning of the German Carnival and, in particular, on *Weiberfastnacht* i.e. the Carnival of Women.

In this context, it is a recurring theme that the cultural and historical aspects were underestimated in favour of more attention to the emotional side of the events and its practical implications for daily life.

As sociologists, we have to focus on these cultural aspects because they have a specific role in social relationships and, above all, in interreligious relations, such as those between Islam and Catholicism.

From a crisis management point of view, we must also not forget to consider that Germany and parts of its communities and population are social systems under stress, squeezed by the high expectations for Germany at a European level, the role they have played in the European scenario and the internal social fragmentations and tensions caused by the migrant waves.

What appears clear in Germany and in all other European countries, including Turkey, is the lack of preparedness and preparation of the hosting system, causing a sense of fear and threat in part of the population⁶, that probably don't have the necessary knowledge, competence and skills to deal with this kind of social phenomenon.

Not only do people or citizens lack the useful information and cognitive framework to cope with these events, but also governments and public institutions do as well: this was the most important gap shown by both the German and the European authorities.

⁵ <https://www.alternativefuer.de>.

⁶ <http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-03/fluechtlinge-kriminalitaet-auslaender-polizeiliche-kriminalstatistik> Mehr Flüchtlinge, mehr Kriminalität? In English: More refugees, more crimes?

Further, the situation was made more complex due to the complicated migrant identification process and the mix of social identities (Kaufmann, 2005) such as refugees, economic migrants and illegal migrants.

In particular, some sources state that among this last social category, the undocumented immigrants, there were terrorists: this information has not been clearly explained by the authorities or governments, but the impact on public opinion was high and the rise of the social movement Pegida - Patriotic Europeans Against the Islamisation of the West (Occident) can be considered a lack of direction and norms from the institutional authorities at the governance level.

The current German situation is represented by the underestimation of the social tensions and conflicts that pertain to many parts of the nation.

The migrants were and are among us now in what, before these events, were public spaces for public uses: we also have to reconsider the role that a public space plays in the definition of social and communitarian identities.

Another lack in this unplanned refugee crisis management⁷ was the different use of social spaces (from streets to gyms and other public spaces used, such as displacement centers) that can also be considered the origin for the rejection of the current social and political situation in Germany, as explained by this event: *“Ever since Frauke Petry and Beatrix von Storch of the right-wing populist political party, Alternative for Germany (AfD), gave the rhetorical order to fire on refugees, the discussion about migration in Germany is out of control. It might just be a coincidence that at almost the same moment this happened, a live grenade was thrown for the first time at a refugee center. But it fits together. Deaths will now be acceptable, perhaps even factored in, for further inciting the German population”*⁸.

Since 2014, after the first refugee crisis, these kinds of acts and reactions became quite common in Germany and in its Laenders, specifically considering that *“Anti-refugee rage grows in Dresden suburbs”*⁹.

The city of Dresden is a core place when analysing the situation in Germany and its relationships with migrants and refugees: it is, in fact, where the Pegida movement began its activities.

Even if there are not, until now, statistical data on the relation between the refugee crisis, undocumented migrants and the rise of the Pegida movement or the AfD Party, it is important to consider that something important is happening according to the definition that: *“resilience is a socialization*

⁷ <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-02/refugees-europe-border-migration>.

⁸ <http://www.zeit.de/politik/ausland/2016-02/refugees-europe-border-migration>.

⁹ <http://www.thelocal.de/20150707/refugee-rage-grows-in-dresden-suburbs>.

process” (Lucini, 2014) meaning the important role played by the authorities and institutions in order to sustain the integration of migrants and refugees as well as to promote the social relationships between the local population, refugees and migrants.

From a different perspective, it is also possible to consider the “internal or group resilience” of Pegida itself and its collective strength for a part of the population that sustains this vision.

Although Pegida and the political party of the AfD are playing a core role within German society, it is important to remember the other side of the situation, represented by the supporters of the refugees and migrants.

For instance, from the months of July 2015 and November 2015 there have been flash mobs in many German cities organized by the activists and the members of civil society to support integration and the immigration policies, and we cannot forget the “refugees welcome” flyers.

From an institutional point of view, the Federal Government, at a central level, is supporting integration and the social cohesion between the local population and migrants¹⁰.

From an institutional point of view, the Federal Government, at a central level, is supporting integration and the social cohesion between the local population and migrants:

- for instance, an interesting perspective is that proposed by the Deutsche Islam Konferenz and is the programme of work aimed at improving the social support for the migrants and a fruitful dialogue between the German citizens and the Muslim immigrants. In this context, one point is more interesting, that is, “preventing extremism, radicalisation and social polarisation”, aimed at facilitating the socialization among Muslims and other citizens;
- another institutional proposal, that marks a sort of institutional resilience and resilience response to the refugee crisis, is that experienced by Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge or the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, who produced an e-flyer in different languages entitled “First Orientation for the Asylum Seeker” with information covering the primary needs of asylum seekers.

Along the lines of the previous experiences, some of German civil society organizes a network aimed at informing and supporting the refugees during their displacement in Germany¹¹.

¹⁰ www.bpb.de Federal Agency for Civic Education.

¹¹ <http://fluechtlingforschung.net/fluchtlingsrechte-sichern/> Refugees Security and Human Rights.

From a sociological perspective, what affects the security challenge and the contradictory relationship between security and migration in Germany can become a social model for the analysis of other situations in the European Union, even if it is necessary to take into account the cultural, political and institutional differences among the Nations.

3. Pegida from a sociological perspective, Resilience in Transition and Temporary Resilience

Pegida - Patriotic Europeans against the Islamisation of the West (Occident) is a far right movement located in Dresden and founded, in 2014, by Lutz Bachmann, even if, during the last two years, there has been a change in the leading figures and some of them have distanced themselves from the extremism of Pegida, founding a new group named "Direkte Demokratie für Europa"¹².

In order to understand the political and cultural background of Pegida better, we have to take a look at its manifesto and its nineteen bullet points¹³:

1. PEGIDA is FOR the acceptance of war refugees and politically – or religiously – persecuted people. This is a humanitarian responsibility.
2. PEGIDA is FOR the acceptance of the duty and also right of integration into the Federal Republic of Germany's Basic Constitutional Law.
3. PEGIDA is FOR the dispersed location of war refugees and persecuted people, instead of their accommodation in inhuman conditions.
4. PEGIDA is FOR a pan-European allocation system for refugees and an appropriate allocation on the shoulders of all EU member-states (a central registration authority to allocate to all EU member-states, similar to the internal German Königsteiner Schlüssela).
5. PEGIDA is FOR lowering the ratio of refugees per welfare-carer (current refugees per social worker c.200:1, in reality there is no welfare-care for partly-traumatized people).
6. PEGIDA is FOR an asylum-application procedure per the Netherlands or Switzerland model, and, until the implementation of it, FOR the BAMFb to shorten massively the duration between application request and processing, to make rapid integration possible.
7. PEGIDA is FOR increasing resources for the Police and against a reduction in their numbers.

¹² <https://www.facebook.com/DDfE-418869361603485>.

¹³ <http://ukrants.co.uk/pdf/Pegida-Position-Paper-English-Translation.pdf>.

8. PEGIDA is FOR the utilisation and implementation of the already-available laws concerning asylum and deportation.
9. PEGIDA is FOR a zero-tolerance policy towards refugees or migrants convicted of offences.
10. PEGIDA is FOR resistance to misogynistic, violent, political ideologies, but NOT to Muslims living here and voluntarily self-integrating.
11. PEGIDA is FOR immigration, per the models of Switzerland, Australia, Canada and South Africa.
12. PEGIDA is FOR sexual self-determination!
13. PEGIDA is FOR the preservation and protection of the Judeo-Christian characteristics of the culture of the West.
14. PEGIDA is FOR the implementation of Citizens' Referendums, per the model of Switzerland.
15. PEGIDA is AGAINST the delivery of arms/weapons to anti- or un-constitutional organisations, e.g. the PKK.
16. PEGIDA is AGAINST the toleration of parallel societies, courts & laws in our midst, such as Sharia Law, Sharia enforcement & judges, etc.
17. PEGIDA is AGAINST the crazy "gender-mainstreaming" or, often, "genderising", politically-correct neutering of our language.
18. PEGIDA is AGAINST radicalism, equally whether religiously – or politically – motivated.
19. PEGIDA is AGAINST hate preachers, equally, whichever religion they belong to

Pegida can be considered the first organised European movement against Muslims and it is also a contemporary social and political movement, considering their presence on social media such as Twitter or Facebook¹⁴. Regarding its Facebook profile and network, a study has been conducted by *Süddeutsche Zeitung*¹⁵, a newspaper covering the south of Germany, and the analysis sustains the need of Facebook for Pegida activities, despite the fact that it is not possible to consider only Facebook, excluding the people who join the weekly meeting in Dresden every Monday afternoon. Furthermore, the network analysis does not focus on Pegida recruitment or its dynamics and it is difficult to clearly identify a Pegida supporter's profiling. A first attempt to carry out a profiling of supporters and participants was made by Prof. Dr. Hans Vorländer with his

¹⁴ <https://twitter.com/search?q=%23pegida>.

https://www.facebook.com/pegidaevdresden?ref=br_rs.

¹⁵ <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/ein-jahr-pegida-pegida-auf-facebook-hetze-im-sekundentakt-1.2806271>.

study “*Wer geht warum zu PEGIDA-Demonstrationen?*”¹⁶ – “*Who and why join the Pegida demonstration?*”.

The snapshot that emerged from this analysis is that: *the “typical” PEGIDA protester comes from the middle class, is well educated, employed, with a net income slightly above average for Saxon residents, is a 48-year-old male, belongs to no confession to, has no party allegiance and comes from Dresden and Saxony*¹⁷.

This first study gives us important information regarding the general profiles of Pegida participants and these characteristics can be understood within the local cultural context.

Another important feature to take into account for the Pegida social and political movement is their spatial development.

In fact at its very beginning, Pegida took place in Dresden, but after months of networking, it became a presence, not only locally¹⁸, but also in the whole European territory¹⁹, which is a typical feature of the general social movements, remembering No Global, Occupy Wall Street and many others.

No matter how difficult the profiling of Pegida supporters and participants is, it is anyway less relevant due to the unclear relations that exist between Pegida, the AfD and the NPD - Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands²⁰.

Indeed, as far as the NPD are concerned, it is important to remember that there is a trial for this party and its alleged unconstitutionality²¹.

In this context, some public opinion has determined that Pegida and the AfD are the same thing (Pegida und AfD sind dasselbe)²² as well as it being arduous to try to identify the differences between the Neo-Nazi organisations²³.

¹⁶ <https://tu-dresden.de/ressourcen/dateien/aktuelles/news/Downloads/praespeg?lang=de>.

¹⁷ In German in the text: *Der „typische“ PEGIDA-Demonstrant entstammt der Mittelschicht, ist gut ausgebildet, berufstätig, verfügt über ein für sächsische Verhältnisse leicht überdurchschnittliches Nettoeinkommen, ist 48 Jahre alt, männlich, gehört keiner Konfession an, weist keine Parteiverbundenheit aus und stammt aus Dresden oder Sachsen.*

¹⁸ For instance there are different names of Pegida according to the city where the movement takes place: Bo-gida: Bonn + Pegida = Bo-gida; Koegida: Koeln + Pegida = Koegida and so on.

¹⁹ http://www.huffingtonpost.it/2016/02/06/manifestazioni-pegida-calais_n_9177488.html.

<http://www.zeit.de/kultur/2016-02/pegida-ostdeutschland-fluechtlingskrise-ausgrenzung-10nach8>.

<http://www.zeit.de/gesellschaft/zeitgeschehen/2016-02/prag-rechtsextremismus-pegida-aktionstag>.

²⁰ <http://www.limesonline.com/oltre-la-cdu-lascesa-dellaltra-destra-in-germania/65838>.

²¹ <https://www.bundesverfassungsgericht.de/SharedDocs/Pressemitteilungen/EN/2013/bvg13-015.html>.

²² <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/fluechtlingskrise/studie-aus-dresden-pegida-und-afd-sind-dasselbe-14090416.html>.

<http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Wie-viel-NPD-steckt-in-Pegida-und-AfD-article17115496.html>.

²³ <http://www.sueddeutsche.de/politik/berlin-neonazis-und-rechtspopulisten-demonstrieren-in-berlin-1.2904579>.

Even if this scenario is true, Pegida cannot be considered to be the majority in terms of the German population and this is also clear by the demonstrations of some Germans and humanitarian organisations against Pegida²⁴.

Current German society and its features, such as social instability, political fragmentation, cultural discords, and economic fluctuations can be considered similar to the general situation in the other nations of the European Union.

According to this perspective, it is interesting to analyze the Pegida movement from a sociological approach, specifically from the sociology of collective behaviors and the implications that this movement will have on German governance and the resilience of the institutions.

It has already been stated that Pegida is a political and social movement, even if it is still waiting for formal legitimation.

Furthermore, Pegida is a social movement due to its sociological features (Fominaya, 2010), representing what can be defined as collective behaviour (Smelser, 1968):

- an “informal” action;
- be collective;
- aimed at changing a situation of conflict or tension;
- with the general scope of social order.

According to the author, the participants are considered deviants or antagonists, living in a state of anomia due to the social situation and their personal identity perception.

Touraine (1975) noted that each social movement takes place when a conflict is present within different sectors of the society. In this approach a conflict arises when a political or institutional transition has occurred and when there is the evidence of a diverse distribution of power.

This is what happened with Pegida: as written before, Pegida can be identified as the social response in the form of a collective process (Alberoni, 1968) from a part of the German population whose feelings and perceptions of insecurity were increasing due to the migration waves.

It is possible to assume that this social movement, like many others throughout human history, takes its social and cultural place due to the social diseases that are felt by living in Germany: even if there is a lack of

²⁴ <http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/inland/rechtsextremismus/wie-viele-weckrufe-braucht-sachsen-noch-14084958.html>.

<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/zehntausende-demonstrieren-in-dresden-gegen-pegida-a-1012353.html>.

<http://www.netz-gegen-nazis.de/artikel/argumente-gegen-pegida-9890>.

<https://www.change.org/p/1-mio-unterschriften-gegen-pegida-nopegida>.

statistical data, we can find a correlation between the facts that occurred in Germany, specifically in Cologne on New Years' Eve and during the Carnival, and the engagement in the Pegida demonstrations.

In the Pegida participant's profiling, what emerges is the low level of active participation of citizens in the institutional and political life of the nation²⁵. These attitudes seem to be quite common in the institutions in the European Union countries nowadays: the fragile bond between citizens and political parties or institutions refers to the sociological theory of the political process model and the relationship between society (or what we can also name civil society) and political power.

Furthermore, the Pegida movement can also be framed according to the three models of social movements identified by Melucci (1976; 1989) and based on the new social values considered by Inglehart (1997) and typical of postmodern societies.

For instance, Melucci (1995) argues that "*the empirical unity of a social movement should be considered as a result rather than a starting point*" and this is also sustained with the general theory on the Pegida movement, solving with this statement the dilemma that "a social movement is a product or a relational process".

Concerning the first item, we can consider Pegida as a product because it seems aimed at the solidarity between those common people who feel migrants such as a threat to the national political stability and the social order of the national society itself.

In this context, what is important to note is the overlapping of different social categories such as migrants, illegal migrants, refugees and Muslims. In fact, Pegida means nationalists against Muslim migrants, the first three categories – migrants and refugees – are referring to the legal and social status of a person, while the fourth element means a religious belonging that crosses through the other categories.

This perspective allows a discussion between the predominance of social categories and social values: the diverse perceptions and attitudes toward these two approaches determine the different levels of conflicts and anomia within Pegida itself: if you look at the migrants, you can accept them based on their legal status and national European legislative criteria, but how can you deal with the religious belief?

How can you evaluate the sense of belonging and religious spirit in each single person?

²⁵ <http://www.zeit.de/politik/deutschland/2016-03/werte-deutschland-identitaet-afd-fluechtlinge-integration>.

This is a point that takes us back to the difficulty of social categorisation and migrant profiling, but this is also a feature of the social movements themselves, aimed at improving the social control on what they consider to be a salient topic.

From this perspective and the preliminary analysis on Pegida, it is possible to affirm that it is a social product as well as a relational process.

It is important to consider that the German institutions and Federal authorities are reflecting on the same issues as Pegida: the immigration waves and the number of asylum seekers.

These are the two major topics of a publication (2013)²⁶ by the Bundesamt fuer Migration und Fluechtlinge or the Federal Office for Migration and Refugees, shrewdly entitled “Warum Deutschland?” meaning “Why Germany?”, asking why Germany is considered the destination of choice for one million, and more, refugees and migrants.

This document states that what is happening in Germany (but at the same time in other European countries) is a crucial social phenomenon, which has the power to reconstruct the image of the Nations themselves.

Continuing the analysis, the aim of aggregation and polarisation on the same ideology or cultural beliefs, are the founding features of Pegida, its founders and members who established, and try to maintain, a collective identity based on their manifesto and the common and cultural beliefs they hold.

The aggregation is itself a relational process meaning that there is a common language and the distinctive signs of group identity such as gadgets, slogans, etc.

The other element common to the other social movements are the presence of conflicts within the movement itself and outwardly against the others who think differently or who are Muslim migrants.


This feature also elicits a different distribution of power (Tilly, 1978) and resources which make the difference in the organisational structure as well as during the demonstrations.

This scenario makes a reflection on what can be called “resilience in transition or temporary resilience” possible.

Specifically the paradigm of a temporary resilience can be explained by the figure below, identifying a sort of conflict and tension able to create and maintain a new acceptable social order and stability.

The general framework is represented by the refugee and migrant crises.

²⁶ http://www.bamf.de/SharedDocs/Anlagen/DE/Publikationen/Forschungsberichte/fb19-warum-deutschland.pdf?__blob=publicationFile.

Figure 1 - *Resilience in Transition and Temporary Resilience*

What is shown in the previous figure is a vulnerable situation or at least a temporary resilience, meaning that the socialization process of resilience (Lucini, 2014) is trying to maintain the needed vital equilibrium of a nation in its previous form, waiting for the new one (i.e. effective migration policies).

Temporary resilience does not relate to any concrete timing, but instead it pertains to a provisional state or social situation.

Temporary resilience is what the European Union is undergoing with the current migration waves: a condition of uncertainty and vulnerable leading, causing lack of trust toward the political establishment.

Further, the resilience in transition means that the three components, as identified, are strictly interrelated and each resilience response has practical implications for the other two components; this also means that a resilience response is not yet organised in a central or decided way, and it is rising and falling according to public perception and related public engagement.

Until now, the establishment of Pegida and related (more or less) political parties means an underestimation of the value that resilience can add to the migrant policies' frameworks and on the operative implications in terms of immigration wave management, supply chain management, displacement, relocation, providing legal information and sharing knowledge on human rights.

The future development of this approach has to be aimed at including resilience as a sociological driver for the analysis of this social movement, but also considering the institutional response that the European Union has to

make within the immigration wave scenario and the correlated emergency response practices.

4. Discussion

What is important to consider for further discussions on this new social and political movement as well as the current situation in Germany and the European Union, are the implications and the effects that Pegida itself seems to have on the tourism industry in Dresden²⁷ and in other Laender cities, causing possible lower incomes, economically, in this sector for the next holiday season and the overall national image of the Federal Republic of Germany.

Despite this fact, other consequences of Pegida could be the increasing of political instability due to the ambiguous relationships among the Pegida, AfD and NPD parties. This can be viewed as a political problem, but it has direct effect on the international scenario and the role that these parties could play with other nationalistic parties such as those in France or Norway.

Furthermore, in the next few months we can expect an increase in the activities of Pegida and the related social tensions, aggressions and social conflicts due to the new immigration waves and the new migration policies between the main European countries and Turkey.

What seems very prophetic was the statement reported by Ronny Zasowk²⁸: *“Auch PEGIDA ist ein Stück Normalität, weil die Deutschen sich wieder öffentlich trauen, Probleme wie Ausländerkriminalität, Asylbetrug und Islamisierung nicht nur stoisch zur Kenntnis zu nehmen, sondern dagegen lautstarken Protest zu organisieren.*

Und so bleibt festzuhalten, dass in Dresden nicht die Schande, sondern die Zukunft Deutschlands auf die Straße ging” generally meaning that *“also Pegida is a piece of normality, because now German people are dealing with the problems of crimes perpetrated by migrants (or by illegal migrants); asylum fraud, islamization and people are now conscious about this situation so the future of Germany took to the streets”*.

This is an illuminating statement because it highlights the core issue of institutional and social resilience that is the need for an internal and external equilibrium.

Pegida is becoming the normality for many people, because it is able to give a cognitive and practical sense and meaning making to threatening events, or it is, at least, perceived in this way, which are not well addressed by

²⁷ <http://www.welt.de/reise/deutschland/article153419306/In-den-AfD-Hochburgen-sorgt-man-sich-um-den-Tourismus.html>.

²⁸ <https://npd.de/pegida-schande-oder-zukunft-fuer-deutschland>.

the public institutions and national authorities. It also focuses on the underestimated role that public engagement has on public opinion and the image of the nation.

Furthermore, Pegida can be thought of as the missing resilient response to the immigration waves and the social phenomena which can arise from the perceived threats and increasing sense of insecurity.

The current national and European migration policies have disclosed the internal vulnerabilities and social inequalities present in each country: for this reason people with the profile detailed before have been oriented to agree with Pegida, the AfD or the NPD.

These extremisms can be, of course, very dangerous for economic, political and social stability and this is the reason why we can sustain the resilience in a transition paradigm, where the borders of normality, normative issues and identities are transients.

Further comparative analysis will be conducted in order to test or modify the resilient paradigm explained previously.

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