La Rivista semestrale Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società intende la Sicurezza come una condizione che risulta dallo stabilizzarsi e dal mantenersi di misure proattive capaci di promuovere il benessere e la qualità della vita dei cittadini e la vitalità democratica delle istituzioni; affronta il fenomeno del Terrorismo come un processo complesso, di lungo periodo, che affonda le sue radici nelle dimensioni culturale, religiosa, politica ed economica che caratterizzano i sistemi sociali; propone alla Società – quella degli studiosi e degli operatori e quella ampia di cittadini e istituzioni – strumenti di comprensione, analisi e scenari di tali fenomeni e indirizzi di gestione delle crisi.

Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società si avvale dei contributi di studiosi, policy maker, analisti, operatori della sicurezza e dei media interessati all’ambito della sicurezza, del terrorismo e del crisis management. Essa si rivolge a tutti coloro che operano in tali settori, volendo rappresentare un momento di confronto partecipativo e aperto al dibattito.

La rivista ospita contributi in più lingue, preferendo l’italiano e l’inglese, per ciascuno dei quali è pubblicato un Executive Summary in entrambe le lingue. La redazione sollecita particolarmente contributi interdisciplinari, commenti, analisi e ricerche attenti alle principali tendenze provenienti dal mondo delle pratiche.

Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società è un semestrale che pubblica 2 numeri all’anno. Oltre ai due numeri programmati possono essere previsti e pubblicati numeri speciali.
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The new migratory flows and the narrow boundary with criminality: complexities and possible solutions

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Abstract
In the last decade, Europe has been affected by an unprecedented migratory flow: millions of people fleeing civil wars, poverty, persecution and continuing violations of fundamental human rights have crossed European borders in search of better living conditions. Europe, which does not provide for the possibility of legal entry for asylum seekers, has responded to the humanitarian crisis by increasing controls at external borders and implementing agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya, with the aim of reducing arrivals. The impossibility to enter legally in the European territory has meant that migrants are forced to turn to networks of human traffickers who, in agreement with the criminal gangs in the European destination countries, take care of the journey and the subsequent exploitation of migrants. The implementation of long-term solutions in Europe, combined with development programs to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin, are necessary to make migration a safe phenomenon, both for host countries and for the thousands of victims of conflicts and environmental disasters.

Key-words
Migration, trafficking, exploitation, criminal networks.
Human history is characterized by the constant mobility of individuals, groups and sometimes entire populations, from one region to another of the globe, searching for better conditions of life. Migratory movements are not only encouraged by economic motivations: over the last few decades, political crises, civil wars, persecutions and the continuing violations of fundamental human rights have caused collective movements with increasingly massive dimensions. Migrations are therefore induced by a combination of economic, environmental, political and social factors: the economic prosperity and political stability of the European Union attracted millions of foreigners, especially since the second post-war period.

However, since 2011, the year of the so-called “Arab Springs”, the living conditions of millions of people have drastically worsened, due to the continuing economic difficulties, the persistence of unstable dictatorial regimes, civil wars and the strong inequalities in access to food and water. According to the data released by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), 2016 was the year with the highest levels of migration ever recorded: 65.6 million people worldwide were forced to flee from their country.

According to the data reported in the UNHCR Global Trends Force Displacement 2016, about 55% of all refugees present in the world come from only three countries: there are 5.5 million refugees from Syria, from Afghanistan and South Sudan respectively 2.5 and 1.4 million.

According to UNHCR estimates, 51% of refugees are under 18 and 84% of refugees are hosted in economically backward regions of the world, where human rights are poorly protected and access to food and water cannot be guaranteed.¹

In the specific case of Europe, 2015 was the year of the largest number of asylum seekers arrivals: overall more than one million people arrived in the continent, of which over 150,000 in Italy and about 850,000 in Greece. However, in a desperate attempt to reach it, about 3,770 people lost their lives (including over 3,500 in the Mediterranean).

The maps published by the Missing migrant project of the International Organization for Migration (IOM), show the three main routes by sea: from western Libya, from the Turkish coasts and from Morocco to the Strait of Gibraltar.²

² OIM, Infographics/Maps, available at http://migration.iom.int/europe/.
The route that affects the central Mediterranean is, rightly, considered the most dangerous in the world\(^3\), and initially it could count on numerous ports of departure in several countries of North Africa; in recent years the focal point for refugee departures has become Libya, where thousands of people fleeing from many countries in Africa and the Middle East arrive, waiting to set sail on crumbling boats to the Italian coasts. In 2015, based on Frontex data, 157,220 fleeing people travelled this route, including over 38,000 Eritreans, 21,914 Nigerians and 12,430 Somalis\(^4\).

Although today the most massive flow of migrants gets into Europe through the central Mediterranean, the route of the Eastern Mediterranean still has some importance and for a long time it was considered the point of entrance to Europe: 885,000 people have crossed Turkey heading, via sea, to the Greek islands to avoid land borders and, overland, to Bulgaria. Among the main countries of origin there are Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq.

This route, unlike that of the central Mediterranean, sees the passage of entire families and, also for this reason, on the total deaths, many are of children: about two children per day are losing their lives along the so-called Balkan route\(^5\).

The western Mediterranean route, numerically less significant, involves mainly Morocco and Spain. The constant cooperation between these two countries has reduced the number of migrants entering Europe and many refugee camps near Ceuta and Melilla\(^6\) have been systematically dismantled by the Moroccan authorities. During 2015 about 7,000 migrants travelled this route, of which 1,991 from Guinea, 1,052 from Algeria and around 800 from Morocco\(^7\).

Eurozone states have reacted to the wave of migration by strengthening controls at external borders, considering the question of asylum seekers as a mere problem of security and public order.

\(^3\)The second most dangerous route in the world is that of Bengal, in the direction of Malaysia, where in 2015 about 800 people lost their lives; the third route is between Mexico and the USA, where they died 350 in 2015.

\(^4\) ANCI, Caritas Italiana, Cittalia, Fondazione Migrantes e Servizio Centrale dello SPRAR, in partnership with UNHCR, Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia, 2016, p. 18.

\(^5\) Ibid.

\(^6\) In the Moroccan territory there are the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, two autonomous towns overlooking the Mediterranean and still claimed by Morocco. Since they have a strategic geographical position, these cities are considered by migrants as possible access doors to Europe.

\(^7\) Rapporto sulla protezione internazionale in Italia 2016, cit., p. 22.
The uncontrolled flow of migrants affecting the European continent generates feelings of fear and insecurity, in extreme cases of racism and Islamophobia.

The refugee emergency is linked to issues related to the security of citizens, in particular because of the risk that the flows of irregular migrants can be used by terrorists to enter the EU. Although there is no direct correlation between the two phenomena, the fear of jihadist infiltrations remains.

The news that fifty suspected militants of the Islamic State had arrived in Italy between July and October 2017 has created concern: the list of names was drafted by Interpol and sent on November 29 to the Italian Ministry of the Interior, which informed the agencies of anti-terrorism in Europe. The news was then denied directly by the Department of Public Security, which stressed the importance of the Italy-Tunisia collaboration to report and block any subjects with a dangerous profile.

According to Europol statistics, Islamic terrorism is responsible for 0.7% of the terrorist attacks in Europe between 2006 and 2013. The remaining 99.3% is of another matrix.

Also the work of the Italian researcher Margherita Belgioioso, (British University of Essex) confirms a media overexposure of the jihadist attacks, which in the biennium 2014-2015 were 3.89% of the total, compared to those made by autochthonous neo-fascist groups, anti-Semitic, racist, antigitanist and Islamophobic.

Those who are guilty of terrorist attacks on European territory are foreigners mostly born and raised in Europe or who have resided there for a long time. However, the massive and uncontrolled entry of migrants into European territory in recent years has in some cases been exploited by extremists to send foreign fighters to carry out terrorist attacks (as in the case of the 2015 Paris attacks). The ideology of the Islamic State has a certain appeal not only on Muslims resident in Europe but more generally on that segment of the population that is least represented, forced to live on the margins of a society in which it does not recognize, now devoid of values of reference.

The uncontrolled arrivals of refugees and asylum seekers constitute an element of strong destabilization for the “host” societies. The lack of con-

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10 Idem.
trol of those who cross European borders makes the population vulnerable, generating feelings of growing insecurity and discontent; the perception of the absence of institutions in the maintenance of public order has led some extremists to rise up to defenders of the homeland, triggering violent reprisals against the immigrant population.

Furthermore, what should alarm governments and public opinion are the connections between illegal immigration and organized crime.

While States implement restrictive policies against migration, criminal groups invest in human trafficking, offering the services needed to reach Europe.

The criminal system that manages the traffics is well articulated and covers every phase of the migration process, from transport to the falsification of the necessary documents and the sorting of the illegal immigrants to the various destinations. Usually the criminal organizations manage the traffic of their own compatriots and they can count on the support of local cartels that allow them to operate also on the Italian territory. After the illegal trade in drugs and weapons, human trafficking is the most lucrative and it makes the organized crime gain several billion euros a year\(^2\).

Attempts to stem entrances to Europe by intercepting smugglers in the waters of the Mediterranean have not proved effective, because the network of traffickers has branched across the African continent, in the countries of origin and transit.

According to the Africa-Frontex Community Joint Report 2016, the main countries that migrants are forced to cross before arriving in Libya are Mali and Niger, which over the years have been able to exploit the desperation of refugees by implementing articulated smuggling networks and tracing, often with the support of local police forces, precise routes to reach the shores of the Mediterranean. The fact that local tribes are involved in these trades facilitates travel, both for the knowledge they have of the territory and thanks to the alliances stipulated between clans\(^3\). In Mali and Niger transit refugees mainly from Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Ghana, Senegal and Gambia. The “bosses” who manage human trafficking in Africa can count on a dense network of collaborators all over the continent and in particular on the support of

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\(^3\) Frontex, AFIC Report 2016, p. 14, available at http://frontex.europa.eu/assets/Publications/Risk_Analysis/AFIC/AFIC_2016.pdf. Transportation is most commonly provided by Tuareg, Toubou and Arab tribes who have operated throughout the Sahara for generations. It should be emphasized that the territories occupied by these ethnic groups extend beyond national borders, which means that the tribes are able to provide the necessary connections for the transport of people and goods in the desert.
Libyan security authorities. We also consider that in some cases there is a strong collusion between terrorists and organized crime, who work together to manage migratory flows, a particularly profitable and constantly growing business. Some smuggling networks are directly managed by terrorist groups, which over the years have dedicated themselves to illicit trafficking in drugs, weapons, diamonds and human beings: after causing situations of great internal instability and fear, the terrorists are responsible for managing the transfer of the fleeing population, crossing the state borders.

Trafficking of human beings has once again become predominant in the Balkan area, especially after the start of the Syrian crisis. In general, the smuggling activity can be divided into three sub-categories: trafficking of women (linked to prostitution), trafficking of children (especially Rom, forced to carry out theft or begging) and trafficking of men (from the perspective of labour exploitation).

Studies carried out by the European Parliamentary Research Service (EPRS), dating back to 2014, show that induction to prostitution is by far the most common form of trafficking in human beings and affects 61% of victims, 95% of whom women, compared to 25% of victims of exploitation at work (75% are men) and 14% linked to other forms of coercion14.

Traffickers promise a better life, in developed countries like those of Western Europe, offering accommodation and employment. Once they arrive at their destination, however, the victims are deprived of their identification documents and placed under the total control of the criminals. In the absence of financial resources, regular documents and a good knowledge of the language of the countries of arrival, the exploited are forced, under the use and threat of violence, to submit to the orders of their torturers.

The gains from smuggling activities are continuous and prolonged over time, compared to relatively lower risks related to arms and drug trafficking.

Refugees, convinced by deception or force to rely on the criminal organizations, come from the poorest countries in the world, characterized by a widespread instability that causes and feeds the same migratory phenomenon. Once arrived in Europe, migrants are mainly placed in the sector of the exploitation of prostitution and undeclared work.

Starting from 2014, the scourge of forced prostitution has reached alarming dimensions, involving thousands of women, often minors. The victims of this trafficking move from poverty to sexual slavery. The promise of a better future pushes them to start relying on traffickers and smugglers: they are in-

structed about the behaviour to be taken with the police once they have land-
ed and are then forced to sell themselves to repay the debt contracted to arrive
in Europe. The nightmare for these women begins before their arrival on
the Italian coasts: they are a bargaining chip to overcome the various check
points during the desert crossings and abused during their imprisonment in
the Libyan detention centres. Over the years, these sex slaves are increasingly
young, despite being forced to appear as adults on their arrival in Italy to
avoid being placed in more controlled refugee reception centres.

Even the problem of labour exploitation has taken alarming dimensions
and we have begun to talk about new slavery. We are talking about 400,000
people who, only in the Italian agricultural sector, suffer forms of extortion
and exploitation or are exposed to “caporalato”15 (labour boss), of which about
80% are migrants. In Italy there are 100,000 workers in the agricultural sector
subject to conditions of serious labour exploitation, that can be considered
slavery16. In Italy there are 80 distressed agricultural districts in which capo-
ralato is a common practice; of these, 33 exploit foreign laborers in working
conditions that can be defined as “indecent” and in 22 of them serious forms
of labour exploitation have been found. We are talking about people who are
particularly vulnerable and isolated from Italian society, who are recruited
at home and brought to work in Italy hoping to improve their condition, but
on arrival they are forced to repay the debt incurred for the trip and therefore
they are forced to work for 14 hours per day for 2 euros per hour17.

This sight of the phenomena brings out the other side of immigration,
not the one in which the clandestine is an outlaw, but one in which he is the
victim of continuous abuse and violence. In the current situation, criminal

15 The caporalato is based on the subtraction of part of the wages of workers, up to 50% of their
income on a daily salary that varies between 25 euros and 30 euros, for an average of 10-12
hours of work. The caporalato also impose a series of taxes to the workers: 5 euros for transport,
3.5 euros for the sandwich and 1.5 euros for each bottle of water consumed.
Marco Omizzolo, Tratta internazionale e sfruttamento lavorativo della comunità punjabi in
article/view/147/328.

16 Research points out that 62% of migrant seasonal workers engaged in agriculture do not have
access to essential services; 64% of them do not have access to water, while 72% have contract-
ed diseases (in particular musculoskeletal diseases) during working hours.
Marco Omizzolo, Tratta internazionale e sfruttamento lavorativo della comunità punjabi in
article/view/147/328.

17 Previous information regarding labour exploitation and the new slavery refer to M. Omizz-
olo, Il movimento bracciantile in Italia e il caso dei braccianti indiani in provincia di Latina
dopati per lavorare come schiavi, in Migranti e territori, ed. Marco Omizzolo e Pina Sodano
(Roma: Ediesse, 2015).
networks have become the only possibility for migrants to reach the European continent, because the current legislation does not allow legal entry also for those who need protection. A large proportion of migrants trying to cross the borders of the Union irregularly have the requirements that guarantee the right to a form of protection (under the 1951 Geneva Convention relating to the Status of Refugees and the EU Directive on International Protection Qualifications).

In an attempt to manage the phenomenon of migration, national and supranational authorities have primarily focused on two types of instruments, both internal and external. Thanks to the latter, intervening in the countries of origin and transit, short-term measures have been implemented (to limit the flows dismantling the networks of traffickers, blocking the borders and financing the security apparatus) or long-term (for example through financing to make transit and origin countries more stable). The internal instruments, on the other hand, concern reception procedures, social integration programs, but also border patrols and strict community legislation in this area.

Regarding European legislation on reception and asylum, reference is made in particular to the Common European Asylum System (CEAS), which establishes that the applicant has the right to apply for protection only once he has reached the territory of the Union. On the basis of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU), the EU Directive on common procedures for the recognition and revocation of the status of international protection was created. This Directive, which also highlights the importance of implementing a common European asylum policy, in Article 3, restricts its scope to applications for international protection presented in the territory of the Union, thus excluding applications for diplomatic or territorial asylum lodged at member states’ representations.

The 1951 Geneva Convention itself does not regulate any procedure for the recognition of the aforementioned status and therefore does not include

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18 Directive 2011/95 / EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 13 December 2011, Strasbourg, laying down rules on the allocation, to third country nationals or stateless persons, of the status of beneficiary of international protection, on a uniform status for refugees or for persons eligible for subsidiary protection and on the content of the recognized protection (recast).
20 In particular, Article 78 (2), subparagraph (d) […] the European Parliament and the Council, acting in accordance with the ordinary legislative procedure, shall adopt the measures relating to a common European asylum system including: […] d) common procedures for obtaining and losing the uniform status of asylum or subsidiary protection.
the possibility of applying for asylum to the diplomatic or consular representa-
tions of the member states in third countries\(^1\).

Likewise, the common visa policy also has a strongly restrictive footprint, particularly towards people from the so-called “risk countries”, which are more likely to generate large flows of applicants for international protection\(^2\): to reach the European Union and stay there, they must be in possession of an entry visa. However, we consider that, in order to obtain a Schengen visa, the foreigner is required to demonstrate particular requirements that are difficult to prove and must also guarantee that he has the sincere intention of returning to his country of origin when the entry visa expires, a requirement that a potential refugee, by definition, cannot satisfy.

The paradox is clear: individuals to whom our system guarantees rights of protection are forced to risk their lives to obtain them. Legitimate measures to combat irregular immigration and protect borders should not prevent refugees’ access to protection in the EU and should ensure respect for the fundamental rights of all migrants.

Although instruments (applicable on a purely voluntary basis) that allow applications for protection at diplomatic missions and therefore legally access to the territory of the Union are envisaged\(^3\), many member states continue to maintain an attitude of closure and participate in the humanitarian paths proposed by the UNHCR to an extent that is still too limited.

To fully understand the limitations of the current regulatory system on immigration and reception, a reflection on the direct and indirect effects of the Dublin Regulation is necessary: not only does it not provide criteria for concrete solidarity and fair sharing, but on the contrary, it imposes disproportionate burdens on some member states, in particular those at the border. What is most disputed to the Dublin system is the rule of the “state of first entry”\(^4\), which is not only obsolete, coercive and detrimental to the fundamental hu-


\(^2\) Considerando n.3 della direttiva 2004/83/CE del Consiglio, recante norme minime sull’attribuzione, a cittadini di paesi terzi o apolidi, della qualifica di rifugiato o di persona altrimenti bisognosa di protezione internazionale, nonché norme minime sul contenuto della protezione riconosciuta, 29 April 2004.


\(^4\) Ibid. M. Di Filippo, La circolazione dello straniero... cit., p. 257 e pp. 202-203.
man rights of migrants but it is also a strong obstacle to the implementation of internal solidarity25.

The Dublin regulation thus undermines the principle of solidarity between states: it is the same preamble to the Geneva Convention that states that, once granted the right to asylum, “exceptionally heavy obligations may arise for certain countries”, to be mitigated effective cooperation based on international solidarity.

The responses of individual European countries to the phenomenon remain individual and based on the logic of emergency and security26. An example is the recent refusal by Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic to fulfil the obligations dictated by the relocation tool, which provides for the division among the countries of the Union of refugees present in Italy and in Greece. The accusation of non-solidarity towards the border countries, strongly rejected by the states involved, was formalized on June 14th, 2017 by the European Commission, which initiated the infringement procedures for disregarded relocations.

In December 2016, thanks to the proposal of the European Commission, border controls were reintroduced between the countries of the Schengen area27, while some states opted for a total closure of the borders, reinforced by the construction of “anti-migrant walls” to prevent the entrances28.

With regard to the “external” management tools, the EU has given priority to a short-term approach, with immediate effect and dedicated to curbing the entry of migrants and asylum seekers, in order to ease the pressure on the Schengen and Dublin systems. Another type of solution, in the long term,

25 We talk about the complementary channels of access to protection in the member states: the Protected Entry Procedures (PEP), the use of Humanitarian Visas, Humanitarian Admissions and resettlement programs.
26 The general principle is: the competence to assess the asylum application is the first state in which the migrant has set foot illegally, by land, sea or air.
28 The 26 countries that signed the Schengen Treaty for the free movement of persons, with the approval of the European Commission, have the possibility to reintroduce border controls for six months, extending the period to two years in the event "the threat for security is combined with border issues such as those presented by the migration crisis ". Article available at http://www.stranieriinitalia.it/attualita/attualita/attualita-sp-754/ue-controlli-a-frontiere-area-schengen-per-3-anni-per-sicurezza-e-ordine-pubblico.html.
is the political, social and economic stabilization of the contexts of origin of the flow, thanks, among other actions of external engagement, to funds allocated to the development programs and to the strengthening of the security apparatus.

Since migration is a complex phenomenon, extremely sensitive and difficult to manage by individual states, in recent years a multilateral approach has been chosen, which envisages cooperation in particular between the countries of destination and transit of refugees.

To curb entrances, in March 2016, a series of actions were agreed with Turkey to limit migratory flows to Europe, in particular in order to limit entry into Greece, which in 2015 had been approximately 850,000. The experts have made many criticisms of a substantive, formal and procedural nature regarding various aspects of the cooperation agreement implemented, and in particular the possibility of fully considering Turkey as a “safe third country” has been questioned. Further violations arise from the repatriations, prepared by the Turkish authorities, of asylum seekers and refugees to countries of origin that cannot be considered safe, such as Syria, Iraq and Afghanistan, as well as documented cases of human rights violations, such as arbitrary detention, medical treatment denied and deprivation of legal representation. In the Greek islands the living conditions of refugees have deteriorated drastically over the last year; repatriations to Turkey are struggling to take off, making Greece a veritable open-air prison.

Again with the aim of putting a stop to arrivals, in February 2017 a cooperation pact was signed between the Government of National Reconciliation (GNA) of Libya and the Italian Government, under the chairmanship of Paolo Gentiloni.

Italy is committed to providing support and funds to development programs in the regions most affected by migration, as well as technical and technological support to the bodies responsible for fighting illegal immigration. Control of the terrestrial borders of southern Libya is crucial, as well as the financing of reception centres by Italy. The implementation of a more com-

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29 One example is the defensive walls built by Hungary and Macedonia. It should also be remembered that the reinstatement of border controls is practicable by virtue of Articles 25 and ss. present in Chapter II, Title III, of the Schengen Borders Code. European Commission, Member States’ notifications of the temporary reintroduction of border control at internal borders pursuant to Article 25 et seq. of the Schengen Borders Code, available at www.ec.europa.eu/dgs/home-affairs/.
31 These qualifications, as governed respectively pursuant to arts. 35 and 38 of Directive 2013/32 / EU, are essential to ensure that the implementation of measures, and in particular
prehensive and broader “Euro-African cooperation” to eliminate the causes of illegal immigration is also considered as a priority, in order to support the migrants’ countries of origin in implementing strategic development projects, level of service sectors, thereby improving living standards and health conditions, and contributing to the reduction of poverty and unemployment.”

However, it must be considered that the provision of funds to partners who are not really reliable, regardless of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, can be disastrous or at least not effective in order to reduce migratory pressure, especially considering that the same corrupt elites are often the ones causing mass displacements.

The Italian initiative has had the favour of European leaders, who have supported the proposal for collaboration with Libya and accepted the solicitation reported in art. 2 par. 4 of the agreement, concerning the desire for Euro-African cooperation. On the example of the Italian project, a summit was held at the Élysée on 28 August 2017, during which the French President Emmanuel Macron welcomed representatives of Germany, Italy and Spain to Paris; the leaders of Libya, Niger and Chad were also present.

The criticisms came immediately and they were very hard. Many NGOs and associations involved in the protection of human rights have denounced the Italo-Libyan cooperation agreement, in virtue of the inhumane conditions of life to which migrants are subjected in Libya, a country that, we recall, has never ratified the Geneva Convention 1951 on the status of refugees, thus releasing from any obligation to comply with the standards of protection.

32 The aid will flow into “different sectors, such as renewable energy, infrastructure, health, transport, human resource development, teaching, staff training and scientific research.” See art. 1 par. B of the Italy-Libya Agreement, text of the Memorandum, 2 February 2017, available at http://www.repubblica.it/esteri/2017/02/02/news/migranti_accordo_italia-libia_ecco_cosa_contiene_in_memorandum-157464439/.
Moreover, in November 2017, UN and UNHCR have made serious accusations against Europe and Italy, guilty of ignoring the inhumane conditions of refugees detained in Libya and collaborating with the Libyan Coast Guard to intercept and reject migrants in the Mediterranean.

According to the High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Raad al-Hussei, UN observers operating in Libya have been shocked by the inhumane conditions in which thousands of refugees are being held in detention centres. Of this shame the EU and the member states are accomplices “for not doing anything to reduce the abuses perpetrated on migrants” and for having entered into agreements with the Libyan government to stem the migratory flow.

The commitment to block departures from Libyan ports has significantly reduced the arrivals of boats on the Italian coast in the summer months of 2017: according to UNHCR data between January and June 2017, 83,000 people arrived, 18% more than in the same period in 2016, while between July and December 2017, 36,000 people arrived, 67% less than in the same period of 2016.

It should be noted that in July the landings fell by 51.3% compared to the previous year and in a month and a half (1 July-15 August 2017) a reduction of arrivals amounted to 43.3% compared to 2016 (13,539 against 31,285 year before).

However, the situation changed rapidly as the refugees modified their travel routes and new routes, perhaps even more dangerous, were inaugurated. Those who are in Libya, outside the detention centres, head west, to Tunisia and Algeria, where they wait for the smugglers, who organize the transfer on dilapidated boats to the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia. Those who have not yet arrived in Libya change their itinerary: from Sub-Saharan Africa it heads towards Morocco, to reach Spain, which in the last months of 2017 witnessed an increase in landings of 300%.

The strong political focus on mainly restrictive policies has not only led to a noticeable deterioration in the living conditions of asylum seekers in transit...
countries, but it has also not produced the desired results. Furthermore, the initiatives undertaken are based on the logic of the short term, while clearly the migratory phenomenon is characterized by structural and long-term problems.

According to the forecasts in the Global Trends 2030, the probabilities that further conflicts may explode in sub-Saharan Africa in the coming years remain high, as well as the risk of inter-state conflicts caused by the insufficiency of natural resources such as water and arable land. The political instability and internal rivalries that characterize many countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America will only exacerbate the civilian population. The possible changes that are taking shape within the international system, first of all the gradual “US disengagement”, will strongly impact on global security creating a strong instability, especially in South Asia and the Middle East. According to the Italian Institute of Strategic Studies, in the next 15-20 years, many States will continue to use terrorist groups to create a strong sense of insecurity. On the basis of this analysis, the countries of sub-Saharan Africa, Central America and the Caribbean will also remain highly vulnerable and unstable from now until 2030, becoming fertile ground both for the proliferation of terrorist and criminal networks that of local rebel groups. The increasing instability of countries already strongly in crisis will only cause an increase in the phenomenon of migration.

Moreover, within this context, mass migration is dangerously emerging as a political “weapon” in the hands of state and non-state actors. These projections highlight the ineffectiveness of the current European migration policy, geared only to the control of external borders and cooperation with countries of origin and transit to block the flow of migration. What appears to be an urgent need is also the reform of the Common European Asylum System, in order to facilitate access to protection outside the territory of the Union, by adopting and encouraging the creation of new legal entry channels in Europe. Furthermore, the revision of the Dublin Regulation is necessary, as it is detrimental to the principle of solidarity among the states of the Union due to the rule of “state of first entry”.

In 2016 there were 49 conflicts in the world\textsuperscript{39}, 815 million people suffering from hunger\textsuperscript{40}, 24.2 million environmental migrants\textsuperscript{41} and over 900 million of these ones those living below the poverty line\textsuperscript{42}: these and other motivations have pushed 65.6 million individuals to abandon their places of origin. Blocking the entrances without implementing development programs to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin will only force the refugees to change their migration route and to undertake increasingly dangerous journeys, relying only on criminal gangs and smugglers.

European states, promoters of freedom and equality, should work together to implement long-term solutions, with the aim of making migration a safe phenomenon, both for host countries and for the thousands of victims of conflicts and environmental disasters.

\textsuperscript{39} A. Ziniti, Le nuove rotte dei migranti. Dopo la stretta in Libia cambiano i percorsi per entrare in Europa, 03 September 2017.
\textsuperscript{42} Of these, two involved multiple states (India-Pakistan, Eritrea-Ethiopia) while the remaining 47 were classified as internal conflicts to the same state. Recent trends have shown that more and more often, during intra-state conflicts, foreign troops are involved in support of the different factions; for this reason, in 2016 one third of the conflicts (about 38\%) was internationalized and in a large part of these (13 out of 18) Islamist organizations were involved. SIPRI Yearbook 2017, Armed conflict and peace processes, 2017, available at https://sipri.org/node/4275.
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La Rivista semestrale Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società intende la Sicurezza come una condizione che risulta dallo stabilizzarsi e dal mantenersi di misure proattive capaci di promuovere il benessere e la qualità della vita dei cittadini e la vitalità democratica delle istituzioni; affronta il fenomeno del Terrorismo come un processo complesso, di lungo periodo, che affonda le sue radici nelle dimensioni culturale, religiosa, politica ed economica che caratterizzano i sistemi sociali; propone alla Società – quella degli studiosi e degli operatori e quella ampia di cittadini e istituzioni – strumenti di comprensione, analisi e scenari di tali fenomeni e indirizzi di gestione delle crisi.

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