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ICUREZZA TERRORISMO SOCIETÀ

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INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL - Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies



SICUREZZA, TERRORISMO E SOCIETÀ

INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL
Italian Team for Security,
Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies

4

ISSUE 2/2016

Milano 2016

EDUCATT - UNIVERSITÀ CATTOLICA DEL SACRO CUORE

SICUREZZA, TERRORISMO E SOCIETÀ
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL – Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies

ISSUE I – 4/2016

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Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano - tel. 02.7234.22.35 - fax 02.80.53.215

e-mail: editoriale.dsu@educatt.it (produzione); librario.dsu@educatt.it (distribuzione)

web: www.educatt.it/libri

Associato all'AIE – Associazione Italiana Editori

ISBN: 978-88-9335-108-9

copertina: progetto grafico Studio Editoriale EDUCatt

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RESEARCH ARTICLES

Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters: a quantitative analysis of radicalization risk factors

ALESSANDRO BONCIO

Abstract¹

The Italian jihadist scene with its fluid profile and features has been analyzed in different occasions by academics and experts. Their publications however, were conducted with a qualitative approach and, apart from some real cases description and analysis, there is a vacuum in the quantitative research that needs to be filled. This short paper is aimed at statistically analyzing data coming from some possible risk factors of violent jihadist radicalization proposed by the prevailing academic literature; the aim is to fill the abovementioned void in the research and promote a more thorough analysis to verify whether there are common denominators that can alert social workers and/or security services about individuals on the path of violent radicalization. The research is limited in sheer numbers and is related only to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) involved in the Syrian – Iraqi conflict. The data were collected by the author regarding individuals listed by the Italian government in the FTF national record, with information collected through open sources. The principal goal of this paper is to verify the subsistence of shared radicalization risk factors in the Italian FTFs milieu, highlighting the possible trajectories exploited by jihadist recruiters and propagandists. However, it is necessary to highlight the fact that this work is only a theoretical hypothesis, which necessarily has to be validated by other studies with a broader analysis sample. Furthermore, validation results should not be taken literally, being clear that a theoretical model remains disconnected from real case scenarios with their unique psychological, personal and societal dynamics.

Key Words

Terrorism, Foreign Fighters, Italy, Radicalization

1. FTF definition and generalities

Since the establishment of the so-called Caliphate in June 2014 by the self-proclaimed Caliph Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi², the foreign terrorist fighters

¹ Disclaimer: all the information originates from open sources and/or personal research and study. The expressed opinions as well as any mistake or inaccuracy in the text should be referred solely to the author.

² Ibrāhīm ‘Awwād Ibrāhīm ‘Alī al-Badrī al-Sāmarrā’ī, born in Iraq on 28 June 1971, self-proclaimed Caliph with the name Abu Bakr (the first Caliph in the Muslim history after the death of the

(FTFs) phenomenon has become of exceptional interest for intelligence apparatus and academic communities; so far, various researchers and institutions have developed definitions and historical context for this topic.

For the limited purpose of this paper, the author refers to the definition of FTFs listed by the UN Security Council Resolution 2178/2014³. Amongst academics, David Malet provided the most cited definition, classifying them as “non-citizens of conflict states who join insurgencies during civil conflict”⁴.

Despite being a completely new phenomenon, the SYRAQ conflict and subsequent FTFs mobilization has reached an unprecedented peak attested at around 30.000 by authoritative estimates⁵. In this paper the author will restrict the analysis only on FTFs involved in the abovementioned conflict despite the transnational nature of global jihadism and groups related to this ideology. In this context, Italy surely plays a marginal role in terms of sheer numbers, and due to its geographical collocation and historical/cultural value for Christianity, the threat assessment of this phenomenon favored a qualitative approach over a quantitative methodology.

Italy and the European Union are currently facing two different but interconnected security threats: the first one regards foreign terrorist fighters trained in Syria and able to execute a coordinated attack in Europe (so called “returnees issue”). Intelligence agencies in the U.S. and Europe have in fact issued warnings of possible future attacks in Europe like the ones witnessed in Paris and Brussels, highlighting the presence of a new European jihadist network made of returnees and “*conflict-commuters*”⁶.

The second threat is posed by the Islamic State (IS) and other salafi-jihadist groups influence and *jihadization*⁷ capability; large shares of Europeans

Prophet Muhammad) al Baghdadi (he states his heritage links him directly to the Prophet’s family).

³ “namely, individuals who travel to a State other than their States of residence or nationality for the purpose of the perpetration, planning, or preparation of, or participation in, terrorist acts or the providing or receiving of terrorist training”.

⁴ D. MALET, “Foreign Fighters: Transnational Identities in Foreign Conflicts”, *Oxford University Press*, 2013, p. 9.

⁵ B. BOUTIN ET AL., “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union; profiles, threats and policies”, *International Centre for Counter Terrorism – The Hague* (April 2016) http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2016/03/ICCT-Report_Foreign-Fighters-Phenomenon-in-the-EU_1-April-2016_including-AnnexesLinks.pdf.

⁶ V. POP, “Islamic State is Planning Further Terror Attacks on Europe, Says Europol”, *The Wall Street Journal*, January 25, 2016 <http://www.wsj.com/articles/islamic-state-is-planning-further-attacks-on-europe-says-interpol-1453726093>.

⁷ Researcher A. Boukhobza, noting the general meaning of the term radicalization and the absence of a widely agreed-upon definition reflecting a nuanced understanding of the phenomenon used the word “jihadization” in this context. A. Boukhobza, “Jouissances jihadistes: genèse d’une Haine-Intellectuelle”, PhD thesis manuscript, 2015. This neologism is intended by the author as “the last stage in a rapid process of radicalization towards violent jihadism, not (only) motivated by religious ideology”. Prerequisites to this last step are a prior cognitive

are exposed to such risk, this leading to the possibility of emulators and to the risk of low-level improvised attacks. IS recent strategy aims at shifting the Western countries focus from SYRQA, bringing the conflict into Europe and USA; this is why recent jihadist propaganda asks followers and sympathizers not to travel to Syria and/or Iraq, but to attack directly in their motherland⁸.

2. Italian FTFs general profile and data

The Italian foreign terrorist fighters situation has been having a minor impact on the society if compared with official figures of other Western European countries⁹. In the past, Italy has been mainly a logistic base for the global jihadist movement rather than a target, and the composition of the Italian *mujahidiin* network has always been fluid and diverse. Those individuals were not very influential if compared with similar networks in Great Britain or France, and they preferred to remain low-profile as Italy served mainly as a harbor and shelter.

Nevertheless, in light of the exceptional ISIS appearance, its current prominence in the jihadist arena and effective media exploitation, it is necessary to re-assess figures and real meaning also in countries like Italy where the numbers are almost irrelevant at a first glance.

The Italian Muslim community amounts to around 1.8 of the 61 million inhabitants¹⁰, but the data are spurious because they do not take into account the illegal migrant flows. Estimates about conversions are around 4000 per year¹¹ and growing steadily.

opening (Q. WIKTOROWICZ, “Radical Islam rising” Muslim extremism in the West”, *Rowman & Littlefield Publishers Inc*, 2005, p. 20-23) towards fundamentalist beliefs (often motivated by trigger factors) and a polarization of positions distancing oneself from the society as a result of exposure to radical propaganda.

⁸ M. CHMAYTELLI ET AL., “Islamic State calls for attacks on the West during Ramadan in audio message” *Reuters*, May 22, 2016 <http://www.reuters.com/article/us-mideast-crisis-islamicstate-idUSKCN0YC0OG>.

⁹ Exhaustive data are difficult to obtain due to the impossibility to ascertain how many residents left the countries and effectively joined the conflict in Syria/Iraq. Moreover, not all the European countries are facing the same occurrence, as the official figures show us; B. Boutin et al., “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union; profiles, threats and policies”, op. cit., p. 4.

¹⁰ Data from the IDOS Studies and Research Center 2014 Statistical Dossier on Immigration www.dossierimmigrazione.it/index_en.php The data are also roughly confirmed by the UCOII (Union of Islamic Organizations in Italy): R. Bongiorno “Cresce il peso delle comunità musulmane” *Il Sole 24 Ore* (January 8, 2015) <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-01-08/cresce-peso-comunita-musulmane-063622.shtml?uuid=ABsVOWaC>.

¹¹ Since the Muslim community has no formal clergy, there is no central institution registering Islam’s adherents or keeping track of the number of conversions. Furthermore, the process of

Italy is historically and culturally deep-rooted in Catholicism and, therefore, conversions to Islam are growing at a lower rate in comparison with other European countries. Just a microscopic percentage of the Muslim community embrace an extremist interpretation of Islamic doctrines, and an even smaller number join a jihadist group. There are certain areas in Italy with different reports of jihadist penetration and proselytism, but the vast majority of the Italian Muslim community is well integrated and lives in accordance with democratic principles.

During a 2014 NATO workshop¹² regarding the FTFs phenomenon, an Italian official stressed the fact that Italy considers homegrown terrorism as “terrorist activities or plots perpetrated within a country or abroad by three different categories of individuals”:

- Italian citizens: converts and second-generation diaspora Muslims;
- *Sociological citizens*, as termed by L. Vidino¹³;
- Visitors: workers or students with a temporary residence certificate radicalized largely within the country.

According to recent reports¹⁴ 16 Italian citizens coming from Italy (of them, two are presumed dead and six others have double citizenship) went to SYRQA. In the second group of sociological citizens fit another 15 individuals coming from Italy. As to the third category, 67 fighters are comprised in that group, bringing the total number to 98¹⁵. Notably, to this amount another

converting to Islam consists of a simple ritual, which requires no formal registration. In order to become Muslim, a person simply speaks out the *šhahāda* (declaration of belief in the oneness of God and acceptance of Muhammad as his Prophet) in front of two Muslim witnesses. Therefore, estimates referring to the number of converts have to be regarded as dubious. M. Uhlmann “Home and Belonging in a Semi-Diasporic Setting: Converts to ‘Reflexive Islam’ in ‘West European Societies’” in F. Kläger and K. Stierstorfer (ed.), “Diasporic Constructions of Home and Belonging” *De Gruyter*, 2015; p. 207-226, 214.

¹² NATO Centre of Excellence Defence against Terrorism “Homegrown Terrorism, causes and dimensions” (June 3-4, 2014) http://www.coedat.nato.int/publication/workshop_reports/02-Homegrown_Terrorism_Workshop_Report.pdf

¹³ According to Vidino’s definition, sociological citizens are legally permanent residents raised in a country (although originally coming from another), who absorbed the local culture, values and social perception of events. L. Vidino, “Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy. Birth, development and radicalization dynamics” *Istituto per gli Studi di Politica Internazionale* (April 2014) www.ispionline.it/it/EBook/vidino-eng.pdf.

¹⁴ The figures were updated by the author adding more recent data to the Italian Defense Minister statement of September 20, 2015 <http://www.ilsole24ore.com/art/notizie/2015-09-20/pinotti-file-dell-isis-87-foreign-fighters-passati-dall-italia-170441.shtml?uuiid=AC51QL1>.

¹⁵ Figures were updated by the Italian Police Chief during the hearing at the Committee for the Security of the Italian Republic on April 26, 2016. <http://www.quotidiano.net/terrorismo-foreign-fighters-1.2100450>.

88 individuals should be added: they were expelled from Italy for public safety and security reasons from the beginning of 2015¹⁶.

3. Analysis of radicalization risk indicators

As noted by various researchers, is not possible to delineate a common path towards radicalization since so many unique elements concur to the individual mental and ideological process. From a counter terrorism perspective, what is particularly worrying is that the process of radicalization is occurring quickly and more anonymously in the Internet age than only one generation ago. Human interactions are limited and an assessment of the individual radicalization is often based on “digital elements”¹⁷; this create a shadowy zone of people expressing extreme ideas, resentment and hatred against Western countries policies. Does it represent a terrorist activity? The answer should be a sound denial, but at the same time it requires a necessary multiagency monitoring activity to better understand grievances and try to intervene where and when necessary.

Apart from the official Italian figures regarding deceased, arrested or still active FTFs, there is a *grey area* of individuals, places and situations that are constantly monitored by the intelligence apparatus. Some 1200 “sites of interest” are in the intelligence list, as well as 300 individuals. Places like mosques and cultural centers, but also private houses, shops, restaurants, internet points are under scrutiny; furthermore, among the 300 known radicals under examination, at least one third have an “extremely complex and problematic profile”¹⁸.

As already stated, it is the academics prevailing opinion that a unique path of radicalization cannot be determined; however, common features are observed worldwide and are commonly associated to guidelines used in Counter Violent Extremism (CVE) programs to counter radicalization and extremist propaganda. Therefore, a simple statistical analysis on those risk indicators can hopefully offer a useful tool to better understand dynamics and patterns linked to violent radicalization paths in Italy.

¹⁶ P. LAMI, “Terrorismo, espulsi i genitori di due marocchini jihadisti radicalizzati”, *Il Secolo D'Italia*, May 20, 2016 <http://www.secoloditalia.it/2016/05/terrorismo-espulsi-i-genitori-marocchini-jihadisti-radicalizzati/>.

¹⁷ “Keyboard jihadists” is another term proposed by L. Vidino to address individuals on an intermediate stage of radicalization, on the path to violent action. L. Bianchi, “Abbiamo chiesto a un esperto quanto è seria la minaccia del jihadismo in Italia”, *Vice News*, February 9, 2015 <http://www.vice.com/it/read/jihadismo-autoctono-italia-intervista-lorenzo-vidino-649>.

¹⁸ C. GIUDICI, “Garage, scantinati, kebab. Ecco i luoghi dove si prepara il terrore in Italia”, *Il Foglio*, January 16, 2016 http://www.ilfoglio.it/cronache/2016/01/16/garage-scantinati-kebab-ecco-i-luoghi-dove-si-prepara-il-terrore-in-italia___1-v-137105-rubriche_c422.htm.

However, it must be underlined that the present research is limited and needs further, in depth analysis. For his purpose the author used only available open source information, so a validation with sensitive data, and on a more broad sample, is required. Moreover, confirmation of the analysis hypothesis should not be considered as a perfect match with real life scenarios. Black swans are always around the corner and every theoretical model is always a generalization of real cases with their unique psychological, emotional, personal and societal dynamics.

Nevertheless, according to the results from the limited analysis completed on the Italian FTFs, it is possible to extrapolate interesting hints on their general profile and background.

3.1 Methodology

The study sample is composed of forty individuals out of the ninety-eight officially listed Italian FTFs (40,8%). The list includes Italian citizens (35%), sociological citizens (30%) and visitors (35%). The examined individuals are young adults ranging from seventeen to forty-two years of age and they include persons of Italian, North African, Balkan and Middle Eastern origin. In the sample there are eight women (20%) and thirty-two men (80%). Altogether, it is a comprehensive view that collects the Italian societal insights with its differences and similarities.

The data were collected and confirmed through multiple open sources, mostly in Italian language; out of 280 entries (seven indicators for forty individuals) only fourteen information are missing; it was not possible to find open source news regarding some risk indicators, mainly because some visitors had no previous media coverage nor accessible biography.

The seven risk indicators, already mentioned and qualitatively analyzed by academics are the following:

- Age (at the time of their *hijra*/arrest/expulsion): jihadist groups are primarily focused on late teens, early twenties individuals for their recruitment activities due to the fragility and the incomplete development of their mind¹⁹. Besides, young age is associated with an unsophisticated vision of the world, and (especially for second generation Muslim diaspora) with social grievances²⁰;
- Criminal record: well aware of the prison role as incubators of violent radicalization, academic literature analyzed in recent years the relationship

¹⁹ See K. Ramakrishna, "Understanding youth in the age of ISIS: a psychosocial analysis", *E-International Relations*, February 11, 2016 <http://www.e-ir.info/2016/02/11/understanding-youth-radicalization-in-the-age-of-isis-a-psychosocial-analysis/>.

²⁰ J. HORGAN, "The search for the terrorist personality", in A. SILKE (ed.), "Psychological perspectives on terrorism and its consequences", *John Wiley & Sons Ltd.*, 2003, p. 3-27.

between periods spent into correctional institutes with individuals thought extremization²¹; the prevailing literature links radicalization to the inmate violent environment and the exposure to extremist thoughts²². Prisons bring together alienated people who may be receptive to anti-social messages offering violent solutions to complex personal and/or societal problems²³.

- Employment: some researches showed a correlation between lack of employment (or an unqualified job) with a radicalization path²⁴; frustration and a sense of perceived social injustice are probably the main factors exploited by jihadist recruiters; nonetheless, a new trend shows young and skilled professionals leaving their country to live and work in an idealized Islamic state²⁵;
- Family situation: some researchers argue that a poor or absent parental supervision, or the presence of a violently radicalized member in the family are risk factors for youngsters to become offenders before age twenty²⁶; despite recent events of entire (or partial) family *jihadization*²⁷, it is still debated if the abovementioned factor can also influence jihadist radicalization²⁸;
- Attitude towards religion; according to O. Roy, nowadays we are witnessing an “Islamization of radicalism, rather than a radicalization of Islamism”²⁹; swift change of religious behavior and rapid conversions are usually as-

²¹ R. ROWE, “From jail to jihad? The threat of prison radicalization”, *BBC Panorama*, March 12, 2014 <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-27357208>.

²² T.M. VELDHUIS, “Prisoner radicalization and terrorism detention policy”, *Routledge*, 2016, p. 49.

²³ J.P. BJELOPERA, “American Jihadist Terrorism: Combating a Complex Threat”, *Congressional Research Service*, 2013, pp. 23-25.

²⁴ A. RABASA, C. BENARD, “Eurojihad. Patterns of Islamist radicalization and terrorism in Europe”, *Cambridge University Press*, 2015, p. 66.

²⁵ F.M. MALOOF, “ISIS recruiting engineers, doctors, accountants, reporters”, *WND.com*, February 2, 2015 <http://www.wnd.com/2015/02/isis-runs-help-wanted-ads-for-professionals/>.

²⁶ As confirmed by A.P. Schmid, a solid family with a positive father figure is a resilience factor against youngsters radicalization. A.P. SCHMID – J. TINNES, “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: a European perspective”, *International Centre for Counter-Terrorism*, December 2015, p. 40 <http://icct.nl/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/ICCT-Schmid-Foreign-Terrorist-Fighters-with-IS-A-European-Perspective-December2015.pdf>.

²⁷ See as example the case of A. Brignoli and M. Koraichi who left Italy to live in the IS controlled territories with their three children. A. BIONDANI, “Ecco Alice l’italiana nel Califfato coi figli”, *L’Espresso*, March 18, 2016 <http://espresso.repubblica.it/attualita/2016/03/18/news/ecco-alice-l-italiana-nel-califfato-coi-figli-1.254571>.

²⁸ L. DAWSON, “Trying to make sense of home grown terrorist radicalization: the case of the Toronto 18” p. 64-91 in P. BRAMADAT – L. DAWSON, “Religious radicalization and securization in Canada and beyond”, *University of Toronto Press*, 2014.

²⁹ O. ROY, “La paura dell’Islam”, *RCS Media Group S.p.A.*, 2016, pp. 28-29.

sociated with a poor understanding of Islamic tenets and as one of the ideological factors linked to violent radicalization³⁰.

- Technological skills: communication technologies (smartphone applications, encrypted messages, and social networks) play a crucial role in the development of the threat of international jihadism so that technological expertise boosts the grassroots radicalization process. Furthermore, radical messages spread via the Internet both inspire and mobilise individuals and networks, serving as a “virtual training camp”³¹;
- Second generation Muslim diaspora. The identity crisis for Muslim youngsters born and raised in European Western countries, as well as the issue of social integration in such states is often observed as a risk factor of exposure to extremist ideas³². Individuals with a Muslim family background, but living in a Western secular society, can experience a general sense of marginalization linked to their religion, a feeling that can be exploited by jihadist recruiters and proselytizers.

3.2 Findings

Despite a required review of the information on a wider sample, some basic considerations can be drawn from this preliminary analysis:

1. Almost all the individuals in the sample experienced a swift return to Islamic principles and beliefs (72,5%), and in case of converts (20%), the process was not lengthy at all. This feature confirms the common sudden process of *jihadization* of youngsters, since they often lack critical instruments to analyze and deconstruct violent propaganda and narratives³³:

³⁰ Especially for the case of converts, the process of internalization of Islam is a long and in many cases painful path. M. Uhlmann states that converts have a pronounced cognitive and individualized access to Islam; she refers to this process as conversion to “reflexive Islam” to distinguish them from the short time-span radicalization processes usually associated with *jihadization*. M. UHLMANN, “Choosing Islam in Wes European societies – an investigation of different concepts of religious re-affiliation” *European University Institute – R. Schuman Centre for advanced studies*, December 2015, pp. 5-11, <http://cadmus.eui.eu/handle/1814/38204>.

³¹ Vv.AA., “Violent Jihad in the Netherlands. Current trends in the Islamist terrorist threat”, *Ministry of Interior and Kingdom Relation*, 2006, p. 43. R. Simcox, “we will conquer your Rome”. A study of Islamic State terror plots in the West”, *The Henry Jackson Society – Centre for the Response to Radicalisation and Terrorism*, September 2015, p. 53 <http://henryjacksonsociety.org/2015/09/29/we-will-conquer-your-rome-a-study-of-islamic-state-terror-plots-in-the-west-2/>.

³² L. VIDINO, “Homegrown jihadist terrorism in the United States: a new and occasional phenomenon?” p. 469-484 in J. HORGAN – K. BRADDOCK, “Terrorism Studies. A reader”, *Routledge*, 2012. A.P. SCHMID – J. TINNES, “Foreign (Terrorist) Fighters with IS: a European perspective”, op. cit., p. 34.

³³ This is especially true for the *digital* environment where youngsters often search for guidance and blindly trust the findings. “Preventing Radicalisation to Terrorism and Violent Extremism. Approaches and practices”, *Radicalisation Awareness Network* 2016, p. 157 <http://ec.europa>.

those who converted were probably fascinated by jihadist ideology even before or at the same time of embracing Islam.

2. Thirty-three subjects are fluent with new technologies, social networks and digital communication (82,5%). Seven of them are real experts (17,5%), thus confirming the nature of the last transnational jihadist wave, hyper-connected and radicalized mainly through the Internet. In Italy this trend was observed since the early 2000's with a lot of "self-recruited" individuals among the local jihadist milieu³⁴.
3. Youth seems to be another common denominator of this phenomenon: apart from a seventeen years old boy³⁵, twenty-one people in the examined sample range between eighteen and twenty-seven years of age (52,5%), fourteen others are between twenty-eight and thirty-seven years of age (35%) and only four are more than thirty-seven years old (10%). It is undoubtedly easier to influence young idealistic minds especially providing a dichotomous (good/evil) vision of the world that gives to such individuals a sense of belonging, very much needed by young, insecure people³⁶.
4. Nineteen individuals were living in dysfunctional or problematic families (47,5%) at the time of their arrest or when they decided to leave for SYRQA; young individuals with no role models at home may seek different figures and behavioral patterns elsewhere. Moreover, it must be remembered that young age, even if associated with a normal family environment, can spark possible generational contrast, furthering the risk of violent radicalization. However, these findings should be necessarily revised in light of the absence of information on six individuals (15%).
5. At least twenty-three persons in the sample were not employed (57,5%) and fourteen of them had an occasional job or an unskilled one (35%). The lack of a job (or a frustrating/alienating working position) is usually considered

eu/dgs/home-affairs/what-we-do/networks/radicalisation_awareness_network/ran-best-practices/docs/ran_collection-approaches_and_practices_en.pdf.

³⁴ As stated by S. Dambruoso, former Italian Public Prosecutor in many investigations related to terrorism. L. VIDINO, *Home-Grown Jihadism in Italy. Birth, development and radicalization dynamics*, op. cit., p. 8.

³⁵ Mahmoud Ben Ammar was recruited in 2015 on the internet by Albanians ISIS affiliated resident in Turin. The boy, who expressed the desire to become a FTF, after an internal struggle decided not to leave for SYRQA and informed the Italian police who arrested the recruiters. W. PETENZI, "ISIS, per la Cassazione Brescia ha fatto scuola: quello fu arruolamento", *Il Corriere della Sera*, October 15, 2015 http://brescia.corriere.it/notizie/cronaca/15_ottobre_15/isis-elvis-elezi-wilma-petenzi-procura-brescia-cassazione-bceaf93e-7348-11e5-b973-29d2e1846622.shtml.

³⁶ F. KHOSROKHAVAR, "Inside jihadism: understanding jihadi movements worldwide", *Routledge*, 2016, p. 196.

as a trigger factor leading to violent radicalization³⁷. Unemployment in fact may lead to “*life-turns*” hoping to gain a professional position within IS current “*state building*” phase. Percentages in this section are incomplete, as the Author was not able to collect information on three cases (7,5%).

6. Thirteen people had a criminal record (32,5%) before leaving for SYRAQ (or being arrested before doing so). This finding is however spurious because five persons were 18 years old at the time of *hijra*/arrest, with an obvious downward influence on the statistical percentage. Conversely, 55% of the examined individuals had no previous criminal charges (22 subjects) while there was no information available on five cases (12,5%). The Italian findings regarding the association between crime history and jihadism are at least questionable; however, almost one third of the analyzed sample has had some justice issue, and prisons are known incubators of extremist thoughts and violent ideas.
7. Finally, a particular note is about second-generation Muslims immigrants; twenty-two persons (55%) out of those sampled are children of first generation Muslim migrants. In Italy, this issue is yet to develop its full potential, but partial indications tend to confirm similar trends from other European countries. Italy in fact was interested by massive migration flows only from the '80s, while the end of World War II brought the first wave of Muslim diaspora into other European countries; this is especially the case of France, Germany, Belgium and United Kingdom, that nowadays (and not by coincidence) account for more than half of the European FTFs currently in SYRAQ³⁸.

4. Similarities with the European situation and Italian features

The growth of the FTF phenomenon in Italy follows the European trend, even though it is slightly lagged in reacting to external stimuli. In May 2014 (before the establishment of the so-called Islamic State Caliphate) there were some 30 Italian *mujahidiin*; in January 2015 the total was 53 (+76%); in May 2015 the number reached 74 (+39,6%); in September 2015 the total was of 87 individuals (+17,5%)³⁹. Finally, in April 2016 the figures are indicated at 98 (+12,6%).

³⁷ M. DUNNE, “is unemployment to blame for radicalization?”, *World Economic Forum*, May 22, 2015 <https://www.weforum.org/agenda/2015/05/is-unemployment-to-blame-for-radicalization/>.

³⁸ B. BOUTIN ET AL., “The Foreign Fighters Phenomenon in the European Union; profiles, threats and policies” op. cit., p. 3.

³⁹ A. BONCIO, “Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters. Numbers, features and case studies”, *International Security Observer*, November 16, 2015 <http://securityobserver.org/italian-foreign-terrorist-fighters-numbers-features-and-case-studies/>.

Apart from isolated cases⁴⁰, the striking and rapid rise of ISIS heavily influenced youngsters in Italy as well as in the rest of Europe, giving them a sense of belonging (especially after the Caliphate “establishment”) and the idea of a new direction in life⁴¹.

An interesting feature is a certain overrepresentation of ethnic *mujahidiin* from the Balkans, while the number of North Africans among the Italian foreign terrorist fighters is lower⁴². It may appear surprising since Muslims with North African origin represent the larger community settled in Italy and the biggest share of the recent immigration wave.

The explanation for this situation is probably twofold. Italy’s first substantial immigration flow from North Africa begun in the 80’s. For this reason, the second-generation Muslim diaspora is nowadays reaching adult age, thus influencing the rate of radicalized individuals.

The second possible cause is related to the ongoing turmoil in Libya, Egypt and Tunisia. ISIS expansion into those gave North Africans a different chance to wage jihad. Moreover, the Maghreb region is easier to reach from Italy and they already have connections, know the social environment and the political situation.

Overall, the Italian jihadist milieu is in line with the rest of the European landscape; it might be represented as a smaller version of the German setting, with high number of unemployed and undereducated people among its ranks, often composed of individuals with previous criminal records. Quite differently from the British jihadist network, usually better educated and integrated and with more qualified jobs⁴³.

⁴⁰ Giuliano Delnevo was the first Italian convert to die in Syria in 2013 as a shahid. He apparently fought with the al-Nusra front, but was allegedly disappointed with their leadership in some notes written on his personal diary. E. DELLACASA, “Il diario di ‘Ibrahim’, jihadista genovese: capi in hotel, noi in tenda”, *Il Corriere della Sera*, August 24, 2014, http://www.corriere.it/esteri/14_agosto_24/diario-di-ibrahim-jihadista-genovese-capi-hotel-noi-tenda-e654d982-2b61-11e4-9f19-fba1b3d7cb6f.shtml.

⁴¹ “Foreign Fighters. An updated assessment of the flow of foreign fighters into Syria and Iraq”, The Soufan Group, December 2015, p. 6, 10 http://soufangroup.com/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/TSG_ForeignFightersUpdate3.pdf.

⁴² This is the case for the official list of 98 Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters; in the examined sample for this research twenty-one individuals are of Maghrebi origin or descent (some of them are Italian citizens), while only nine persons come from the Balkan region.

⁴³ R. AHMED, D. PISOIU, “Foreign fighters: An overview of existing research and a comparative study of British and German foreign fighters” – *Centre for European Peace and Security Studies*, December 2014, https://ifsh.de/file-ZEUS/pdf/ZEUS_WP_8.pdf

5. Conclusion. Further researches

This preliminary study, quantitatively analyzed the relationship between some risk factors of violent radicalization with the growth of the current Italian jihadist generation. Within the terrorist threat assessments published by various institutions and authors, the extreme fragmentation of the human factor and a quicker process of violent radicalization are the norm⁴⁴. Home-grown jihadism is a solid reality for IS and the Qa'idist movement as a whole; youngsters identity crisis, intra and extra societal factors, lack of reference models are a fertile ground for skilled recruiters and proselytizers. IS presents a simplistic vision of the world, immediately accessible for the youth searching for an appealing ideology to build a sense of belonging and change their position in the society, going “*from zero to hero*”, chasing their dream in SYRQA with the newly established Islamic state⁴⁵.

Another reason that stimulated this research is the necessity of de-radicalization programs, useful to defuse this downward spiral and intervene when needed. Many wannabe foreign terrorist fighters fall into violent jihadism as a result of period of personal distress; psychological, economic, personal difficulties are not vehicles towards radicalization, but factors that increase the risk. It is necessary to develop a comprehensive approach to enhance the resilience of individuals to jihadist narratives and to de-radicalize (permanently) those already under this spell⁴⁶.

The Italian situation has not yet developed all the push and pull factors related to the radicalization of individuals who decide to join the conflict in SYRQA and become foreign terrorist fighters. The preliminary outcome of this research shows that some indicators are (at the moment) more relevant than others in shaping a “national” general radicalization pathway model, and hopefully more researches will be published to refute and/or confirm the findings.

Other factors and elements should be examined and linked to the unique societal and historical situation of Italy as cradle of Christianity in order to

⁴⁴ As proposed in 2005 by jihadist ideologue Mustafa Setmariyan Nasar, better known as Abu Musab al Suri in his e-book “A call to global Islamic resistance”; in his lengthy book he foresaw a new generation of jihadists with no direct link to the central leadership, training and learning by themselves in independent, individual terror cells. D. Samuels, “The new mastermind of jihad”, *The Wall Street Journal*, April 6, 2012, <http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052702303299604577323750859163544>.

⁴⁵ V. PREMAZZI, “From zero to hero, women and men attracted by the Islamic State”, *Oasis Center*, February 5, 2016, <http://www.oasiscenter.eu/articles/jihadism-and-violence/2016/02/05/from-zero-to-hero-women-and-men-attracted-by-the-islamic-state>.

⁴⁶ G. SABATO, “Nella mente del terrorista. Strategie di prevenzione”, *Le scienze – Italian edition of Scientific American*, April 23, 2016 http://www.lescienze.it/news/2016/04/23/news/terrorismo_prevenzione_psicologia_radicalismo_culti-3063513/.

have a clearer picture of the Italian FTFs phenomenon. However, the author's hope is that this first quantitative research will be at least useful in shaping a priority list of warning elements related to the violent radicalization process in the country.

Annex 1

RADICALIZATION RISK FACTORS FOR ITALIAN FOREIGN TERRORIST FIGHTERS

	NAME	AGE AT DATE OF HIJRA/ARRIST	CRIMINAL RECORD	EMPLOYMENT	FAMILY ENVIRONMENT	ATTITUDE TOWARDS RELIGION	TECHNOLOGY SKILLS	SECOND GENERATION MUSLIM DIASPORA
1	G. DENEVO	23	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	CONVERT	YES	NO
2	M.G. SERGIO	25	NO	NO	NORMAL	CONVERT	YES	NO
3	M. SERGIO	30	NO	NO	NORMAL	CONVERT	YES	NO
4	W. KORALCHI	24	NO	WAITRESS	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
5	A. MOUTHARRIK	24	NO	WORKER	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
6	M. SCANNIMANICA	25	NO	NO	NORMAL	CONVERT	EXPERT	YES
7	S. COSTANTINI	18	NO	NO	NORMAL	CONVERT	EXPERT	YES
8	A. EL-AROUBI	21	YES	NO	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	YES
9	M. REHALI	18	NO	NO	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	NO
10	E. HODZA	27	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	NO
11	A.R. NAUROZ	36	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	NO
12	A. BRIGNOLI	32	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	CONVERT	YES	NO
13	M. KORALCHI	30	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
14	B. GAROUAN	28	YES	FARMY-HAND	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	YES
15	A. KORUZI	23	NO	FARMY-HAND	PROBLEMATIC	CONVERT	YES	NO
16	H. EL-MAHDI	20	NO	WORKER	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	EXPERT	YES
17	M. KARAWALESKI	27	NO	WORKER	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
18	L. MESINOVIC	36	NO	MENTAL JOB	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
19	M. EL-MKHAYAR	18	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
20	T. ABULLALA	18	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
21	S. HAI-SAMI	42	YES	ELECTRICIAN	PROBLEMATIC	HIGHLY RELIGIOUS	YES	NO
22	V. BERESHA	33	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
23	L. NOUSAIR	28	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
24	O. KHACHIA	31	YES	WORKER	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
25	J. IBRAHIM	31	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
26	K. BEN HAVIDA	38	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	HIGHLY RELIGIOUS	YES	NO
27	V. MADELARA	41	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
28	H. MEHDI	25	NO	MERCHANT	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
29	D. EL MEHDI	23	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
30	E. ANTYEDOSKI	31	YES	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
31	S. BENGHARKI	26	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
32	A. KHACHIA	23	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
33	M. N. BEN AVARA	36	YES	PIZZA COOK	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
34	J. ELHANAOUJ	25	YES	NO	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
35	L. BRKI	35	NO	WORKER	NORMAL	HIGHLY RELIGIOUS	YES	YES
36	M. WAQAS	27	NO	WORKER	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
37	S. PILE'	24	NO	NO	NORMAL	CONVERT	YES	NO
38	N. SAGHARI	34	NO	WORKER	NORMAL	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO
39	M. T. BEN AMMAR	17	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	YES
40	A. ELEZI	38	NO	NO	PROBLEMATIC	SUDDEN RETURN	YES	NO

Framing AQAP's intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen: shifting patterns of governance and the importance of being local

ELEONORA ARDEMAGNI

Abstract

This article addresses the issue of jihadism in Yemen, framing jihadi networks' territorial penetration whether in the context of the ongoing Yemeni multilayered conflict, as in the chronic failure of Yemen's state-building from the unification so far. Due to a gradual convergence in operational areas and targets, the research article contends the occurrence of a rising intra-jihadi rivalry on Yemen's soil between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has deep tribal ties with some Yemeni tribes, and emerging cells of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Three factors that disempower IS's mobilization capabilities are identified here, building the evidence of AQAP's intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen. Firstly, AQAP was able to establish proto-emirates in the Abyan region (Jaar and Zinjibar provinces) in 2011, before the experience of the "Caliphate" between Syria and Iraq: that was a vanguard experiment in terms of identity, territoriality and language. Secondly, AQAP and its affiliates, as Ansar al-Shari'a, rely on a tribal wire of linkages and informal economy ties with local population, flourished in remote provinces out of state control. Thirdly, AQAP has elaborated jihadist narratives able to interact effectively with the Yemeni context, so rallying consensus (direct or tacit) among indigenous southern populations, where the *shaykh* plays a more prominent role if compared with the *imam*. To highlight similarities and differences within the jihadi galaxy, the article offers a comparison, in the first section, between AQAP and IS in Yemen, according to genealogy, structure of the organizations, targets and geography, narratives. In the second section, the article introduces a focus on AQAP's shifting pattern of governance in the south of Yemen, where it has established fiefdoms and attracts recruits leveraging on tribal/regional discontent *vis-à-vis* the Sana'a-based system of power. As a matter of fact, the Abyan proto-emirates (2011-12) embodied a *shar'ia*-oriented approach: the implementation of Islamic law was prioritized in the relationship with local communities, since the aim was to win popular support through top-down measures predominantly based on coercion. On the contrary, the Mukalla's mini-state in Hadhramaut (2015-16), founded on fuel smuggling, showed the adaptable, community-first face of jihadism: such a scheme is more difficult to counter for central authorities than the former because able to win local communities' consensus through the interaction with local leaders, organized welfare and locally-tailored propaganda. It is not by chance that AQAP decided to rebrand itself in Mukalla as "Sons of Hadhramaut". AQAP's shifting pattern of governance is going to enhance the resilience of jihadism in many Yemeni areas out of state's control, especially in coastal southern regions. Moreover, as the last section of the essay analyzes, the widespread discontent of southern tribes about interim president Hadi's federal reform (which was designed and approved by an appointed and not elected committee in 2014, but not implemented yet), could furtherly empower jihadists, given the historical mistrust and rivalries among populations that will be called to share resources and authority if the draft will

enter into force (for instance, Abyan and Lahj, Hadhramaut and al-Mahra). Notwithstanding a Yemeni-focused lens of investigation, this article takes into account the current Middle Eastern scenario and its domestic implications (i.e. the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran), as the necessity to include Yemen's instability into the broader Gulf of Aden's regional security complex, in order to analyze dynamics and sources of insecurity.

Key-words

Yemen; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; jihadism; security; tribes; Mukalla

In Yemen, the intra-jihadi rivalry between al-Qa'ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) and local cells of the so-called Islamic State has been gaining momentum, exacerbated by the ongoing multilayered conflict in the country. Since the beginning of the crisis, jihadi networks were able to capitalize on security vacuum, local resentment against central institutions and the sectarian narrative promoted by Saudi Arabia and Iran as a power politics tool. Notwithstanding escalating "spectacular" attacks against Shia civilians and security/governmental forces, IS didn't manage to challenge AQAP's supremacy within the Yemeni jihadi camp so far. Nevertheless, the intra-jihadi rivalry is now on the rise, due to a gradual convergence in operational areas and targets between AQAP and IS. There are at least three factors that disempower IS's mobilization capabilities in Yemen, underlying AQAP's intra-jihadi hegemony. Firstly, AQAP was able to establish proto-emirates in the Abyan region (Jaar and Zinjibar provinces) in 2011, before the self-proclamation of so-called Caliphate between Syria and Iraq: that was a vanguard experiment in terms of identity, territoriality and language. Secondly, AQAP and its affiliates, as Ansar al-Shari'a, rely on a tribal wire of linkages and informal economy ties with local population, flourished in remote provinces out of state control. Thirdly, AQAP has elaborated jihadist narratives able to interact effectively with the Yemeni context, so rallying consensus (direct or tacit) among indigenous southern populations, where the *shaykh* plays a more prominent role if compared with the *imam* (Kendall, 2016a). For instance, AQAP's English-language publications, as the magazine Inspire, are primarily devoted to foreign audiences: taking into account the high illiteracy rate, the internal *dawa* is carried out through the ideological use of oral culture and traditional customs, as poetry and songs. These devices find place even in AQAP's Arabic publications and videos for locals¹. Adding new complexity to this scenario, AQAP has recently introduced a flexible pattern of governance in southern controlled-cities, as was Mukalla (April 2015-April 2016), searching to merge

¹ As the new newspaper Al-Masra and the media outlet Wikalat al-Athir, focused on welfare.

with the existing social tissue. This community-oriented pattern prioritizes welfare provision and administrative involvement of local population with respect to direct military control and strict *shari'a*-implementation, which however remain significant tools of coercion. A compared analysis between AQAP and IS in Yemen contributes to furtherly shed light on the topic.

1. Genealogies

The bulk of al-Qa'ida in Yemen (renamed AQAP in 2009, when the Saudi and the Yemeni cells merged) was constituted by *mujahidin* returning from Afghanistan, as in the case of the Aden-Abyan Islamic Army (Johnsen, 2006)². In the Eighties, at least 30.000 Yemeni volunteers left the country to support the anti-Soviet jihad in Afghanistan: most of them returned to the homeland, so becoming the vanguard of jihadi proliferation in Yemen. Shaykh Abdel Majid al-Zindani, one of the Islah party's leading figure³, played a key-role, since he cultivated close contacts with the first Osama bin Laden during the Nineties. In 1998, several Yemeni citizens were involved in the al-Qaeda's terrorist attacks against two U.S. Embassies in Kenya and Tanzania (Shay, 2007). Ali Abdullah Saleh, Yemen's president until 2011, was a champion of ambiguity towards local jihadism. At the beginning, he rallied the support of jihadi fighters to combat southerners during the civil war in 1994 (Bonney, 2009a) and then, after 9/11, he signed a security alliance with the United States in the name of the *war on terror*, choosing to arbitrarily implement securitization policies (Mermier, 2010). Instead, the Yemeni branch of the so-called Islamic State appeared for the first time in the media in November 2014: Ansarullah (the Huthis' movement) had just seized the capital Sana'a, paving the way for the *coup d'état* in January 2015. IS in Yemen is predominantly constituted by AQAP's defectors; beyond Yemenis, Saudi citizens represent the backbone of both jihadi organizations. Yemeni Salafi movement developed in the Eighties around the figure of Muqbil al-Wadi', a

² The Aden-Abyan Islamic Army was organized in the 1990's by Abu Hasan Zayn al-Abadin al-Mihdhar, a Yemeni commander from Shabwa. The militia supported Saleh-led government against socialists in the south. (Johnsen, 2006).

³ The Islah party (the Reform Party, in the sense of the Salafi return to pious ancestors, the *al-salaf al-salih*, also known as Yemeni Congregation for Reform, *al-Tajammu al-Yamani li-l-Islah*), was founded in 1990. Widely considered a moderate party which accepted the Saleh-led system of power, Islah is a complex movement which rallies whether the Yemeni Muslim Brothers as the Salafis, together with tribal *shuyyukh* (*shaykh* Abdullah al-Ahmar, the paramount leader of the Hashid tribal confederation, was the founder of Islah), businessmen, reformist intellectuals and the conservative *milieu*. Al-Zindani still represents the most radical wing of the party and appears on the United States' list of global terrorists.

tribesman from Saada's highlands educated in Saudi Arabia. Founder of the Dar al-Hadith *madrassa*, al-Wadi's opted for a loyal approach *vis-à-vis* the Yemeni regime. After his death in 2001, Yemeni Salafis have followed divergent paths: some adopted the traditional quietist posture, while others embraced the Sahwa movement or the same Muslim Brotherhood. In any case, Yemeni Salafis majority remained tacit allies of the regime. (Bonney 2009b). On the other hand, Saudi Arabia has massively contributed to the spread of the Salafi-Wahhabi doctrine in Yemen (Sunnis use to follow here the Shafi *madhab*)⁴, through kinship ties and transnational patronage. This has occurred especially in Hadhramaut, where Sufi Islam is instead an ancient legacy and experienced a revitalization in the Nineties, as the Dar al-Mustafa institute in Tarim testifies.

2. Structure of the organizations

Islamic State in Yemen is organized in small, regionally-based networks, which claim direct responsibility for the attacks in the country. These *wilayat* are several: Sana'a, Aden-Abyan, Shabwa (the most active and recognizable cells), Ibb-Taiz, Lahij, al-Bayda, Hadhramaut. The majority of IS's top-ranking commanders in Yemen are Saudis: their prominent role would be generating confrontation within the organization. In two letters dated 15 and 17 December 2015, more than 100 IS's members asked to al-Baghdadi for the removal of the current *wali*, denouncing an excessive interpretation of *shari'a* (Estelle, 2015). AQAP shows a more hierarchical structure with respect to the Yemeni cells which pronounced the oath of allegiance to the caliphate. Nasser al-Wuhayshi, killed during a U.S. drone attack in June 2015, was substituted by his deputy Qassim al-Raimi, who soon pledged allegiance (*bay'a*) to Ayman al-Zawahiri. During the Obama administration, Washington's counterterrorism strategy has registered an impressive increase of drone strikes, but this tactic did not produce positive outcomes: AQAP remains the most dangerous al-Qa'ida's node for U.S. homeland and abroad interests. Although many top-AQAP commanders were killed (and then rapidly replaced), the impact of the drone warfare campaign on recruitment was even counterproductive, since recurrent civilian casualties fueled jihadi enrollment among southern, disenfranchised youth. This is especially true for the affiliate Ansar al-Sharia, the 'chain of transmission' between the terrorist organization and local tribes. The competition between AQAP and IS regards grassroots recruitment and

⁴ Shafeism is a synthesis between two schools of Islamic jurisprudence (*madahib*): malikism, based on conservative tradition, and hanafism, which emphasizes the role of reason in religious understanding.

didn't involve apical commanders so far: IS-*wilayat* were mostly created by AQAP's defectors attracted by higher salaries (Zimmerman and Diamond, 2016) and a more aggressive attitude with respect to al-Qaeda. In some cases, grey zones between AQAP and IS still persist, as in the case of "Wilaya Hadhramaut", which could not be necessarily linked to IS. In August 2012, after the temporary emirates' dismantlement in Abyan, AQAP's local cell moved to east (Mahfad in Eastern Abyan and Azzan in Shabwa, Michaels and Ayyash, 2013) and may have rebranded itself as Wilaya Hadhramaut. In fact, before the appearance of IS, AQAP used to name its territories with the term *wilaya* (province), in order to distinguish them from the *muhafaza* (governorate) belonging to civil states. For instance, in 2011-12, Abyan's proto-emirates were called *wilayat* by AQAP, rather than *'imara* (emirate), (Kendall, 2016a).

3. Targets and Geography

AQAP prioritizes hard targets, as security forces, and Yemeni government officials, while IS mainly attacks the Huthis and Yemen's Shia community, without distinctions between hard and soft targets. In May 2012, during the national military parade celebrating the reunified republic, AQAP claimed responsibility for the suicide attack that killed more than 90 soldiers in Sana'a (Al-Arabiya, 2012). In March 2015, IS claimed credit for the suicide operations against two Sana'a mosques, Badr and Hashoush, which killed more than 130 believers, (BBC News, 2015). Yemeni Sunni and Shia communities use to pray in the same mosques, but in March the capital was already under Ansarul-lah's control. However, this targets categorization becomes day by day more nuanced, even though it remains a salient criterion of analysis. AQAP and IS's attacks have been following a convergent trend, enhanced by overlapped geographical areas of confrontation (as Aden and recently Mukalla) since the start of the Saudi-led military intervention against Shia militias (the Huthis and former president Saleh's loyalists, in March 2015) and then of Saudi-Emiratis' airstrikes against swathes of territory held by jihadists (March 2016). From late 2015 on, IS uses to target government officials and coalition bases, as frequently occurred in Aden, or young police/military recruits in the south. IS began to carry out attacks in Aden when the city was "reconquered" from Shia rebels by the Yemeni army and Sunni militias. In Mukalla, IS (maybe based in in the northern Wadi Hadhramaut sanctuary, not along southern coasts so far) has begun to carry out attacks since AQAP withdraw from the city in April 2016. IS has also criticized AQAP's decision to avoid armed confrontation in Mukalla with the Yemeni army, Sunni militias and Emirati Presidential Guard's units.

Aden and Mukalla are now key-cities in Yemen's battlefield, contested among government and coalition's forces, pro-independence militias (al-Hiraak in Aden), local tribes and AQAP (supported by some Hadhrami clans in Mukalla). Both cities register growing numbers of Islamic State's infiltrates. AQAP operates mainly in central and southern Yemen (as Taiz, al-Bayda, Hadhramaut). In al-Bayda, AQAP has entrenched strong alliances with some tribal clans, as the Dhahab tribe (Qayfa confederation) in Rada'a district: the governor Nayif Saleh Salim al-Qaysi is an AQAP member under U.S. sanctions (Zimmerman, 2015; Palmer, 2016). After AQAP's withdrawal from Mukalla, the jihadist presence in al-Mahra, the Yemeni most Eastern region, would be rising.

4. Narratives

AQAP's discourse has traditionally combined polemics against the "far enemy" (the United States and the West, Israel and the Jews) with invectives against the "near enemy" (the Yemeni government and the security forces, the Saudi monarchy). In this framework, AQAP has managed to partially exploit southern popular anger towards northern-driven élites, picturing Sana'a's institutions as shared enemies in order to forge tribal alliances on the ground. In Hadhramaut, AQAP has skillfully played the card of the Hadhrami emancipation from a corrupted and unequal central state, dominated by Saleh's northern oligarchy and his political heirs. As a matter of fact, AQAP has capitalized on the 2011 Yemeni uprising and the 2013 Hadhrami anti-government protests (Bafana, 2014) to prepare Mukalla's governance experiment. On the other hand, Islamic State in Yemen has bet since the beginning all its ideological resources on sectarian, anti-Shia rhetoric. The Huthis (a minority part of the Zaydi Shia branch, rooted in Saada's northern fiefdom⁵) have been labeled by IS as the primary enemy – with an eye to expand its leverage in the south – so emphasizing the sectarian narrative already fueled, for power politics purposes, by Saudi Arabia and Iran (Colgan, 2015). The unsolved Yemen's multilayered conflict risks to empower not only the role of jihadi net-

⁵ Zaydism is a Shia branch predominantly rooted in Yemen. Its believers recognize five imam, differently from Jaafarism (the Twelver Shia, most of them located in Iran). Zaydi's religious élite claims descent from the Prophet Muhammad (the *sayyids*, or *sāda*): the Huthis are a Hashemite family. In Yemen, the Zaydi Imamate (897-1962) was founded in Saada, where Huthis still have their political fiefdom. A document signed by prominent Zaydi clerics in 1990 declares the abandon of the imamate project, even though ambiguities on this topic remain. Not all Yemeni Zaydis are Huthis. Ansarullah, the Zaydi revivalist movement, is the Huthis' political umbrella, founded at the beginning of the Nineties with the name of *al-Shabab al-Mu'min*, the Believing Youth (Dorlian, 2013, International Crisis Group, 2014). The Huthis' militia encompasses at least 20.000 fighters (al-Dhahab, 2016).

works, but also the strength of the sectarian message proposed by IS. AQAP could be tempted to escalate the sectarian tone of its propaganda, in order to compete with IS in recruitment and media, as some statements and small-scale attacks against the Huthis have stressed since 2015.

5. AQAP's shifting patterns of governance

AQAP has been repositioning its governance model from a *shari'a-first* approach to a *community-first* posture oriented to power-sharing with local actors. The first type of governance was applied in 2011-12 in some coastal Abyan's cities (Jaar, Zinjibar). Despite some alliances with indigenous tribes opposed to Sana'a, AQAP (under the banner of the affiliate Ansar al-Shari'a) self-proclaimed the emirates due to the military vacuum and a spread indifferent mood among locals. AQAP and its network implemented strict *shari'a* codes, banned Arab music and the *qat* (a narcotic leaf which is, at the same time, a local custom and a source of economic survival for many clans), provided basic services to the population, as electricity and water, organizing garbage collection and phone lines connection (Sincox, 2013). In Abyan, AQAP emphasized ideology on pragmatism, rejecting and trying to replace traditional customs, as *qat*, in the name of the "Islamic purity": the aim was to win popular support through the use of coercion rather than consensus. In this framework, the military campaign headed by the Yemeni army, with the ground support of popular committees and U.S. airstrikes, managed to temporarily dismantle the emirates, since locals didn't oppose government forces. In 2012, Nasser al-Wuhayshi wrote two letters to AQIM's leader, advising him to gradually implement *shari'a* and redesign models of governance not to alienate local population's sympathy (Horton, 2016): few years later, Abyan has become a lesson learned for the Yemeni al-Qaeda's node. The affiliated Ansar al-Shari'a seized Mukalla in April 2015: when jihadists took the control of the city, the local army's unit didn't intervene to prevent it. As usual, AQAP robbed bank deposits, released prisoners from the jail, abolished taxes. In Mukalla, the capital of the richest Yemeni governorate (oil and gas reserves), AQAP designed a well-functioning "militant economy", imposing fees on ship traffic and organizing fuel smuggling (Bayoumi et al., 2016). *Qat* was banned, but *shari'a* was only intermittently implemented: this time, AQAP demonstrated to be an adaptable, pragmatic organization, deciding (maybe due to some initial protests in the town) to involve locals in administrative tasks. Therefore, AQAP has assured the military control of Mukalla, delegating civil government and its duties to local, tribal bodies: it is not by chance that AQAP rebranded here "Sons of Hadhramaut", echoing the historical Hadhrami quest for autonomy in order to rally consensus among

inhabitants. The pro-AQAP Hadhrami Domestic Council (HDC), established in April 2015, was tasked to provide basic services and pay salaries: it encompasses some tribal *shuyyukh*, academics and theologians. Differently from what occurred in Abyan in 2011, AQAP didn't raise the al-Qa'ida black flag in Mukalla. Prioritizing governance on ideology, AQAP has attempted to solve water problems, land disputes between southerners and northerners, reconstructing damaged infrastructures and improving healthcare provisions. The Hadhramaut Tribal Confederacy (HTC), a military and security alliance established by prominent tribes on 2013 to rule the city, has always rejected AQAP and its brand-new banners; however, it has avoided direct confrontation with jihadists so far (Zimmerman, 2015). In April 2016, at the dawn of the ground offensive to regain Mukalla (organized by the Yemeni army, plus Sunni militias, Emirati Presidential Guard's units and some U.S. militaries), AQAP decided a strategic withdrawal from the city, following local intermediation. Similarly, a recent AQAP's statement in Abyan (now rebranded "Sons of Abyan") warned women and children that the organization would attack military commanders' homes. In 2016, AQAP and its affiliates have withdrawn from Jaar and Zinjibar (Abyan) and from the city of Azzan (Shabwa): in both cases, jihadists have left their strongholds after Saudi-led airstrikes and mediation with local *shuyyukh*. In the long-term, this community-oriented approach risks to be even more menacing for central authorities than the first, *shari'a*-driven one, especially in areas when central institutions were absent and unwelcomed since decades.

6. The federal reform and the intra-southern rivalry: the next window of opportunity for jihadists?

The future implementation of the federal reform project, contested by many southern regional actors, could furtherly turn local tribes towards AQAP. The draft, elaborated in the framework of the National Dialogue Conference, but designed by a 22-members Committee of Regions appointed and headed by interim president Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi, reorganizes Yemen's administrative map in six macro-regions (Thiel, 2015). With regard to the southern regions, they would be clustered in the brand new Aden (current Aden, Abyan, Lahj and Dhala'e governorates) and Hadhramaut (Shabwa, Hadhramaut, al-Mahra and Socotra) regions: AQAP and IS have their fiefdoms just in these areas, where they strive for the hegemony within the jihadi galaxy. Rooted rivalries and mistrust persist among southern tribes: many of them will be unwilling to share power and resources, probably looking for jihadi's support against tribal competitors. For instance, the southern civil war in 1986 have left deep enmities between Dhala'e, Lahj fighters (the so-called Tuqma) and those proceeding from Abyan and

Shabwa (the Zumra), since the Tuqma defeated the Zumra during a battle that caused about 10.000 victims in ten days⁶ (International Crisis Group, 2016: International Crisis Group 2013). Furthermore, president Abd Rabu Mansur Hadi's systematic promotion of army officers and bureaucratic officials proceeding from Abyan, his native region, with the purpose to enhance his weak leadership vis-à-vis the *ancien régime*, has furtherly exacerbated tensions between southern tribes and transitional institutions. Hadhramis and Mahris are also dissatisfied with the suggested federal reform. Hadhramaut is the richest Yemeni region in natural resources (oil, gas, unexploited gold deposits, water and land): 80% of producing oil fields are located within its administrative boundaries. On the contrary, al-Mahra has few natural resources and 80% of its inhabitants don't have direct access to water and electricity. As a matter of fact, such a new macro-region would be a fusion between 'have' and 'have-not' governorates, with all its political implications. Hadhramaut has always looked for autonomy from the Yemeni state, with the support of the Hadhrami diaspora, powerful and deeply tied with the homeland. According to a 2013 survey (Kendall, 2014), 99% of 34.000 respondents in al-Mahra rejected the proposal to merge with Hadhramaut too and 86% asked to be ruled by a cross-tribal council, opposing all federal solutions. Not to forget that socialist forces entered in al-Mahra from Hadhramaut in 1968, when the Mahra Sultanate of Qishn and Socotra was abrogated and then integrated into the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. With regard to the archipelago of Socotra, it was recognized as governorate only in 2014, while it previously belonged to Aden and then to Hadhramaut. (Ardemagni, 2016b).

7. Conclusions and Perspectives

The ideological and territorial space for AQAP and IS is going to expand without a viable, comprehensive political agreement between the Yemeni government and Shia rebels. Direct, informal talks between the Saudis and Ansarullah (the Huthis' political movement) have relatively settled violence along the Saudi border in the first half of 2016, but can't secure the south from jihadists' penetration. In this framework, intra-jihadi rivalry between AQAP and IS is likely to increase, because of a gradual convergence trend in operational areas and targets. Notwithstanding this phenomenon, AQAP maintains an hegemonic position within the Yemeni jihadi field with respect to IS. The concept

⁶ "Zumra" and "Tuqma" terms, lifted from the Iraqi and the Syrian Ba'ath Party respectively to describe competing groups, indicate the split occurred within Yemeni southern socialists during the 1986 intra-south civil war. At least 30000 partisans of president Ali Nasser Mohammed (Zumra), defeated by Tuqma, left native Abyan and Shabwa regions to reach the north, where they rallied under Ali Abdullah Saleh's neo-patrimonial network.

of hegemony, traditionally applied to state actors, is referred here to a non-state actor (AQAP) which acts as a state actor in areas under its control: in these territories, AQAP shows, if compared to IS, superiority in military capabilities and financial resources, plus a certain degree of recognition by local populations.⁷ At a micro-level, AQAP's hegemony is corroborated by three factors: the 'emirates vanguard project' appeared in 2011, deep tribal linkages and local knowledge, a jihadist narrative able to mix ideological goals with indigenous customs and grievances, so creating an effective story-telling. Open IS-AQAP competition is going to influence AQAP's language and tactics, fueling sectarian rhetoric and polarizing mixed societies (as in the central Dhamar region). However, AQAP's new, community-oriented pattern of governance showed in Mukalla has been drawing a line between AQAP and IS directions in Yemen. Such a kind of governance can become even more resilient and difficult to eradicate with respect to the *shari'a*-driven model, since it directly bets on Sana'a's chronological political failures, seeking for local support. For instance, AQAP was able to build an effective «narrative of injustice» (Phillips, 2016) with regard to the land issue, since many southerners traditionally complain about systematic land appropriation and redistribution operated by the Sana'a-based central power, in favor of tribal allies and cronies. Focusing local propaganda on the land problem, AQAP has skillfully succeeded to emphasize the chronic mismanagements of the Yemeni system of power, which transcends and persists the resignations of Ali Abdullah Saleh. Denouncing a deep politicized issue as the land one is – rather than poverty – AQAP nurtures in the long-term the vicious cycle of mistrust between Yemenis and the United States, since Washington is the first Yemeni governments' sponsor, so rhetorically carving out new niches for further jihadi penetration. From a regional perspective, Saudi Arabia and United Arab Emirates (UAE) started only in March 2016 to conduct airstrikes against jihadi safe havens in Yemen. Gulf monarchies have changed attitude *vis-à-vis* AQAP threat in Yemen, as emphasized by Saudi Foreign Minister's recent interview on *Le Figaro*, when he pictured jihadists, not Huthis, as the first military coalition's targets from that moment on (Malbrunot, 2016). Beyond past ambiguities, Saudis and Emiratis decided to target AQAP and IS cells when they began to heavily threaten the stability of areas reconquered by the recognized government, as Aden. On the contrary, jihadi militias formerly participated in many battles

⁷ According to Charles Kindleberger, who developed the theory of hegemonic stability to explain the international system, the fundamental resources of hegemony are military and financial supremacy, plus recognition by the others; in other words, the "hard power" and the "soft" one. Hegemony is always temporary, since costs grow faster than the resources for its maintenance (Parsi, 2007).

where anti-Huthi forces were engaged.⁸ This occurred in central regions as Taiz, al-Bayda, Mareb and in the southern Abyan. Yemen is a “milieu of networks” (Medici, 2012), open not only towards the Arabian Peninsula and the Gulf, but on the road to the Horn of Africa too: for this reason, Aden’s security remains critical (al-Dawsari, 2015; Ardemagni, 2016b) not only for Yemen, but for the stability of the whole neighborhood. As a matter of fact, Yemen, Somalia and Sudan represent a real regional (in)security complex, sharing some features of interdependent instability. For instance, they host epicenters of Islamic radicalism and swathes of jihadism, experienced foreign colonial rule (with regard to Yemen, the British in the South) and civil wars. Direct or indirect “state legitimization of terror activity” is also recurrent here (ties and links between members of authoritarian regimes and criminal-terroristic organizations), as well as government lack of steps to counter violent extremism (Shay, 2007). Aden, and to a lesser extent Mukalla, is a *choke-point* for trade and energy: their instability could also provoke a resurgence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden, a fundamental waterway that has to be addressed as the same region of insecurity, taking into account the tribal/clanic social structures and their transnational dynamics (Lewis, 2014). Surely, Yemen’s security vacuum represents more and more a congenial environment for jihadism.

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⁸ Anti-Huthi forces refer to a loose coalition of Islah’s militias, al-Hiraak pro-independence militants, popular committees and other tribal warriors.

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Le mille e una Libia del passato calate nella realtà del presente: quale direzione?

DIEGO BOLCHINI¹

*In ogni istante della vita
siamo ciò che saremo
non meno di ciò che siamo stati*²

OSCAR WILDE

Abstract

Il cubo di Rubik è un oggetto creato dal professore di architettura ungherese Ernő Rubik nel 1974. Pensato originariamente a scopo di studio tra matematici ungheresi, il cubo di Rubik presenta nella sua versione standard 9 quadrati su ognuna delle sue 6 facce, per un totale di 54 quadrati. Come per il cubo ungherese esistono diverse possibili strategie risolutive (es. permutazione spigoli, permutazione angoli), così anche per il dossier libico la Comunità Internazionale sta cercando soluzioni che consentano di mettere a sistema un *puzzle* caratterizzato da un complesso paesaggio politico-tribale rispetto al quale è oltremodo difficile decifrare e ordinare i cromatismi esistenti.


Key Words

Libia; Anthropology; Strategy; Asymmetric Warfare; Terrorism;

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² Citazione tratta da A. MANGANELLI, F. GABRIELLI, *Investigare. Manuale pratico delle tecniche di indagine*, CEDAM, Padova, 2007. Gli autori nel testo a pag. 351 ricordano come “questa frase contrassegna molte vicende del nostro vivere e ci ricorda come l’analisi dei fenomeni non debba mai prescindere da un serio studio del passato per comprendere il presente e, forse con qualche presunzione, costruire il futuro”.

Fig. 1: Immagine del c.d. “Cubo di Rubik”.
 (Tratta dal sito https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cubo_di_Rubik)



1. Introduzione: prospettiva e metodologia di ricerca

Winston Churchill una volta disse: “*the further backwards you look, the further forward you can see*”. Vale a dire: la retta del futuro passa per almeno due punti, di cui uno è collegato alla storia intima di persone e Paesi³.

Provando ad adottare questa *assumption* alla luce del dossier libico e della corrente dicotomia tra l’attuale Presidente del Consiglio Presidenziale Fayez Al Serraj⁴ e il Generale Khalifa Haftar (rispetto alla quale diversi attori e osservatori auspicano quanto prima il raggiungimento di una prospettiva finalmente collaborativa sotto la regia ONU), appare utile mettere insieme come in un “gioco di specchi” alcune fasi storiche e avvenimenti della Libia del passato.

Questo poiché tali segmenti storici sono suscettibili di avere ancora ripercussioni (o peggio strumentalizzazioni) tanto nella attualità della narrativa estremista dell’*Islamic State* quanto nella stessa percezione dell’*human terrain*

³ Frase riportata in C. ANDREW, *The Defence of The Realm: The Authorized History of MI5*, Penguin Books, 2010.

⁴ Il governo di Al Serraj, pur essendo stato legittimato dalla Risoluzione del CdS ONU 2259 del 2015, ha ancora una effettività non pienamente esplicita. Secondo l’Inviato Speciale ONU per la Libia, Martin Kobler, alla data di agosto 2016 il consenso verso Al Serraj era in forte difficoltà a causa delle problematiche economiche del Paese. Nello specifico l’alto diplomatico tedesco ha ricordato come elementi di criticità e malcontento sociale la corrente svalutazione del dinaro libico e le progressive interruzioni di energia elettrica nella stessa città di Tripoli (passata da una copertura di 20 ore al giorno nell’aprile 2016 a circa 12 ore nell’agosto 2016). http://www.askanews.it/minaccia-isis/libia-kobler-popolarita-governo-al-sarraj-si-sta-sgretolando_711878882.htm.

system libico visto nel suo complesso. Quest'ultimo è oggi costituito da circa 6 milioni di abitanti, circa un terzo dei quali aventi poco più di 20 anni di età⁵.

Nella ricerca, condotta con il sopra indicato approccio metodologico, ci si soffermerà sulla ricognizione di due casi relazionali specifici: il rapporto bilaterale italo-libico e quello libico-statunitense⁶. Successivamente, si tratteggeranno alcuni elementi di riflessione sull'affidabilità del sistema politico libico con alcune conclusioni e prospettive individuate per il futuro.

2. Il rapporto LIBIA-ITALIA: un caleidoscopio di immagini e percezioni eterogenee

Il Prof. Luigi Goglia, già docente di Storia e Istituzioni dei Paesi Afro-asiatici presso la Facoltà di Scienze Politiche dell'Università Roma Tre, ricordò ad un convegno tenutosi nel 1996 (vale a dire in tempi "neutri", ben lontani dalle attuali urgenze e contingenze storiche) un episodio sconosciuto ai più.

Questo il dato storico fornito: il governatore italiano in Libia Italo Balbo istituì a Tripoli l'Istituto di Alti Studi Islamici, con una doppia finalità. Gratificare la cultura locale e diminuire l'esodo di giovani libici costretti al tempo ad emigrare in Egitto per studiare alla prestigiosa Università cairota di Al Azar⁷.

Balbo nel periodo del suo governatorato in Libia (1936-1940) fu in definitiva – per quasi unanime valutazione storiografica – molto attento alle esigenze della popolazione libica, anche facendo specifico riferimento a quelle culturali. Un approccio decisamente nuovo e "aperto", specialmente considerate le sensibilità del tempo.

Non a caso forse oggi, nell'anno 2016, il richiamo di Aqim (al Qaeda nel Maghreb) e Daesh all'Italia – in termini di messaggi a connotazione ideologica negativa – punta ad una ben diversa fase storica del rapporto italo-libico. Cioè al tempo del generale Rodolfo Graziani e delle battaglie di Omar al Mukhtar, già immortalate nel film del 1981 intitolato *il Leone del Deserto*, parzialmente finanziato da Mohammad Gheddafi⁸.

⁵ Su territorio italiano, la presenza libica è stimata attualmente in poche migliaia di unità, costituendo dunque una comunità ben più piccola rispetto alle più nutrite comunità musulmane albanesi, marocchine, bengalesi o tunisine.

⁶ Sin dalla penetrazione economica del Paese a stelle e strisce mediante la *Esso* (Exxonmobil), quando nel 1959 fu scoperto il giacimento petrolifero di Zelten.

⁷ Atti Convegno Internazionale nel Centenario della nascita di Italo Balbo (Roma, 7-8 novembre 1996).

⁸ Prof. M. Lombardi, Università Cattolica di Milano, presentazione tenuta al Convegno "*La guerra delle idee e della comunicazione: L'influenza strategica contro il terrore islamista*". Roma, Senato della Repubblica, 22 febbraio 2016.

La divisione media di Isis Tarabulus (Tripoli) avrebbe anche diffuso a fine luglio u.s. un nuovo video di propaganda con *frame* associati a volti di figure politiche istituzionali italiane, esasperando e distorcendo le narrative politiche⁹.

Il “caso libico” dunque, forse ancor più di altri contesti, impone una importante ginnastica mentale in senso dia-cronico, un lungo allenamento alla considerazione dell’altro punto di vista, rivisitando di conseguenza i personaggi, le storie e le narrative raccontate dai diversi attori nel corso del tempo.

Questo anche perché la Libia racchiude nella sua storia una gamma di identità e appartenenze amplissima: è la terra che ha dato i natali a Settimio Severo, Imperatore Romano nato nel 146 D.C. vicino a Tripoli, ed è anche il paese di Mohammed Game, cittadino libico autore dell’attentato parzialmente fallito contro una installazione militare in Milano nel 2009, occultando l’esplosivo in una cassetta di attrezzi, realizzato per protesta contro l’impegno militare italiano in Afghanistan¹⁰.

La scenografia libica è stata poi in grado di costruire nei decenni scorsi potenti immagini collettive, stratificatesi nel tempo e aventi forte connotazione emotiva: si pensi, tra le altre, alla scultura di epoca gheddafiana alta 6 metri raffigurante un pugno di alluminio verde che distruggeva un aereo con la scritta “USA”.

Un altro esempio di argomentazione con prospettiva “a prisma” viene da una dissertazione proposta per il Dipartimento di Studi Orientali dell’Università dell’Arizona, USA, e discussa nel 1988¹¹.

Nella ricerca l’autore libico, evidenziando il rilevante numero di prestiti linguistici italiani esistenti nel dialetto arabo-libico parlato in Tripolitania, auspica nel suo *paper* – scritto in lingua inglese – che lo studio possa aiutare gli educatori della nazione libica a “epurare” il dialetto da tali prestiti sgraditi. Ne sono individuati oltre 600.

Perché dunque utilizzare un prestito linguistico a evidente origine italiana come *affaariyyaat* per indicare le questioni d’affari? Perché non far ricorso all’arabo classico per esprimere questo concetto?

In fin dei conti, seguendo questa logica, lo stesso Gheddafi aveva bandito per anni le automobili statunitensi *Ford* nel suo Paese e vietato l’utilizzo di cartellonistica lingua inglese¹².

⁹ <http://silendo.org/2016/08/11/lisis-si-interessa-allitalia/>.

¹⁰ S. DAMBRUOSO, V. SPAGNOLO, *Un istante prima*, Mondadori, 2011. Stefano Dambruoso è un magistrato italiano già sostituto procuratore a Milano, membro del dipartimento antiterrorismo e del comitato per l’islam italiano presso il Ministero dell’Interno.

¹¹ *Italian loanwords in colloquial Libyan Arabic as spoken in the Tripoli region*, University of Arizona, 1988. <http://arizona.openrepository.com/arizona/handle/10150/184333>.

¹² N. MACFARQUHAR, *L’Ufficio Stampa di Hezbollah ti augura buon compleanno*, UTET, 2009. Neil MacFarquhar, già corrispondente per il New York Times, ha avuto diverse occasioni di

Su un piano cognitivo, la pretesa di epurazione linguistica portata avanti dall'autore appare motivata da finalità essenzialmente politiche. Di fatto, in un mondo culturale inter-connesso a rete, è sempre più difficile se non impossibile rintracciare nuclei identitari “puri”.

La stessa tanto decantata cucina mediterranea non sarebbe tale senza il pomodoro, importato dal Continente americano, come pure vi sono studiosi che hanno sottolineato le influenze e le coincidenze tra la mistica sufica-islamica e quella di S. Francesco D'Assisi¹³.

Anche la lingua dialettale libica, vista da vicino, non sembra sfuggire a questa dinamica generale contenendo contaminazioni e prestiti insospettabili.

Si pensi alla forma verbale libica *gaemiz!* (“*siediti*”). L'etimologia è incerta. Ma parrebbe riscontrabile una radice persiana (dunque indo-europea e non semitica) come *miz*, tavola – curiosamente avente la stessa radice del latino *mensa* –, passato poi in arabo mesopotamico.

Il verbo è utilizzato anche in Tunisia con il significato originario di “accoccolarsi, accosciarsi”¹⁴.

Si consideri poi che l'arabo maghrebino (di cui fa parte il dialetto libico) si è imposto sul pre-esistente berbero, contaminandosi a sua volta con elementi linguistici endogeni.

3. Il rapporto LIBIA-USA: quale qualificazione e interpretazione?

Nel 1986, solo due anni prima del lavoro di tesi sopra ricordato il Presidente USA Reagan, nella stessa lingua inglese usata dal dissertante libico auspicante la piena autarchia linguistica nazionale, aveva ordinato il lancio di missili contro Gheddafi (Operazione *Eldorado Canyon*) in ritorsione all'attentato occorso presso una discoteca di Berlino¹⁵.

Due anni più tardi nel 1988, nell'anno stesso di dissertazione della tesi, esplose il volo PanAM diretto a New York con oltre 200 persone a bordo.

soggiorno in Libia in differenti fasi della sua vita.

¹³ S. MARCONI, *Francesco Sufi, radici islamico-sufiche nelle scelte di Francesco di Assisi*, Edizioni Libreria Croce, 2008.

¹⁴ O. DURAND, *Dialettologia Araba*, Carocci, 2015. Olivier Durand è professore associato di Dialettologia araba e filologia semitica presso la Facoltà di Studi Orientali dell'Università Sapienza di Roma.

¹⁵ Nel mese di Maggio 2016, a 30 anni di distanza dai fatti, si è tenuto un interessante Convegno in Roma che ha ripercorso anche questo episodio spartiacque nella storia delle relazioni internazionali libiche, organizzato dalla Fondazione Craxi e dal titolo “*La crisi libica dall'operazione Eldorado Canyon ai giorni nostri. Una sfida per l'Europa*”. Interventi e testimonianze di P.F. Casini, Stefani Craxi, F. Frattini.

Il rapporto bilaterale USA-Libia continuerà negli anni a procedere “a strappi”, oscillando tra chiari (il ripristino dei rapporti diplomatici nel 2006 e la storica visita del Segretario di Stato Condoleezza Rice in Libia nel 2008, primo Segretario di Stato a fare questo dopo 55 anni) e scuri (l’uccisione dell’ambasciatore Usa in Libia Stevens nel settembre 2012, quale ripercussione della proiezione di un film di egiziani-copti negli Usa).

Nel maggio del 2016 il *Washington Post* rendeva noto la presenza di “*Contact/Assessment Teams*” composti da Forze Speciali USA rischierati in Libia allo scopo di identificare potenziali alleati tra la miriade di fazioni armate presenti sul terreno e raccogliere elementi di informazione sulle minacce, mappando i *local networks* “amici” e “nemici”.

Lo scopo è dichiarato essere anche predittivo: la domanda fondamentale è sapere quali gruppi e fazioni saranno disposte ad allinearsi nel lungo periodo al governo unitario nazionale libico di Al Serraj.

L’intelligence mirata a capire il terreno umano (c.d. *Human Terrain*) appare dunque fondamentale, pur non potendo ovviamente contare sul rischio zero perdite garantito invece da operazioni IMINT (*Imagery Intelligence*) condotte a mezzo droni oppure osservazione satellitare¹⁶.

Se questo è ciò che l’amministrazione USA sembra aver ricercato a livello tattico-operativo, a livello politico-istituzionale è apparsa forte la ricerca di legittimazione di Al Sarraj, che sempre nel mese di maggio u.s. ha presentato alcuni atti politici significativi come il provvedimento per la creazione di un comando operativo congiunto per la lotta a IS.

L’incontro-riunione di Vienna del maggio 2016, co-presieduta dal Segretario di Stato Kerry e dal Ministro Gentiloni Silveri si è posto anche in tali termini di legittimazione estesa¹⁷.


È invece storia recentissima la decisione statunitense di effettuare – nel mese di agosto u.s. – attività diretta a mezzo di assetti aerei su territorio libico in un’ottica di contrasto dinamico al Califfato nel più ampio contesto nordafricano.

¹⁶ MISSY RYAN, *U.S. establishes Libyan outposts with eye toward offensive against Islamic State*, Washington Post, 12 May 2016. https://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-security/us-establishes-libyan-outposts-with-eye-toward-offensive-against-islamic-state/2016/05/12/11195d32-183c-11e6-9e16-2e5a123aac62_story.html.

¹⁷ http://www.esteri.it/mae/it/sala_stampa/archivionotizie/comunicati/2016/05/libia-riunione-ministeriale-a-vienna.html.

Fig.2: Rappresentazione grafica di approccio olistico ad uno scenario operativo (SISTEMA CHIUSO).

(Tratta da Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009; <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-01-3.pdf>)



The objective of intelligence must be to penetrate not only denied areas but denied minds in order to gain an understanding of intents and motivations of individuals and small groups in countries that are unfamiliar to us [JOHN S. BROWN/JEFFREY R. COOPER, *Washington Post*, 10/05/2005]

4. Quale affidabilità del sistema politico libico?

Resta da considerare, a livello politologico, l'affidabilità del sistema politico libico, quanto meno per come si sta cercando di osservarlo e definirlo da una prospettiva occidentale.

Sistemi, processi e regimi politici hanno rischi di fallibilità intrinseci, finendo in casi estremi per non funzionare, adempiere parzialmente alle proprie funzioni o addirittura collassare.

Come tentare dunque di valutare la *political reliability* libica? Muovendo dal modello concettuale elaborato dal Umberto Prof. Gori, Professore Emerito di Relazioni Internazionali all'Università Cesare Alfieri di Firenze, non si potrebbe parlare ancora nel caso libico in termini di misurazione di affidabilità in quanto l'entità politica libica (leggasi Governo Al Serraj) non ha ancora raggiunto un rendimento di lavoro costante al tempo T.

Troppi ancora sarebbero i fattori strutturali e dinamici di instabilità e isteresi nel funzionamento del sistema libico.

Di fatto, i diversi attori politici e miliziani endogeni oggi operanti su territorio libico (tra cui si ricordano *Islamic State* in Libia, il gruppo salafita *Ansar al Sharia*, la Fratellanza musulmana di Tripoli, la milizia militare del Generale Haftar, la milizia federale denominata *Petroleum Facilities Guard* oltre ad un arcipelago di diverse altre milizie) rendono oltremodo frastagliata e diversificata l'individuazione dei centri di potere formale e informale.

Solo per fare un esempio della rilevanza degli ambiti di potere informale, si pensi agli indotti economici generati nel contesto informale libico dal traffico di uomini: questi sono stimati essere, secondo alcuni analisti, dal 30 al 50% del Pil dell'intera Tripolitania, con il coinvolgimento diretto o indiretto di interi clan tribali¹⁸.

Lo stesso ex Capo della Polizia di Stato Antonio Manganelli, nel corso di una intervista individuava già nel 2007 nella realtà libica taluni sodalizi criminali dediti non solo al traffico e allo spaccio di droga, ma soprattutto alla gestione e al traffico di esseri umani. Per Manganelli “*Gli algerini, in particolare, hanno evidenziato attività di tipo terroristico, mentre i libici emergono prevalentemente nel traffico di clandestini*”¹⁹.

Facendo riferimento all'attualità, il Gen. Christophe Gomart, alla direzione dell'intelligence militare francese (DRM, *Direction du renseignement militaire*) riferendo al Parlamento francese dell'area di crisi libica nel 2016

¹⁸ G. GAIANI, *Migranti, l'urgenza di interventi sugli scafisti*, Il Messaggero, 26/05/2016.

¹⁹ A. MANGANELLI, intervista a Nazione-Carlino-Giorno del 17/5/2007 dal titolo *Coi banditi ai ferri corti, cronache di storie vissute*.


segnalava le interconnessioni possibili di flussi marittimi tra porti turchi e porti libici, con special riguardo alla città di Misurata²⁰.

In tal modo criminalità organizzata libica, criminalità transnazionale, immigrazione clandestina, estremismo ideologico jihadista e criminalità economica comune sono fenomeni che sembrano sovrapporsi e saldarsi in parziale intersezione tra di loro.

Più in generale, per dirla in maniera anglofona in Libia abbiamo oggi un *complex tactical environment*, tale che il laboratorio politico libico con i suoi molteplici attori inter-agenti non sembra consentire oggi una chiara concertazione di bisogni e obiettivi delle parti.

In chiave di psicologia dinamica dei gruppi, le posizioni delle varie parti sottendono infatti un iceberg di necessità e paure, interessi e valori differenziati. Non appare agevole individuare un perimetro comune ove costruire²¹.

Fig. 3: Rappresentazione dell'Iceberg P-I-N (Posizioni, Interessi, Necessità).
(Tratta da G. Candotti, La negoziazione nella risoluzione dei conflitti,
http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/IASD/65sessioneordinaria/Document/s/466InnegoziatonellarisoluzionedeiconflittiCANDOTTI.pdf)



²⁰ <http://www.opex360.com/2016/07/13/selon-la-drm-il-existe-veritable-flux-maritime-les-ports-turcs-la-libye-pour-ravitailler-daesh/>.

²¹ http://www.difesa.it/SMD_/CASD/IM/IASD/65sessioneordinaria/Documents/466InnegoziatonellarisoluzionedeiconflittiCANDOTTI.pdf.

La gamma ideologica rappresentata dalle diverse entità libiche è oggettivamente amplissima, e non tutti i gruppi sono forse riconducibili ad una logica politica non violenta (v. figura a pagina seguente).

Si pensi in questo senso anche alle misure adottate subito dopo la caduta di Gheddafi. Il Governo ad interim di Tripoli, Il Consiglio Nazionale di Transizione, annunciò l'erogazione di stipendi a tutti quelli che avevano combattuto il regime e le forze lealiste. Nel giro di poche settimane i rivoluzionari "dichiarati" arrivarono a oltre 250.000 unità (a fronte di una stima di effettivi reali di circa 20.000 individui), incentivando la creazione di nuovi gruppi armati indipendenti dal potere centrale, creando feudi di potere delocalizzato²².

Fig. 4: Rappresentazione grafica di una possibile Matrice di Valutazione delle Percezioni, avente ad oggetto la detenzione e uso di armi da parte di soggetti extra-istituzionali (milizie/altri gruppi informali).

(Tratta da Joint Publication 2-01.3, Joint Intelligence Preparation of the Operational Environment, U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009; <https://fas.org/irp/doddir/dod/jp2-01-3.pdf>)

PERCEPTIONS ASSESSMENT MATRIX								
Condition	Cultural Norm	Proposed Alternative	Population's Perception	Acceptable Difference In Perception	Root of Difference	Possible to Change Perception	Proposed Solution	Possible Consequences
Use of firearms	Criminal Elements Carry Weapons openly	Confiscate All weapons	Unfair; population not protected by traditional means	No	Culture: Criminal element provides a measure of security for population	No; population and friendly forces at risk	Psychological operations program; Weapons turn-in program	Civil unrest; armed backlash

A questa pulviscolarità politica, formale e informale, si aggiunge in un'ottica di legittimazione elettorale il basso tasso di partecipazione elettorale da parte di cittadini libici²³.

Il territorio libico è inoltre ovviamente – come ogni altra entità politica – anche un sistema “aperto”, dipendente da notevoli sollecitazioni e influenze esterne (politiche estere di altri Paesi, contermini e non) oltre che dalla proprie turbolenze socio-istituzionali interne.

²² S. ANDERSON, *Fractured Lands: How the Arab World Came Apart*, The New York Times, Magazine, August 2016 http://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2016/08/11/magazine/isis-middle-east-arab-spring-fractured-lands.html?_r=0.

²³ C. GLENN, *Libya's Islamists: Who They Are And what They Want* <https://www.wilsoncenter.org/libyas-islamists-who-they-are-and-what-they-want>, Wilson Center, Washington, DC.

Tra le sollecitazioni esterne, ovviamente, una riflessione a parte meriterebbe il fenomeno attrattivo rappresentato dalle risorse naturali libiche, come greggio e gas naturale per diversi Paesi esteri vicini.

La sicurezza dell'approvvigionamento e le infrastrutture energetiche di diversi sistemi energetici nazionali hanno infatti rilevanza oggettiva ai fini delle Strategie Energetiche Nazionali (SEN) e dei collegati scenari di riferimento.

5. Conclusioni e prospettive per il futuro

Alla luce della frammentazione libica attuale, occorre necessariamente evitare il proliferare e il diffondersi di visioni e prospettive “antagoniste a priori”.

Come espresse una volta un noto politico italiano, lavorare per smussare gli angoli non conferisce gloria, ma aiuta a premunire le nazioni e gli individui dai fondamentalismi²⁴.

L’“arma della memoria”, felicemente ricordata in un suo recente testo dallo storico Paolo Mieli, gioca un ruolo fondamentale in questo processo di raccordo di valori, volontà e credenze²⁵.

Radicalizzare ed esaltare le memorie divisive (i c.d. “Chosen Traumas”, descritti dallo psicoanalista Vamik Volkan²⁶) è un esercizio di comunicazione decisamente pericoloso, come ben sanno i media degli estremisti affiliati al radicalismo islamico, soprattutto alla luce dell'attuale giovane piramide demografica libica.

Portare invece alla luce le memorie inclusive e coesive – come può essere il caso storico dell'Istituto di Alti Studi Islamici di Tripoli creato per limitare l'esodo studentesco libico in Egitto al tempo di Italo Balbo oppure anche quello attuale dell'assistenza umanitaria fornita dall'Italia²⁷ – può aiutare nel trovare punti di contatto e di mediazione con diversi segmenti sociali quanto a visioni, culture e progettualità.

Come suggerito dal Dott. Paolo Scotto di Castelbianco, Responsabile della comunicazione istituzionale del PcM-DIS e Direttore della Scuola Unica di Formazione

la comunicazione conforma l'immaginario e produce significati, anzi una gerarchia di significati. Essendo noi stessi immersi in un framing costante, in un continuo break point tra fatti e opinioni, dobbiamo prestare estrema attenzio-

²⁴ G. ANDREOTTI in F. MARTINI, *Nome in codice Ulisse*, Mondadori, 1999.

²⁵ P. MIELI, *L'Arma della Memoria, Contro la reinvenzione del passato*, Rizzoli, 2015.

²⁶ http://www.huffingtonpost.com/khwaja-khuro-tariq/isis-and-the-chosen-traum_b_8223950.html.

²⁷ http://www.difesa.it/Primo_Piano/Pagine/20160412Aiuti_umanitari_46_brigata.aspx.

ne alla c.d. sentiment analysis (analisi dell'opinione e percezione dei diversi gruppi sociali di riferimento)²⁸.

Più nello specifico, allora, oltre a focalizzarsi sulle dinamiche del presente confronto politico ruotante attorno al duopolio formale Al Serraj-Haftar, andrebbe parallelamente indagata con attenzione e profondità la memoria e narrativa storica dei vari gruppi clanici libici, vera ossatura sociale del Paese²⁹, al di là delle categoria e sovrastruttura statale e della attuale minaccia “epidemica” avente natura califfale-estremista. Dinanzi al rischio di insolvenza finanziaria del contesto economico libico³⁰, occorre poi ristabilire il ciclo di produzione e le esportazioni petrolifere, nonché distribuire internamente le rendite e i proventi anche su base clanica e tribale. Questo al fine di generare redditi in grado di coprire i bisogni essenziali della popolazione libica, compresa l'elettricità, la sanità e le infrastrutture³¹.

Il generale statunitense Michael T. Flynn – già Direttore della *Defence Intelligence Agency* (DIA) statunitense dal 2012 al 2014 – così si è espresso sul rischio di marginalità dell'intelligence rispetto a una strategia di azione, evidenziando proprio i fattori abilitanti del tessuto socio-economico:

focalizzando la maggior parte degli sforzi di ricerca e raccolta sugli insurgent groups, spesso si è incapaci di rispondere a domande fondamentali circa l'ambiente di azione, ignorando o male interpretando i meccanismi di economia locale, le dinamiche di obbedienza sociale e potere informale³².

Nel contesto libico, si pensi alle tribù *Warfalla* (storicamente radicata nella Pubblica Amministrazione e nell'Esercito monarchico libico del quale rappresentava la quota maggioritaria), *Zuwaya* (storicamente attestata nelle aree desertiche attraversate dalle condutture petrolifere), *Qadhafi* o *Gheddafa* (tribù

²⁸ Convegno “*CounterIntelligence, la protezione del Sistema Paese dallo spionaggio e dall'ingerenza*”, Istituto Sturzo, Roma, 25 maggio 2016.

²⁹ Storicamente, l'*Human Terrain System* (HTS) libico, composto da circa 6 milioni di abitanti suddivisi in un network di circa 140 gruppi tribali, ha sempre avuto un centro di identificazione nel livello clanico-informale più che nello Stato-apparato. Lo stesso concetto gheddafiano di *Jamahiriyya* (*Stato delle masse*), elaborato nel *Libro Verde* del 1975, implicitamente sembra dare rilevanza ed enfi all'aspetto sociale-familiare-popolare più che all'aggregazione politico-istituzionale formale. (V. K. MERZAN, S. COLOMBO, S. VAN GENUGTEN, *L'Africa Mediterranea, Storia e Futuro*, Donzelli, 2011).

³⁰ L'economia libica è basata sull'estrazione ed esportazione di idrocarburi (principalmente greggio), che contribuiscono al PIL nella misura del 70%, generando circa il 95% delle entrate fiscali e il 98% dell'export totale. <http://www.parlamento.it/application/xmanager/projects/parlamento/file/repository/affariinternazionali/osservatorio/focus/PI0022prov.pdf>.

³¹ http://it.radiovaticana.va/news/2016/08/14/libia_le_milizie_libiche_mettono_in_sicurezza_sirte_/1251351.

³² MAJ GEN MICHAEL T. FLYNN E ALIAS, ‘*Fixing Intel: A Blueprint for Making Intelligence Relevant in Afghanistan*’, Center for a New American Security, 4 Jan. 2010, available at www.cnas.org.

originaria della Cirenaica, trasferitasi nella regione di Sirte nel XIX° secolo e legata all'aviazione e al Mukhabarat, i servizi di sicurezza) *Maqariha* o *Al-Farjani* (la tribù di appartenenza del Gen. Haftar³³), al clan *Mangoush* (presente nella città portuale di Misurata, al quale è dedicato un quartiere della città vecchia).

Questi gruppi hanno decine se non centinaia di anni di storia propria, narrative ed auto-percezioni³⁴.

L'*Islamic State*, di converso, ha solo 2 anni di storia identitaria, ed è per di più – rispetto alla Libia – un fenomeno importato ed extra-locale per quanto in relativa espansione numerica fino ad inizio anno 2016³⁵.

Al di là della virulenza o della presa ideologica di breve periodo di IS, va infine ricordato come la storia di lungo periodo di braudeliana memoria può continuare ad avere il suo peso specifico nello sviluppo delle dinamiche e relazioni umane in terra di Libia.

Per lo storico francese F. Braudel (1902-1985) infatti, lo strutturalismo storiografico viene spiegato con una suggestiva metafora: la storia “eventuale” (ovvero quella di breve periodo, dominio del cronista) corrisponde all'increspatura superficiale delle onde, mentre i grandi mutamenti corrispondono alle correnti del mare, ben al di sotto del pelo dell'acqua. Questo è alla base del suo concetto di storia quasi immobile.

Adottando una prospettiva a-storica, l'auspicio corrente da parte Occidentale per il futuro libico è che si possa giungere ad una condizione di:

- monopolio legittimo della forza da parte di forze di polizia e di difesa libiche unitarie;
- direzione e controllo operato una autorità politica riconosciuta e legittimata tanto sul piano interno che da un punto di vista internazionale.

Ma questa è appunto la prospettiva occidentale. Le culture sono diversamente stratificate, e una logica occidentale potrebbe essere non completamente applicabile in diversi contesti geografici, culturali ed ideologici (c.d. *non-western intelligence systems and cultures*).

³³ Nel grande gioco delle prospettive identitarie, e oltre al legame tribale, secondo alcuni Haftar sarebbe gravato dalla doppia “ipoteca storica” di essere stato un ex-comandante di Gheddafi oltre a persona già vicina agli Stati Uniti (ove ha a lungo soggiornato). Ciò potrebbe essere elemento ideologico cavalcabile tanto dal sostrato di antiamericanismo tutt'ora presente in taluni settori della popolazione libica, quanto da chi vedrebbe nella sua figura una – seppur parziale – continuità con il precedente regime gheddafiano.

³⁴ A. MONTI BUZZETTI COLELLA, *Qui sotto c'è una tribù*, Focus, Scoprire e Capire il Mondo, Giugno 2015.

³⁵ Secondo Alessandro Orsini, docente alla LUISS di Roma, nel novembre 2015 i miliziani di IS in Libia sarebbero stati circa 3000. Nel febbraio 2016 erano diventati 5000. A. ORSINI, *Minacce interessate contro l'Italia in Libia*, Il Messaggero, 1 maggio 2016.

La realtà dei fatti nel Paese magrebino potrebbe convergere con un certo grado di difficoltà ad un simile modello nel breve periodo, considerando ad esempio proprio i suoi poli pulsionali di natura tribale.

Il Gen. Giuseppe Cucchi, già Segretario Generale del CESIS, Direttore del DIS-Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri nonché ex Addetto Militare al Cairo, ha parlato in tal senso della fondamentale questione dei c.d. “*cerchi di fedeltà*”, vale a dire quei cerchi sociali concentrici il cui più interno rappresenta un singolo soggetto, circondato progressivamente dalla famiglia ristretta, da quella allargata, clientelare, amici clan e tribù³⁶.

Sarà dunque fondamentale la gestione dei conflitti tra i diversi cerchi³⁷, cercando di non pregiudicare gli equilibri dinamici interni. Nel mondo arabo-maghebino le dinamiche di potere informale, non istituzionale e personale sembrano avere tutt'ora hanno un peso specifico rilevante nella determinazione e nell'allocazione di risorse e valori.

Altro elemento significativo per una corretta comprensione del contesto libico sarà una approfondita ricognizione dei diversi micro-ambienti sociolinguistici di interazione.

Capire la gente, posti e luoghi presuppone conoscenza della lingua di espressione corrente dei cittadini del posto.

Sotto questo aspetto, va osservato che gli studi sui dialetti e la lingua libica non hanno storicamente vantato primazia all'interno della dialettologia araba.

A tal riguardo si pensi come solo nel Maggio 2015, alla 11^a Conferenza dell'AIDA (*Association internationale de la dialectologie arabe*) svoltasi in Bucarest, per la prima volta nei 20 anni di storia dell'associazione è stato dedicato un panel interamente dedicato al dialetto libico.

Gli *arabic dialects* parlati a Tripoli, Bengasi e nel Fezzan sono stati investigati negli anni recenti con particolare attenzione dagli studiosi arabisti dell'INALCO (*Institut national des langues et civilisations orientales*) Dominique Caubet e Christophe Pereira.

Quest'ultimo ricordava come negli anni 2000 ancora numerose parole italiane venivano utilizzate per i nomi di oggetti e utensili³⁸.

³⁶ G. CUCCHI, citato in U. RAPETTO, R. DI NUNZIO, *L'Atlante delle Spie*, Bur, 2002.

³⁷ Voci dal Mondo, Radio Rai 1, Reportage dalla Libia, Puntata del 15/05/2016. Intervista al generale Mohammed al Gharsi del comando unificato per la lotta allo stato Islamico. Intervista in studio al Prof. Giuseppe Bettoni, Professore di Geografia Politica all'Università di Roma Tor Vergata. <http://www.vocidalmundo.rai.it/dl/portaleRadio/media/ContentItem-d93538b7-beaa-412f-9967-6fc8dbf25b6c.html#sthash.CnDPWWpE.dpuf>.

³⁸ Pereira, Christophe, 2007. *Urbanization and dialect change: The Arabic dialect of Tripoli (Libya)* http://www.academia.edu/1218694/Urbanization_and_Dialect_Change_The_Arabic_Dialect_of_Tripoli_Libya_.

Fra i più curiosi, sicuramente c'è il termine *do-mani*, che significa sterzo (*steering wheel*) ed evoca chiaramente l'atto fisico con il quale si guida (a "due mani" appunto).

L'auspicio per il futuro è che chiunque siederà al volante della Libia del futuro sia ben attrezzato alla guida, pronto ad evitare gli ostacoli che si frapperanno lungo la strada della auspicata riconciliazione e della pacificazione nazionale.

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ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES

Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Italian Case

LARIS GAISER, PIETRO SCHIOPPETTO

Key Words

SWF, geofinance, economic intelligence, public intervention

1. Sovereign Wealth Funds

Sovereign Wealth Funds (SWF) are state owned funds of investment that manage portfolios of financial activities. Such funds began in the 1950s with the foundation of the *Kuwait Investment Authority (KIA)* — 1953 specifically, 8 years before the independence of the country from the British Crown — and have increased dramatically with the end of the past millennium, on the wave of development in the financial sector. Considering the definition given by the International Monetary Fund (*Sovereign Wealth Funds — Generally Accepted Principles and Practices — Santiago Principles, 2008*), SWFs are funds or other vehicles of investment created purposely and possessed by governments for macro-economic goals; they hold, manage and administer their own activities in order to reach specific financial objectives, employing various strategies of investment including external activities; they generally derive their own availability from a surplus of balances of payments, operations on the official reserves of currency, income of privatizations, fiscal surpluses, or export turnovers of raw materials (Curzio, Miceli 2009). Their origin, that is historical antecedent, can be traced to the Companies of the East and West Indies founded by European sovereigns (French, English, Dutch, Danish, and Swedish) during the 16th and 17th centuries. These presented certain characteristics common to the investment funds of today. Just as today certain sovereign subjects have surpluses of foreign money tied to the sale, generally, of raw materials such as petroleum or gas, so too in the past the industrial revolution produced wealth for certain monarchs to invest in order to promote the economic development of their own countries — as well as the expansion of colonial empires — giving life to the interweaving typical of geo-politics and geo-economics, that still today characterizes that type of activity. The importance of understanding the SWFs is in the fact that they can be used in a targeting way in strategic sectors for the economies of the countries. They can

be the object of attention on the part of intelligence since they could easily lend themselves to operations of “colonization countdown” (Jean 2012). For example, their work could lead to failures of foreign countries present in the sectors in which others intend to acquire monopolies, or to create a market that is more suitable to the sale of their own products. Sovereign funds can be differentiated on the basis of their own finalities: funds of stabilization, funds of savings, companies of investment of reserves, funds of development and funds of retirement. The definition of SWF given by IMF excludes the official reserves held by central banks, companies of public property in the traditional sense of the term, public or private pension funds that directly deliver the retirement loans and that are financed through retirement contributions, and obviously any financial activity managed or held by private groups. The main actors in this field are the countries of the Persian Gulf, Singapore, China, Russia, and Norway and up until a short while ago, Libya. Having passed through alternative phases in which they were first ignored, then looked upon with worry, and therefore accepted with benevolence due to the international economic crisis, and finally fallen into the same difficulties due to the world climate, there are almost 60 sovereign funds today with an activity of almost 4 trillion dollars and the first ten most important operators hold 77% of the total patrimony. By 2017 it is estimated that the goods in possession of SWFs could accumulate to 8 trillion dollars. We are talking about conspicuous figures, and if one recalls that 80% of SWFs pertain to governments of the Middle East or to emerging countries of Asia, it is easy to understand why their investments receive particular attention by western politics. The strategic sectors and national security are easily exposed, at least in theory, to their penetration, also because it is clear that as an expression of state willingness, their action on the international market is impregnated with geo-political aspects and are bringers of interests that fit beyond the maximization of returns. SWFs are global actors that are capable of influencing markets and states. As we will see in the following analysis, however, the great world economic powers have up until now known how to respond to the potential political use of funds, by issuing laws of defence or by acting politically so to limit their influence.

From a historical point of view, the decision of the British administration of the Gilbert Islands, today the Republic of Kiribati, to give life to the *Revenue Equalization Reserve Fund* in 1956, in order to capitalize on the annuities of the local phosphorus mines, followed the institution of the *KIA* in 1953. In the 1970s, in the wake of the increase in petroleum prices, the exporting countries accumulated great quantities of fine currency that had to be reallocated. Abu Dhabi, Alaska, USA, Canada and Singapore formed their own sovereign funds. The 1980s and 1990s were characterized by a sensitive

fall in prices of unrefined materials and by the growing globalization that facilitated the flux of capital and created commercial imbalances between the countries that were indebted and those that accumulated financial reserves on the basis of exportations. Oman and Libya were convinced that their future development could not be trusted to petroleum and gas alone and founded, respectively, the *State General Reserve Fund* in 1980 and the *Libyan Arab Foreign Investment Company* — which came before the *Libyan Investment Agency* (LIA) — in 1981. Like a wheel, Brunei (1984), Norway, Malaysia (1993) would follow. In the 1990s, it was above all the currency crises that hit the emerging countries. They restricted certain sovereign entities to allocate their currency wealth to investments with more secure returns. The Chinese *Safe Investment Company* (1997), the *Hong Kong Monetary Authority Investment Portfolio* (1998) and the *Korea Investment Corporation* (2005) were founded. The increase in prices of unrefined materials in the beginning of the new millennium would finally give a final propulsive incentive to the phenomenon of the SWFs that would give them a considerably increase to their number and capitalization. By 2007 and 2008 these funds became among the main international actors of the financial sector that had definitively entered into the crisis and were in need of saving. During these two years, two thirds of all transactions undertaken by SWFs since 1995 were recorded with two important trends: the first of geo-economic nature brought a preference of investments toward Europe and the United States; the second of sectorial nature brought the net preference for the banking and financial sector with 92 billion dollars invested — more than half of those in the USA — in only 12 months.

SWFs are instruments that represent the capitalism of a state with a distinctly geo-economic nature or, if one prefers, geo-financial. 35% of the total *assets* of SWFs pertain to countries of the Middle East based on petroleum revenues. 37% is linked to the Asian area where the *China Investment Corporation* (CIC), the Singaporean *GIC Private Limited* and the *Temasek* are the leaders of the area and for the most part the SWFs are based on the fiscal and monetary surpluses of Beijing's trade revenues from its exports. North America barely arrives at 2% with the *Alaska Oil Fund* and the Canadian *Alberta*. Africa holds 4% while South America can count on the Chilean retirement fund based on the derivatives of copper exports that holds 2% of the sector. Europe in proportion to its own economic power can be said to be practically absent with 9%. On the Old Continent, we can count on the Norwegian retirement fund and two Russian funds (*Reserve Fund* and *National Wealth Fund*) — based on unrefined and gas revenues — together with some marginal funds, the more recent French and Italian strategic funds and the

Irish retirement fund. The European Union as a political entity is completely absent.

The fact that the countries of the EU are not protagonists in the sector theoretically leaves the counterparts with greater margins of movement and pressure. Therefore, in Europe as in the United States, they have watched the emergence of the growing economic clout of sovereign funds following the crisis of subprime mortgages in which they intervened with their capital in various international banks such as USB, Merrill Lynch and Barclays, the perplexities have grown and sometimes full-scale suspicions on the political use of funds. They arouse this perplexity because of the possible interferences of foreign governments — mainly non-democratic — in the management of enterprises. If we want to be more precise we can identify three types of possible problems: a) pertinent to possible penetrations in the strategic sectors of the domestic economy and consequent capacity of influence of the choices at the international level; b) control and sale of strategic goods or transfer abroad of industrial knowledge; c) problems tied to public security. Today, Germany, France and the United States are countries that have adopted protective measures in the face of SWFs, for the most part due to their lack of transparency.

The international sector does not have generally accepted existing regulations and the size of funds are usually inversely proportional to their transparency. In order to avoid such difficulties in the future, the position that the European Commission, the International Monetary Fund and the OECD take will be very important. All three organizations listed above have published behavioural suggestions in recent years with the goal to facilitate the exchange of information and comprehension, that is, the collaboration between receiver and giver. The OECD has adopted the ministerial declaration on SWFs and the politics of receiving countries (OECD 2008), the group of work of the IMF, a code of auto-regulation pertinent to the means of reporting, governance and transparency, known as the Principles of Santiago — voluntary rules to assure that the funds operate as subjects of the market with sufficient clarity — and the European Commission has published “*The so-called Sovereign Wealth Funds: regulatory issues, financial stability and prudential supervision*” (Mezzacapo 2009) in 2009. In this document, despite all of the cares of the case, the Commission asks national governments to avoid the adoption of protectionist measures against investments of Sovereign Funds, recalling the attention of member states to the fact that possible restrictions against investments are already compatible with the principles established by the EC Treatise, in particular those regarding the free circulation of capital.

All of this clarifies how the big international actors watch attentively to the evolution of these vehicles of public investments. The possession of import-

ant financial resources and their strategic, coordinated use can affect changes in geo-economic equilibriums in the international system given that the SWFs are, clearly, an extension of state power between the public and private sectors and therefore an integral part in the field of economic intelligence. These do not always act by merely following the financial logic of the maximization of profits, but rather they sometimes follow the goals that can be considered a prolonging of power. While the private sector is generally oriented toward profit in the short or medium term, the SWF are not subject to this type of pressure, they are the property of the strategic-state, which was hinted at in the introduction. In 2009, the Pentagon organized a two day military exercise in Maryland. The emphasis of these war games was placed not only on military aspects, but also on the global economic scenario and the related spheres of influence of nation states. One of the proposed scenarios was that of an unexpected and improvised withdrawal of a SWF that was hostile to the United States in a context of a generalized geo-political crisis (Csurgay 2011). This demonstrates with what attention the big powers follow the phenomenon described here and with what depth they study its possible effects. Those who occupy themselves with economic intelligence must recall the fact that the size or the financial weight of a SWF is not always of primary importance. Very often the geo-political weight of the owner state is more important. Despite the fact that it is the United Arab Emirates hold the majority of goods in sovereign funds, the reallocation of investments from the country have less of an impact than those made and forecasted by larger countries with fewer financial resources, such as Russia or China. In the geo-financial game that we are discussing, the psychological perception of power is therefore of fundamental importance (Kirshner 2009). Vladimir Putin represents one of the rarest cases of public declaration of pursued strategic directives (Putin 2006). The use of funds, before the economic downturn caused by the EU/USA sanctions related to Ukraine issue, was completely integrated with the geo-political and geo-economic objectives of the country. According to President Putin, the financial means obtained by exports from the extraction of raw materials — the principal resource of the nation — must be used to help socio-economic development in Russia. If the country does not have a sufficient system of small and medium-sized industries to create, in the medium term, wellbeing and stability, the public administration must burden itself with a “*top-down*” strategy that contributes to the creation of a stable social state. Furthermore, the earnings that derive from international investments must be able to guarantee the updating of technologies and the development of additional scientific knowledge so that the great industrial complexes can continue to compete with the Western multinational organisations in the segments of primary importance for Russia, namely aviation, defence and ener-

gy. The strategy delineated by Putin has produced its first results in the past ten years and has signified the abandonment of the neo-liberal development model in favour of the strategic-state model oriented toward the perfection of economic intelligence in the historical vital sectors. The goal of the Russian external strategy is, alternatively, to re-earn positions in the neighbouring areas that Moscow considers as within its sphere of influence: Caucasus, Central Asia and Eastern Europe. On the other hand, the most recent laws regarding this do not follow any international logic based on reciprocity, given that, while Russia acts proactively toward the external in coordination with agencies of intelligence, the latter, specifically the FSB, are actively involved in the control of possible external penetrations of controlled funds by states in the ownership of 39 companies that are part of the sensitive sectors of nuclear energy, aerospace, natural resources and the industry of defence.

The second giant, perceived as such, is China, which is clearly interested in pursuing the “*go global*” strategy, that is, the internationalization of the Chinese economy, coordinated by the Office of State Enterprises and by the Commission for the control and administration of public goods that predicts within the context of China’s peaceful development (*peaceful rise*), with which the Asian giant wishes to become a central power in the world equilibrium without having to deal with military tensions or conflicts, a substantial jump in the economic quality that favours the strategic-state as a whole. The funds handled by Beijing are different from those of Moscow. They are not based on returns generated by natural resources, of which the country is running out, but by balance surpluses from exports, from great quantities of foreign money and savings held in the nation’s coffers. The People’s Republic, like that of its Russian neighbours, used SWFs to earn geo-political influence. By directing it, for the most part, towards regions rich in raw materials, such as Africa, China locked in their industrial supply chain which fuels a middle class that is today estimated to be about 300 million people. The rest of the capital from the SWFs is directed towards the West where it hopes to gain political influence and technological know-how. The guiding principles the Chinese authorities follow concerning the use of financial capital are: a greater “earning in impressive quantities of foreign money held, to reduce the excess of liquidity and savings in circulation, to gradually reduce the goods based on the American dollar, to reduce the international pressure on the national currency due to the undervaluing of the tax of exchange, to facilitate the globalization of their own financial sector, by receiving new experiences, to obtain the transfer of technologies that help the transition toward an economy based on the knowledge the produces goods with high added value, to develop the strategic international force and to earn geo-political influence in the various corners of the world.” (Csurgay 2011, pag.58)

In this sense, we can cite two emblematic cases of SWFs for geo-economic use that illustrate the aspirations of China and the effective coordination of state economic intelligence. In 2004, the Chinese Lenovo Group acquired IBM's personal computer business in a deal worth 1.75 billion US dollars. The investment led to the acquisition and transfer to Asia of technological knowledge with which Lenovo was able to become a relevant player in the sector of personal computers and to make a jump of general quality in the industry of the country toward a "*knowledge based*" society. The second case of particular relevance can be found in the acquisition by the automobile company Geely of Volvo from Ford, in 2010, for 1.8 billion dollars. The greatest benefit found for the Chinese producers was to be in the acquisition of information, as well as productive capacities, in adherence to the standards requested by EU markets.

China holds 1 trillion and 152 billion dollars of the public debt in the USA and in 2010 its Sovereign Wealth Fund acquired over 9 billion dollars in shares of American enterprises, including Morgan-Stanley, Bank of America and Citigroup. In addition to this, it possesses significant shares in Apple, Coca Cola, Johnson & Johnson, Motorola and Visa. Interdependence is the instrument with which Beijing seeks to pave the way for its own *peaceful rise* and to safeguard itself against threats and obstacles set down by rival countries. We are dealing with a geo-economic strategy based on capital in exchange for security, capital in exchange for sovereignty, and capital in exchange for political autonomy and for non-interference. The investment moves guided by state interests do not have only a purely market value, but are deeply characterized by geo-political values with large-scale consequences, and the United States feel themselves called into action. To maintain the advantage, they cannot respond, even on other sections of the chessboard.

During the bipolar confrontation, Africa was used as a continent in which the United States and the USSR could conduct their own "proxy wars", by competing at a distance. With the Fall of the Berlin Wall, the continent went back to being "forgotten" in that it was not vital for the world equilibrium and for the single superpower that had remained on the earth. Following this, the RPC knew how to seize upon the opportunity by rushing into the void that was left and slowly positioning it as a privileged partner, above all, one that was not intrusive, since it did not interfere in the doings of internal politics and did not demand democratic standards. Beijing knew how to use its own resources to earn itself a strong political advantage that it was also able to demonstrate to the world, on the occasion of the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation held in 2006, to which they presented to 48 African nations. The use of the SWF has played a pivotal role in Chinese geo-political strategy.

Energy companies of the country are today significantly present in Angola, Nigeria, Chad, Libya, Guinea, Sudan, and Algeria (Claire 2008).

As already underlined, SWFs are clearly an instrument of economic intelligence suitable for pursuing market objectives together with geo-political objects. All this gives form to worries for which the western democracies have not been able to find adequate answers. As underlined by Brad Setser in the *Special Report*, n. 37 edited by the *Council on Foreign Relations* by the title “*Sovereign Funds and Sovereign Power*” (2008), the principal strategic problem is found in the fact that the political and military power of a debtor also depends on the support of the creditors and China is a creditor of the international system *par excellence*, as well as a majority holder of US debt. In the international system of equilibriums it is difficult to imagine that a power can feel sufficiently free when its own financiers are not even an allied country. For the United States the “financial weakness of the debtor (...) becomes a strategic vulnerability” and the non-democracy of the majority of countries that control Sovereign Wealth Funds become a “political vulnerability of the *soft power* of the USA” (Curzio, Miceli 2009, pag.97). Nevertheless, despite the fact that it is clear that the growth relative to SWFs could, in the future, contribute to modifying the means of confrontation of the big powers and general equilibriums, up until now, there have been no striking examples of threats to the national security of OECD, EU countries, or towards the USA. Sovereign Wealth Funds tend to be attracted to situations of stability and by favourable economic climates. However, it is also true that the past does not necessarily represent the future and certain operations that have already been carried out by sovereign funds in the United States, Australia and Europe have contributed to foment the debate that is internal to national security, that is, to the defence of the national interests, by reinforcing, furthermore, the conviction concerning the necessity of introducing new safeguard laws, and in this way, by scratching the sanctity of the theorem of free exchange and the flux of capital in the globalized world. In 2005, the *China National Offshore Oil Corporation* (CNOOC) launched a hostile public offer, valued at 18.5 billion dollars, against the American petroleum company, *Unocal Corporation*. Within a few months (November 29, 2005) the *Dubai Ports World* (DPW), controlled by the Sovereign Fund of Dubai, *Dubai World*, attempted a hostile acquisition of the *Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company* (P&O), a company that managed the main ports of the United States (including those of New York and New Jersey), through a public offer, valued at 5.7 billion dollars. In Australia, over the course of 2007 and 2008, the large investments made by the sovereign funds, *Temasek* of Singapore, and by *China Investment Corporation* (CIC) caused a clamour. The acquisition of a stake (14.99%) of Rio Tinto (one of the biggest mining companies

in the world) by Chinalco, a *state-owned Chinese enterprise* also caused concerns. The worries concerning the risk associated with investments into strategic enterprise that Sovereign Wealth Funds would participate in became the object of many public declarations by those of political authority. This paved the way for processes focused on introducing new national disciplines regarding foreign investments and a phase of national enterprises held to be strategic or to review those that were already existing.

In the month of October 2007, The USA equipped themselves a new law for the regulation of investments from abroad, called Foreign Investment and National Security Act of 2007 (FINSA), updating the competencies of the Committee on Foreign Investment in the United States, chaired by the Secretary of the Treasury who was guilty of having given the “green light” to the above-mentioned acquisitions. The European Union, on the other hand, did not remain immobile. Concerns were also expressed by the President of the European Commission, José Miguel Barroso, who had confirmed that the “European Commission was really concerned with the way in which certain Sovereign Funds of third countries were operating, even if they represented, without a doubt, an opportunity for Europe. Funds of public and private European investment were subject to strict rules of governance and information; we cannot allow non-European funds to be managed in an opaque way, and used to achieve strategic-geo-politics (Alvaro, Ciccaglioni 2012, pag. 20).

During those years within the European Union, the then-President of the French Republic, Nicolas Sarkozy, among others, was also concerned, and on several public occasions had wanted to manifest his own fears toward Sovereign Wealth Funds, above all with the reference to the lack of transparency of the related systems of *governance*. Already on September 10, 2007, the French President, at the end of a meeting with the German Chancellor, Angela Merkel, had hoped for “*particular attention*” for the sectors in which the competition was “*distorted by Sovereign Funds*”. During the session of October 21, 2007, Sarkozy proposed the creation of European Sovereign Funds to the European Parliament, one for each state, that could front the recession and “*defend strategic European industries from possible hostile actions on the part of non-European countries*”. On February 8, 2008, he furthermore declared that “*France would not provide inert aid to the growing financial power of the Sovereign Funds and of those who were speculating with particular audacity. It is out of the question that France will stand still without reacting.*”(Gaiser 2016, pag.151) Even the European economic and social committee, in turn, in its opinion, on November 5, 2009, the purpose of which was “*to consider the impact on industrial change of Sovereign Wealth funds (SWF), and Alternative Investment Funds (AIF). AIF are Private Equity (PE) and Hedge Funds (HF).*” It confirmed that “*Many OECD governments have*

stressed the importance of monitoring and possibly regulating SWF. There is a concern that SWF investments are a threat to national security and their lack of transparency has fuelled this controversy. In turn, this provokes protectionism and economic nationalism amongst recipient countries. A further concern is the lack of accountability which could cause SWF to distort or destabilize financial markets." (Gaiser 2016, pag. 152).

Therefore the European Commission initially reacted in 2008 with the Communication *A common European approach to Sovereign Wealth Funds* in which the principal EU institution related that "*within the EU, several Member States are looking at whether to make their own policy response [with respect to the rapid expansion of Sovereign Wealth Funds]*" and that "*recent experience shows that the opacity of some SWFs risks prompting defensive reactions. Indeed, in recent months, several Member States have been under pressure to update national legislation and to explore applying exceptions to the application of the principles of free movement of capital and establishment.*" (Gaiser 2016, pag. 152)

Following this, the Commission published the already cited *Economic Papers* in 2009, with which they tried to direct member states toward an approach that would recall the orientations of the Justice Court in its law, that made reference to the *golden shares*, *action spécifique*, or, according to the Italian order, to special powers of the state in the privatized companies, which means that the states have the right to limit foreign investments when it is necessary to pursue goals that care for the public order and national security. Motives of a purely economic nature are therefore inadmissible. Nevertheless, moving at the international level can be risky for the integrity of the internal market that, in recent years, due to the economic crisis, has already suffered pressures that have seen it on the brink of a cliff, together with the entire European construction. To have 28 heterogeneous positions does not add up to a sufficient response; nevertheless the Commission today does not have the powers to directly negotiate agreements with third parties on direct investments. The most probable scenario is that single countries will continue to operate, each on their own, elongated lists of sectors to monitor, watering down the specifics as occurred in the USA, France, Germany and Japan, in which one regularly speaks of the defence of the "sensitive infrastructures" (Curzio, Miceli 2009, pag. 109). As suggested by Alberto Quadro Curzio (2009), perhaps it would be good to begin to think not only from the defensive point of view but also from the offensive, that is, the proactive, positioning oneself as the EU in the market of Sovereign Wealth Funds in order to have the opportunities to play on the same level and also to take advantage of such financial vehicles in order to better amalgamate the common market or the collaboration between countries of the Euro group. A European

Sovereign Wealth Fund would underline a retaking of the capacity of institutional economic engineering that in its 50 years of construction, the EU has abundantly demonstrated and it would be concrete sign of revitalization of the process of cooperation that underwent so much damage from the economic crisis of the last few years and from the often weak connected decision of the continental political representatives. The fund could be constituted by official gold reserves of countries adherent to the Euro system and would immediately become one of the biggest SWF in the world with an estimated capacity of about 400 billion euro. This endowment would immediately have positive consequences:

- the EU would go from a passive to an active player in the world of SWFs;
- the EU would be able to invest in the “internal” market, financing enterprises, banks and infrastructures;
- the EU would raise the standards of transparency and operation of SWFs to the global level;
- the European Sovereign Fund would be a part of a project of broad breath that would provide the emission with European titles of public debt.

During the initial period of research for a solution at the European level, the French President, Sarkozy, brought forward his own national solution that culminated in November 2008 in the launch of the SIF, that is, of the Strategic Investment Fund with an initial capital of 20 billion euro. The fund, that was activated very quickly, received its objective from the politics the goal of protecting national enterprises from possible unwelcome acquisitions. The work of the SIF was oriented almost immediately in favour of operating industrial enterprises, above all in the sector of advanced technologies, not to mention operations in support of small and medium-sized enterprises for which it gave life to a fund of *private-equity* that allowed or stimulated their invention. Other initiatives of the Strategic Investment Fund was characterized with the creation of a specific fund dedicated to biotechnology and in stipulated agreements of collaboration between various national *software* producers. The SIF possesses several characteristics than distinguish it from traditional state industry.

First, it acts as minority shareholder, investing in firms that are at the top level of their respective markets, relevant for national competitiveness because of their technologies and assets. This practice recently joined the majority shareholder model as a viable alternative to control the economy and became a popular choice for States, even prevalent in countries like India and Brazil (Musacchio, Lazzarini 2012). It is often complemented by special voting rights like double voting for state-owned shares in France and Golden Share and Golden Powers in Italy (Alvaro, Ciccaglioni 2012).

Secondly, The Fund acts as a Long Term Investor, assuming business risk and supporting industrial plans. By putting a profitability limit to its action,

the French State defends itself against accusations to act to recreate a center of state-owned industries or to rescue bankrupt companies.

Thirdly, SIF has established partnerships with other SWF in order to make joint investments in the national strategic enterprises, thus allowing the French authorities to permit foreign investments on which they are able to keep close supervision.

The SIF represents thus a highly innovative experience that sharply contrasts with EU's action stagnation. In the last years, the European network of national SWF has never progressed from a project stage. Only recently EU re-assumed an active role of economic growth promotion with the Juncker Plan.

France instead progressed on its path of development, creating a new kind of Investment Funds that, while maintaining many features similar to the ones of SWF, has different objectives and structure. This same pattern has been quickly followed by Italy with its Italian Strategic Fund (Fondo Strategico Italiano, FSI), now renamed CDP Equity, whose experience is analyzed in the second part of the article.

2. A peculiar case of SWF: the Italian Fondo Strategico Italiano (now CDP Equity)

For complex historical and cultural reasons, Italy faces difficulties in articulating and pursuing its national interest (Graziano 2007). In the last decades the country has slowly reacted to new possibilities of the global economy. But in recent years, security threats and original examples of public investments have pushed for new forms of intervention. The impending need to defend Europe's second largest industrial sector with scarce public resources, led to the intervention of Cassa Depositi e Prestiti (CDP) which mobilized resources around 58 billion Euro between 2009 and 2014 (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2015).

CDP, traditionally active in the sectors of postal deposits and local authorities finance, became a public company in 2003. Therefore, it deeply changed its nature and activities of investment and internationalization. In the investments field, CDP assumed a central role in supporting public policies, passing from a financial holding dedicated to finance investments of the public administrations to a real National Development Bank that grants liquidity to the bank system to ensure credit access to the Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs). Towards internationalization CDP is initiator and core sponsor, together with European Commission, EIB and CDC, to KfW, to the Spanish Instituto de Crédito Oficial, to Polish PKO Bank and to Marguerite Infrastructure Fund while together with BE, CDC, the Egyptian Hermes Bank and the Moroccan Caisse des Dépôts et Gestion, it sponsored the In-

framed fund for infrastructure in the countries of southern and eastern Mediterranean (Bassanini 2015).

Acting out of the perimeter of the state sector (although owned 70% by the Ministry of Finance) its operations constitute a form of state intervention that does not fall under Maastricht constraints (Ninni 2013). Its interventions are not considered State aid and its financial activities are not consolidated in the Italian public debt.

Currently its goal is to mitigate the weaknesses of Italian productive system: under capitalized companies, little focus on innovation and internationalization and an average small size of the companies which cannot be addressed without funds and directives from the public sector. CDP can act as a development bank, activating financial instruments, such as export and credit guarantees but it's also able to develop an industrial policy to promote the growth and the consolidation of the company's capital. In 2012 the resources invested are equal to 1,5% of the Italian GDP.

This role is enhanced by the recent CDP's acquisition of the status of a National Investment Bank. The EU Regulation n. 2015/1017, which governs the European Fund for Strategic Investment (Feis), attributes this status to organizations that receive from member states the mandate to carry out development activities or promotion. Of the 34 billion Euro with that eight states made available to support the Feis, Italy contributed with 8 billion through the CDP.

Within the equity area CDP created two instruments: the Italian Investment Fund (FII) and the Italian Strategic Fund (FSI). The first is an equity fund aimed at strengthening small and medium-sized enterprises capitalization and size, in order to create "average national champions".

The second, Italian Strategic Fund (owned 90% by CDP and 10% by Fintecna, 100% CDP) was launched in 2011 with a capital of 4,4 billion of euro and the goal to involve up to 7 ml in the Italian economy.

The Fund birth, structure and mission closely intertwine with the aforementioned French experiences and concerns about economic security. FSI was established with the objective of defending national champions from foreign takeovers. Because of the European Union limitations on the protectionist actions, these objectives are not directly mentioned and there aren't traces of them in the incorporation deed (Ninni 2013). At the same time it is clear how the structure, mission and action of the Fund faithfully follow SIF's features listed above.

FSI's looks toward medium to large firms of national interest, aiming at supporting their growth, aggregations and to strengthen their competitive position, thus generating an economic return for the public investor.

At the same time, the Fund promotes agreements and joint ventures with foreign institutional investors (Qatar Holding, Russian Direct Investment

Fund, the Kuwait Investment Authority and Korea Investment Corporation) in order to channel foreign direct investment in the Italian system. An example is the 2012 agreement signed between FSI and Qatar Holding LLC (QH). This created a joint venture called IQ Made in Italy Venture, with a total capital of 2 billion €. Its objective is to invest in Italian companies operating in sectors of Made in Italy: food, fashion, furniture and design, tourism, lifestyle and leisure, with the aim of creating a pole for luxury goods (Accetturo 2013).

Like the CDP, FSI defines itself “a medium to long term investor” and a “patient capital provider” which intervenes to overcome a number of structural limitations of Italian capitalism providing investments adequate to business plans and economic cycles.

The Fund identifies companies that are compatible with its intervention within specific criteria defined by the Ministerial Decree of Implementation (DM 08/05/2011) and its Statute.

Sectoral criterion: companies must be active in areas of “national interest” (defense, security, infrastructures, transports, communications, energy, insurances, brokerage, research and high-tech innovation, public services, tourism and hotel, agribusiness and distribution, management of cultural and artistic heritage).

Dimensional criterion: firms must generate an average annual turnover of not less than 300 million euro and employ not less than 250 units of personnel.

Systemic criterion: if the company generates a relevant industrial cluster or creates positive externalities for the Italian economy as a whole, the requirements falls to 240 million euro and 200 units.

At least one of these requirements must be satisfied in order to justify the intervention of FSI. The company must be Italian (but also companies that have subsidiaries or permanent establishments in the country may be taken into account), the revenue must not be less than 50 million Euros and the number of employees exceed 250. On the basis of 2013 data over 2,000 Italian enterprises fall within the potential target of the Fund.

Besides these requirements, additional bylaws prevent FSI to intervene in non-economically sound operations or in companies in need. The enterprises which receives the investment must be in a situation of economic balance and present prospects of profitability. The Fund financial investments are geared to an economic return on investment in line with market yields, so FSI behaves like a private investor, investing with an implicit prohibition to save firms from bankrupt.

The Fund’s investments follow a series of patterns of intervention and although there are not explicit objectives, however we can clearly identify some lines of action.

1. To strengthen the industrial system: FSI acts as medium to long term investor and provides capital to companies which are leaders in their industry or have the chance to become if provided with room for growth, but are unable to obtain financial resources on the private market. Once these companies have been put on a virtuous track, they may aggregate other economic realities and attract the much needed investments.
2. To consolidate the local public services sector: the objective is to aggregate the operators of a currently dispersed sector of utilities and to create “national champions” that would be able to sell their services on the international market.
3. To support the construction of infrastructures: in order to support the growth of companies operating in the sector and to construct the infrastructures themselves. This action will benefit the entire production system. Investment modes follow three main criteria.

1. Investment is preferably in primary capital, although the acquisition of existing shares isn't excluded.
2. Minority stakes are bought in order to avoid market distortions by the public operator. The Fund may derogate from this important principle and become the majority shareholder in only two cases:
 - The acquisition of a company that operates in a sector where there is a natural monopoly.
 - In order to correct a temporary financial imbalance which could jeopardize the assessment of the value of a healthy company and cause its sale for a distorted prices.
3. The investments have value of at least 50 million euro. To reduce risks, FSI differentiates its portfolio by investing no more than 20% of its capital in each industrial sector.

The institution governance reflects the need to bring together strategic dimension and profitability of investments within an articulated structure. A Board of Directors is responsible for identifying the strategy and approve the investments. Its action is supervised by a Board of Auditors. Alongside we find the Investment Committee, which evaluates investment opportunities by issuing opinions. Finally, a Strategic Committee, made up of seven recognized experts, expresses sound opinions in the areas of intervention and general investment policies.

On 31 March 2016 the assembly of members FSI (CDP 80% and 20% Bankitalia) has renamed the company from Italian Strategic Fund to CDP Equity, allowing the company to continue to manage directly and through the vehicle FSI Investments all the investments and assets that are already in the portfolio.

This name derives from the new business plan that clearly divides the portfolio of the investments into a “market area” and a “system area”. Acquisitions considered “temporary”, like those in which FSI behaves as a private

equity fund by entering into the company's capital to relaunch the activity and then sell its share, will be separated from those of the "system", investments in infrastructures and utilities of national priority which are thought to remain permanently in the portfolio the FSI.

Furthermore the management has now not only the explicit task of promoting the development of Italian companies of medium to large size but also to pursue the entering of new investors among the shareholders of the company, in order to lower the CDP share from the current 100% to a minority stake.

This whole operation is strongly linked to the new CDP industrial plan 2016-2020, that under the direction of Costamagna and Gallia aims at allocating 160 billion Euro in four key areas: companies, public administration, infrastructure and real estate. To these resources must be added another hundred billion fruit of possibility granted to CDP to access the resources put together by the EIB under the Juncker plan.

The reorganization of the Fund is considered instrumental in enhancing the CDP capability to boost the growth of national firms and defend strategic economic assets.

For the topics of this research, according to the Statute, nor the internal structure of the society nor the investment criteria has changed till now and there haven't been any new major investment in the last months. Considered these elements and for clarity reasons in this text we maintain the name Fondo Strategico Italiano (FSI) to define the CDP Equity, waiting for future developments of the society.

The objectives of the Fund are now extremely ambitious. Although not backed by a constant stream of financial resources like many majors SWF, it has been tasked with important missions. A brief examination of some of its investments is useful to verify if the Fund's action is adequate to its objectives of strengthening the industrial system, the local public services and the infrastructure sector.

1) Ansaldo Energia (AEN) is the main Fund's investment and the one that best illustrates its strategy to strengthen the industrial system. In 2013 FSI acquired 100% of AEN by Finmeccanica, allowing it to focus on the sectors of defense and machinery industries. In the medium term, it seeks to list the company on the stock market and to dilute the share of the Fund to a minority stake. AEN is a historic Italian company, a center of technological excellence, a strong exporter and source of a considerable industrial cluster. Today the company is a pioneer in the fields of electrical systems and gas turbines.

The Fund has inserted Shanghai Electric (SEC), which acquired a 40% ownership, in the capital. The SEC entrance is instrumental in order to carry out plans of technological development and market strategy of AEN in Asia: a series of joint ventures were promoted, Research and Development laborato-

ries in Shanghai and in Genoa were created and new investments in the Far East, for years the main market of Ansaldo, were made.

The Ansaldo operation has therefore accomplished all the FSI objectives. It strengthened and internationalized a relevant company in a strategic sector (energy), with positive effects on exports and on the Italian economic system. It injected foreign capital from institutional investors without loss of the Italian identity of the firm. It produced an economic return from the investment and reduced the share of the Fund to active minority (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2015).

2) Regarding the sector of local public services, Interbank Company for Innovation (SIA) represents the most significant and creative intervention of the Fund. SIA is a leading European IT services company dedicated to financial institutions, businesses and public administrations, in the areas of payments, network services and capital markets. It currently operates several relevant networks on behalf of the Bank of Italy: the National Interbank Network, the Traded Market in the Italian Stock Exchange of Government Bonds and platforms for the settlement of payments.

In 2014 the Fund acquired 49.9% of the company, aiming for a growth in size that may activate a process of concentration of the rather dispersed national sector of e-money and payments. The national security issue of ensuring the digital payments security that underlies this investment is quite evident. The other objective is to leverage the group's expertise in order to help to speed up the digitization of public administration processes, in particular payments, e-invoicing and relationships with citizens, thus containing costs and improving the PA services. A further goal is to speed up the diffusion of the use of electronic money in Italy, currently below European average, thus strengthening economy and contrasting its underground sector (Cassa Depositi e Prestiti 2015).

3) Finally, regarding the infrastructure sector, FSI has a significant investment in Metroweb Italy Spa, a group of companies active in the construction and management of optic fiber infrastructures and owner of the largest fiber network in Europe. Still today, in Italy the broadband diffusion is not even close to the objectives of the Digital Agenda. FSI's investment aims at filling this gap and it's part of a plan to bring under state control the system of networks, after the attempted sale of Telecom to the Spanish firm Telco.

The retard in ICT development is a heavy burden for Italian firms. Not only the companies aren't yet fully covered by broadband but there is a delay in the adoption of all the related technology in particular in the management of supply chain and business activities. The recent document "Italian Strategy for Ultra-Wide Band" announced a strategic plan for the ultra-wide band aimed at achieving by 2020 the coverage of 85% of the population with at least 100 Mbps connectivity (Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri 2014).

The document boldly states that «The ultra-wide band will be the backbone infrastructure of the entire economic and social system», with clear reference to the cyber warfare threat to the national security.

The implementation of the plan was originally to be carried out by a synergy of Metroweb, Vodafone and Telecom, but this possibility soon disappeared, given the unavailability of Telecom, still anchored to the protection of the copper cables infrastructure, to cooperate with Metroweb. The plan had then to pass several stages of development and evaluation at EU level. An interventionist approach presented Metroweb as main actor, in competition with private operators. Instead another vision imagined a complementary relationship between public and private investors, with public invests in areas where individuals do not have sufficient backing, so that a market failure would be almost inevitable. The examination at Brussels strengthened this second approach.

These patterns have determined a division of forms of public support for geographical areas. In areas defined of high private return potential (A and B), government grants will not be possible or disbursed in limited ways. Instead in areas C private operators could intervene with a substantial public contribution (70 percent) in the capital. D areas have been identified as those in which private investment would not be available even in these conditions.

In the month of June 2016 the notice of pre-qualification tenders for allocation of subsidies for the development of ultra-wide network in unprofitable areas finally came out.

Enel Group entered the broadband market through the creation of a new company Enel Open Fiber, EOF. This firm will focus on the realization of ultra-broadband connections by exploiting the already existing electrical infrastructure without going into the market retail. It will also participate in future tenders for the construction of the ultra-broadband network in areas C and D. Finally on August 2016 CDP Group communicated the integration between Metroweb and Enel Open Fiber. The latter will carry out a capital increase of 714 million euro, reserved to CDP Equity. Following the capital increase, Enel and CDP Equity will hold an equal stake in EOF. At the same time EOF will buy for 714 million euro the entire capital of Metroweb, which will be enhanced to 814 million euro.

This set of interventions seems to define a separation between the management of the main infrastructures and retail services and a public-private collaboration guided by state-owned and state-controlled firms Enel and Metroweb. It is a clear example of creative Geo-Finance intervention that will allow Italy to build up the ultra-broadband network under State guidance without breaking the EU rules on state aid.

These interventions also highlight how the nature of FSI is somehow ambiguous. Although listed as a SWF by research institutions, such as the lead-

ing SWF Institute, FSI-CDP Equity cannot be considered a “normal SWF”. As its french counterpart, it manages portfolios of financial activities as an Institutional Investor and seeks long term perspective, minority shares and profitability of its investments. But contrary to major SWFs, it doesn’t count on resources from commodities market or trade surpluses and its defensive action seeks to protect national firms rather than acquiring shares of companies on the international market. Nonetheless the Italian Strategic Fund, taking into account its mission and its actions, clearly emerges as an actor of industrial policy and Geo-Finance.

As already stated, this role isn’t emphasized in its documents and statements. Despite the crisis and the return of public intervention, the idea of industrial policy is still opposed ideologically in Italy. At the same time concepts like Geo-Finance and Economic Intelligence are still confined in a narrow academic debate and can’t find any spot on programmatic documents.

The Fund action doesn’t represent a return to the old forms of State Intervention but the application of the Grey Economy model and Geo-Finance approach. It blends objectives, personnel and practices of public and private sectors while attracting and controlling at the same time international capital inflows.

Augusto Ninni highlighted the main changes compared to the twentieth-century state intervention: the investment in healthy companies only, the role of minority shareholder, the criteria of efficiency and profitability of investments, the management selected from the private sector and employed according to its rules. The Fund is able to act without undergoing many forms of pressures. Its management is reasonably free from the requests exerted by the shareholders of private companies to constantly increase stock’s value. The Fund also avoids the distortion of economic rationality caused by politicians on public companies in order they serve social purposes (Ninni 2013). Furthermore Bassanini notes that the FSI interventions, market operator of the CDP Group, are not considered neither state aid nor debt, marking them a strong element of discontinuity (Bassanini, Reviglio 2015).

There are also other clear differences between CDP and IRI, the former Italian public holding of state industries, which was instrumental in the realization of the Economic Miracle of the 50’s but was later labeled as inefficient and disbanded in the ’90s. First, IRI was essentially a management holdings company. Instead the equity component administered by CDP Equity, compared to the total of CDP activities, it is rather less than 15%. Second, by law and by statute, CDP can only invest in companies in a position to stable financial equilibrium, with adequate opportunities for growth and profitability. The rescue of companies in crisis does not fall within the scope of the activity of CDP, reflecting precise European constraints. Third, the IRI employed

mainly public capital while CDP employs mainly private resources, from households and, to a lesser extent, by the financial markets (Bassanini 2015).

We can also add that it's now the right time for a more balanced view of the decades-long IRI experience. The recent history of IRI by Laterza, clearly highlights the institution's central economic role in the fascist and post-war era. Its six volumes have pointed out the resilience shown in the 80's and clarified how the holding disposal was to a large extent imposed by the European Commission. Despite the positive contribution to the public finances that allowed the entrance of Italy into the Euro area, this privatization wasn't completely justified by economic reasons but had instead a highly ideological background. This decision deprived the country of a central economic player and of a vital heritage of industrial and organizational culture and it wasn't followed by the rise of any private subject capable of assuming the same leadership function that IRI had played for decades (Artoni 2014)

The study of the FSI policies thus shows how the Fund has assumed a role in economic policies that was long neglected by the public actors. But is this role "strategic", as the Fund's name suggests?

The term strategic suffered in the second half of the twentieth century, a heavy "semantic overstretch", overflowing from his political and military significance to a productive, communicative, marketing extension. It became a communicative tool to signal relevance, primacy, long-term planning. Recovering the term significance in a sense broader than the traditional one but more respectful of the original meaning, strategy may be defined as «the art of success in face of conscious opposition in an environment that is conflictual, but not necessarily violent» (Bozzo 2012).

As highlighted in the first part of the article, globalized economy can be read as an Economic War or a Geo-Finance Competition, in which states (even if the game is at positive-sum and takes place in largely cooperative forms) compete and hinder each other to maximize their comparative advantage and safeguard their sovereignty through economic power. Given the primacy of international financial market, the management of capital inflows has become crucial to defend the national productive structure. The adjective "strategic" can be therefore applied in the sense of «pursuit of national interest through Geo-economic competition» (Bozzo 2012). Applying this theoretical reflection to FSI, we can affirm that the Fund fulfills a strategic function articulated in four dimensions.

1) In the first dimension/sense, it can be said that the Fund is strategic because it's concerned about the success of companies operating in sectors that the Italian Government has decided to be "strategic". According to ministerial decree (DM 08/05/2011), the «companies of relevant national interest» are strategic companies that play key role in the national economy for their sector

or size (Cassa P Depositi e Prestiti 2013). The sectors are: defense, security, infrastructures, transports, communications, energy, insurance and financial inter mediation, research and high-tech innovation, public services. With the decree of 2 July 2014 which replaced the one of 2011, the scope of the Fund intervention has expanded to tourism and hotel sectors, agribusiness and distribution and management of cultural and artistic assets.

The choice of sectors clearly resumes the indications of Law No. 474/1994 (art. 2) to protect the Golden Share, «companies directly or indirectly controlled by the state operating in the defense, transport, telecommunications, energy sources, and other public services» and Law No. 56/2012, which creates the Golden Powers regime. The State action can be extended to all companies deemed strategic, operating in the sectors of defense and national security (art. 1, Law 56/12) and in the energy, transport and communications (art. 2, L. 56/12). In each case, the FSI's intervention seeks a different strategic objective.

- Companies in the defense and security area fall into a classic sense of strategy linked to the threat of military aggression. These companies, that still generate significant economic and technological return, must be defended in any case from the competition and from foreign takeovers.
- The areas of infrastructure, transport, communications and energy, the complex of networks, have an important role in the National Security Strategy (recently increased because of the risks linked to cyber warfare) but can also be considered the back-bone of the productive system.
- The areas of insurance, financial brokerage, research and innovation and public services are in general basic services for the economic activity as a whole. Insurance and finance sectors were in the past under strict state control. Scientific research, especially basic research, is highly dependent on public funds.
- Finally, public services are mostly provided by companies owned by local authorities. Investments in these are a relevant for Geo-Finance competition.
- Tourism and hotel sectors, agribusiness and distribution, management of cultural and artistic assets, are instead more specific sectors of the economy, with less systemic importance for the overall production. However, they have importance for the Italian economy.

2) The second strategic dimension is made up by the action of the Fund aimed at overcoming the structural elements of weakness of the Italian productive system. The greatest strength of the Italian production system is its indisputable reserve of entrepreneurship: «Italy has an extraordinary, and in some ways unique, entrepreneurial culture. [-] It is the country in Europe with the highest number of firms in absolute terms» (Coniglio 2007).

The role of export oriented industrial enterprises is crucial: «In 2012 the Italian industry produced 257 billion euro of added value, with an occupancy

of 4, 7 million people. Today it accounts for less than 20 per cent of added value and total employment, but it is a key source of innovation and competitiveness (realizing more than 70 percent of spending on research and development of the private sector) and has a decisive role in keeping poised the balance of payments (accounting for almost 80 percent of exports). Using more and more services, it also acts as a driving force for the service sector: industrial exports incorporate added value produced by the service sector for 40 per cent of its total value (OECD / WTO, 2013)» (Accetturo 2013).

However, various factors play against the national economic system: small size of the companies, reliance on bank system, low technological innovation and poor internationalization. The Italian “dwarfism”, with an absolute predominance of micro-enterprises, even if it contributes to entrepreneurship and employment, damages the economy in terms of efficiency and technological development. Both the productivity gap of Italian companies and their dependence from a bank-centered financial system are real problem. and The 2008 crisis and the following credit crunch have carried out a merciless selection of firms.

Technological development is the basis of the economic position of the States. The low technological level of Italian productions, despite the excellences, is undoubtedly linked to the structural problem of the small size of the company but even more to the lack of an Innovator State, as Mazzucato suggested.

In *The Entrepreneurial State* she shows that, contrary to popular perception, the greatest technological innovations of XX century were a result of researches stimulated or directly carried out by public bodies. Mazzucato suggests that any State should configure as Entrepreneurial State: a public actor aware of his economic mission that explores the “risk landscape” by stimulating research and creating new markets. This action is crucial where large capital investment are required in uncertain situations. The role of private sector is certainly not excluded, but the author emphasizes its short-term horizon and its tendency to depend for the costly and uncertain business of basic research on bodies that are largely dependent on public financing (Mazzucato 2014).

The absence of an Entrepreneurial State in Italy has unfortunately deep historical and cultural roots. Since the Economic Boom the country continued to base its growth on a «model of development without research». Some explanations for this sort sighted policy may be the poor penetration of the secular, reformist and positivist values of science in the society, the political instability that inhibited long-term projects and favored a party-division of resources and the institutional weakness that did not allow the rise of civil servants figures able to connect public bureaucracy, research and companies without favoring private interests (Pivato 2011).

The internationalization limits are perhaps the most serious deficiency, closely linked to the other problems mentioned. «Between 1990 and 2010 the world stock of FDI has increased tenfold, a much more rapid progress than GDP and international trade». Empirical evidence clearly indicates that companies that invest abroad tend to benefit from internationalization, in terms of access to markets and efficiency gains in the use of resources. Italy finds difficult to operate in this context both as an investor and as a receptor of investments. «Italy accounts for a market share of just over 5% (FDI), less than half of its value for the EU's GDP (12%). The distance between Italy and other major European economies is confirmed even if measured by the amounts of investment received from abroad: less than 5% of the investments in the EU are directed in Italy» (Cristadoro, Federico 2015).

There is also an institutional problem: the public support system for internationalization works via different entities and Ministries but acts without coordination and frequent overlaps. «Italy devotes considerable human and financial resources to the promotion, especially when compared with how much other major European partners invest. This is not reflected in the settlement capacity and expansion in foreign markets, or in the degree of production internationalization of enterprises» (Vergara Caffarelli, Veronese 2013). A more coordinated system to support diplomatic/trade policy and greater transparency in the use of public funds would be much needed improvements.

The assistance from the Fund can be effective in overcoming each of these limits, as reflected by its policies and the cases previously analyzed. The financial problem is dealt with the acquisition of shares and the entry of foreign partners in the company's capital. Companies are pushed into enlargement policies to overcome the status of SMEs. Technology receives special attention as investments in high-tech companies which promotes the expansion of R&D are favored. The internationalization support to companies (exports, foreign investments and partnerships with institutional investors) is addressed in order to supply a real public good. These operations are more coordinated than the average ones of the public sector, thus making the weight of the state support in trade policy really making the difference.

3) The third strategic dimension is a specific feature of the FSI that we will call "screen function." In Europe the capitals of SWFs constitute indispensable resources for national economies but the risk of losing control of strategic assets worries politicians and opinion makers. As in few other fields it's clear the dilemma between economic openness and sovereignty.

Following the French experience, the Fund intervenes by opening to foreign funds its areas of expertise while ensuring both remuneration for the investor and national control. «It is thus outlined in fact a further mission to CDP (in the form of FSI), to help attract foreign investment in Italy [-] with-

out necessarily giving in to foreign investors the controlled interests, indeed usually helping to maintain control in Italian hands [-]. To 3 billion euro acquired in two years by FSI, in fact you can add the 2,1 billion paid by State Grid of China for the acquisition of 35% of Networks (the company that owns the control of Terna and Snam) and 500 million granted by KfW for financing infrastructure projects or Italian SMEs; as well as co-financing agreements (for a total of 4 billion) subject of two Memorandum of Understanding signed between CDP and the China Development Bank and between CDP and the Brazilian BND» (Bassanini 2015).

The idea underlying this policy is that it is possible to intertwine foreign investors in a network of economic and political relations, making them co-interested in the vitality of Italian companies and national economy itself. The Ansaldo case is the clearest example of the validity of this strategy. The main obstacle to this policy is the size of Foreign Institutional Investors, representing the growing importance of non-Western countries, compared to the resources of the Strategic Fund. Italy risks to quickly become a minority partner in these kind of openings and to be forced to accept unfavorable agreements that would reproduce the risks of predatory acquisitions that FSI was created to avoid.

In the long term the operation could work only under the condition of an overall Italian economic recovery, an increase in the resources of the Fund and a careful institutional scrutiny.

4) The fourth dimension summarizes the other three and is linked to the inner nature of Geo-Finance operations. The action of the Fund seeks to protect National Interest: to guarantee sovereignty, to maintain an open, competitive and vital national economy, to defend it from hostile takeovers by international finance, to avoid the loss of productivity and technology. These objectives are fulfilled through a Geo-Finance action aimed at collecting and controlling national and international mobile capitals, putting them at service of the country system, thus avoiding exploitation of the country resources by international finance.

FSI defends and tries to expand a number of companies whose vitality is crucial for the Geo-Finance competition. Benefiting the national economy as a whole, it tries to overcome the structural limits of the system and to reap the benefits of competition and foreign investment, limiting the disadvantages. In an international system in which all the main actors behaves drawing inspiration from Geo-Finance approach and Economic Intelligence logic, the competitive action of FSI assumes its real strategic significance.

3. Conclusions

In conclusion, we can say that the world of Sovereign Wealth Funds offers broad margins of development. This means that the spaces of future manoeuvres are broad on the part of nations in a geo-political sense. SWFs today clearly represent an instrument of that which Carlo Pelanda, in his book, *The Gand Alliance* (2007), defines as a new bipolar clash between democratic capitalisms and autocratic capitalisms in which the great western economies have the task of knowing how to manage such a situation and to respond in such a way that the game is rebalanced and that the international economy leaves reinforced. The financial vehicles examined in this paragraph hide within themselves the seed of capitalism and a national activity that goes beyond of the normal patterns of macroeconomic analysis and the theory of exchanges. The means of response of economic intelligence of the states that are most interested will also be fundamental to understanding in which direction the reforms of the institutions of Bretton Woods can go. The restructuring of the economy and of world finance is a necessity and to do this, it is necessary that the big powers reduce their own symmetrical imbalances.

The analysis of the Italian case shows how, reacting to these changes, the nature of state intervention is increasingly characterized as a middle ground between direct public intervention and private regulatory action.

World economy is evolving into “grey economy” where government agencies are managed with private sector criteria while the State or other public bodies hold minority shares of firms equipped with special powers (Bortolotti 2008). Direct control is replaced by influence, guaranteed by the Statutes and privileged relations of the companies with the government. It is so configured a new variety of state capitalism, characterized by higher efficiency and lower social charges. It is therefore completed the path from the Producer State, sole owner of a vast industrial apparatus, to the Controller State, which prompted liberalization and competition, to the Investor State, that integrates features of the private and the public sectors.

In this context, the action of FSI has already achieved concrete results, with positive repercussions for the Italian economy and sovereignty but many doubts remain on the Fund’s action.

In favor of the overall validity of the project we can affirm that:

- The structure and action of the Fund are consistent with its mission and the Italian and international economy, creatively overcoming the old models of state intervention.
- There are significant opportunities to expand the Fund operations, especially if CDP will assume a leading role in the management of networks.

- The long-term vision makes FSI it independent from political pressures and short sighted interests.
But several critical areas remain:
- Time delay: as for other European countries, an Italian response to institutional investors different from unconditional opening or protectionism came only after the 2008 economic crisis.
- Size: The capital of the Fund is still tiny for the Italian economic needs, in comparison to the French experience and confronting the resources of major Sovereign Funds.
- Dubious Screen Function: the Fund protects strategic companies from foreign direct institutional pressures but links them to dynamic economies and to non-democratic decision-making centers. So it is hard to believe that these countries won't try to exert indirect influence on their investments.

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From Nuclear and Radiological Smugglin to Nuclear Terrorism: Understanding the threat to the European cities

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Abstract

After the terrorist attacks in Paris, Bruxelles and Nice claimed by Islamic State (ISIS) the question that has been raised is if ISIS could use nuclear or radiological weapons in addition to firearms and suicide explosions. This paper has the goal of clarifying the threat's scenario, answering to the following question: *Is there a concrete threat about the use of nuclear or radiological weapons in Europe by ISIS?* In order to this, the first part explains the strong political and divine motivation of attacking the apostates and the evidences in the interest of using CBRN weapons. Lastly, were described the different more likely smuggling routes and the states implicated in the trafficking which a terrorist organization could use for acquiring the materials. The last part concerns the threat assessment. It has been described the two main facilitators of the nuclear and radiological attack by terrorists, in other words the jihadist infiltration in the Balkan and the link between terrorists and criminal groups. The conclusion is that the concrete threat concerns the use of the RDD (radiological dispersal device) in a hypothetical attack against European city, however for logistical and technical reasons it is very unlikely the use of a nuclear device for generating an atomic blast.

Key Words

Terrorism, NBCR, Nuclear, Radiological

1. Understanding the threat scenario

The rise of the *Islamic State of Iraq and Syria* and its gradual claim as proto-state has created a new threat scenario about the use of nuclear and radiological weapons to cause mass casualties and to spread terror in Europe. Then, it is claimed that «there is a very real risk of ISIS using unconventional weapons in Europe and beyond» (Immenkamp 2015, 2). In this framework, is fundamental to analyze the concrete sustainability, the real threat, from the terrorist organizations, specifically ISIS, in relation to the acquisition of nuclear and radiological material. In this way, this paper will focus on three parts:

1. The evidences about the motivations of ISIS of using CBRN weapons in Europe;
2. The main core of the work will focus on the description and representation of the nuclear and radiological smuggling routes, considering specifically the Balkan area and Caucasus;
3. The final part of this paper concerns a descriptive threat assessment divided in two part: Firstly, a focus on jihadist infiltration in the Balkan region and the link between terrorism and criminal groups; Secondly, a brief analysis on the real threat to European cities.

1.1 Islamic State's motivation

Motivation can be decomposed in two different types: a political motivation and a strong-divine motivation of ISIS for achieving its political and religious goals. After the self-declaration of the Caliphate on 29 June 2014 by the current leader *Abou Bakr Al-Baghdadi*, the main ISIS' goal is to build a worldwide Caliphate with a great ambition to lead the lives of all Muslim within the framework of radical Islamic law called *Sharia* (Pichon 2015). Along similar line are U.S officials highlighting that «the Islamic State's goal is to established an Islamic caliphate through armed conflict with governments it considers apostate [...]» (Humud et al. 2014, 43). The ISIS' propagandist system works a lot in this direction for spreading messages of terror “*to the nation of the cross*”, indeed some video have been released by the most important ISIS' media branches, such as *Alwa'ad Media Production*, they have threatened Rome, London and Berlin with phrases as “*Fight them; Allah will punish them by your hands*”. The second side of motivation refers to the will of attack the infidels through any available instrument. This was confirmed by the concretes facts. In August 2015 U.S. intelligence community warned that ISIS would had carried out mass casualty attacks (Sciutto 2015), not long afterwards on 13 November 2015 a series of terrorists attacks have happened in Paris, Saint-Denis a northern district, killing 129 people and others 368 people were injured (Marcus 2015). After three days the arrest of the only survivor of the Paris attacks *Salah Abdeslam* in Molenbeek (Belgium), a second cell linked with the Paris cell attacked the Bruxelles airport and the subway station. Taking advantage of a window of opportunity ISIS, that claimed the attack, killed 35 people and 270 were injured (Readhead 2016). Following are shown the three summarizing aspects about the motivations:

- The extreme ISIS' will to attack the West and submits the infidels;
- The extreme ISIS' will to do that through any available instrument;
- The logistic capacity and the ISIS' will to take advantage of opportunities as much as possible for attacking.

1.2 Evidences on ISIS' motivation about the use of CBRN weapons

These aspects are not merely theoretical in relation to use of CBRN. ISIS has demonstrated different times how, if it can use CBRN, it will do that. Regarding the use of **chemical warfare agents**, since its proclamation, ISIS has used them against the infidels Muslims. Specifically, against the *Syrian Opposition Groups* that is formed by Iraqi, Syrian and Kurds government militia. Despite most of the chemical weapons has been destroyed from the Syria government, in 2014 ISIS used bombs during the battle with chlorine. In the same period, ISIS fighters used chlorine gas for suffocating Iraqi militiamen, causing the death of 300 soldiers.

In April 2015, ISIS bombarded different residential areas and security checkpoints using chlorine gas-imbued grenades. After four months, ISIS used artillery for bombarding Kurds in Makhmour (Iraq) with several health effects (e.g., blisters, burns, damage to the eyes and respiratory system). Finally, in 2015 were used mustard weapons against Iraqi and Syrian cities (Lt. Col. res. Dr. Shoham 2015; Eweiss 2016).

Considering the use of **biological weapons** there are different evidences about the will of use them. Firstly, In January 2014 a laptop was found by Abu Ali, a commander of Syrian rebel group in Northern Syria, in a ISIS' hideout in Syrian province of *Idlib* (close to the border with Turkey). Inside the 146 gigabytes were «found 19-page document in Arabic on how to develop a biological weapons and how to weaponized the bubonic plague from infected animals [but not just that, in fact] the document includes instructions for how to test the weaponized disease safely, before it is used in a terrorist attack» (Doornbos and Moussa 2014).

More recently, in March 25, after Bruxelles attack the authorities captured *Abderahmane Ameroud* in Schaerbeek during the inquiry about the jihadist network in Bruxelles. Inside the Ameroud's bag were found animal biologic materials, such as excrements and testicles, that it could be used for infecting people with illnesses (e.g., cholera) (Norman 2016).

Regarding the use of **nuclear and radiological materials**, ISIS fighters in June 2014 have approximately stolen 40kg of low enriched uranium from scientific department at the Mosul University in Iraq. Despite experts have minimized any superior threat in relation to the quantity and quality of uranium (NATO 2015), «looking at the level of brutality of ISIS, there is a clear signal that the would not hesitate to use [nuclear weapons] against their opponents» (K. Lalbiakchhunga 2015, 16).

In the same way, there are other evidences about the ISIS' interests to nuclear and radiological weapons. Even though the German Intelligence denied the notice, different articles (Dearden 2016; Halkon 2016; The Guard-

ian 2016) reported that *Salah Abdeslam* had relevant documents in his *Mollenbeek* apartment about a nuclear research center. The documents would have concerned the *Juelich Research Center* and the atomic waste stored, near the Belgian border. As it is confirmed there is a clear link between Paris and Bruxelles attack, also there is a connection in relation to the interest about nuclear. This is evident from the Bruxelles suicide bombers *Khalid* and *Ibrahim El-Bakraoui*. They recorded at least 10 hours of footage of the outside of the home of the research and the development head of the Belgian Nuclear Program, probably for kidnapping him. The CEO of the European Strategic Intelligence and Security Center private consultancy said «The terrorist cell [...] naively believed they could use him to penetrate a lab to obtain nuclear material to make a dirty bomb» (Steinbuch 2016).

2. Accessibility of nuclear and radiological materials

2.1 Investigating the nuclear and radiological smuggling routes

After the description of the motivation of ISIS, we proceed to study the accessibility of materials, therefore the related trafficking routes. The analysis will be focused on the Black Sea countries and the neighboring countries, in other words the Balkan Peninsula. Indeed, it was confirmed that «dozens of ISIS jihadists have infiltrated into European countries and have recently installed a “secret base” in the Balkans» (Yousef 2015). In fact, all Balkan countries reveal the existence of different jihadist’s networks and the connected link with organized crime networks. In relation to nuclear and radiological smuggling, there is a concrete difficulty with open source analysis concerning the real number of the trafficking cases. In this sense with the problem of *dark number* are unknown the number of non-reported and not intercepted smuggling cases.

Historically, nuclear smuggling cases emerged in the aftermath of the fall of the Soviet Union in the middle of the 1990s, indeed this transitional period was characterized by a rapid reduction of security and the collapse of the economy. Most likely nuclear and radiological materials that entered in the black market could still be for sale today (Squassoni and Armitage 2015). In according to different researches (Delanoe 2015; Zaitseva and Steinhäusler 2014) the main countries involve in the smuggling are **Russia, Moldova, Ukraine, Romania, Georgia, Armenia** and **Turkey**. Each one with a different *role* within the smuggling routes. Firstly, it will be analyzed the Caucasus, after that the Balkan region. Secondly, investigating on open sources and Global Incidents and Trafficking Database (CNS 2016b), for the main country are shown different smuggling cases from 2010 to 2016 and a more specifically tables of the seizures from 2000 to 2016 (see appendix n. 1 e 2).

2.1.1 Main countries in nuclear smuggling routes: Russia, Caucasus and Turkey

Russia

Russia has been identified as the *primary source* of proliferation of the nuclear and radiological materials, indeed it represents the first point of origin of the materials in order to traffick them in the Balkan Peninsula and Caucasus. This is confirmed by different researches. According to L. Shelley, Director of the Transnational Crime and Corruption Center, «the fact that nuclear materials appear to be leaving Russia via the Caucasus rather than across Russia's long and loosely border with Kazakhstan suggests that smuggling networks have intentionally made the Caucasus their route of choice for nuclear materials [...]» (Hofmann 2011). In the same way, the smuggled materials came from Russia to the Balkan countries through **Ukraine, Moldova and Romania**.

Taking into consideration the case in June 2011, when Moldovan authorities arrested in Chisinau different people during a transaction for selling a sample of uranium. For authorities this was a third case in a series of connected cases¹. In this way, in according to Moldovan authorities the HEU² have been smuggled from **Russia** through **Ukraine and Moldova**, specifically **Trans-Dniester (Transnistria)** that subsequently has been analyzed. The Database on Nuclear Smuggling, Theft, and Orphan Radiation Sources (DSTO)³ has reported that from 1991 to 2012 Russia was involved in 90 incidents relating nuclear material. Considering the trafficking routes in the Caucasus, the following will be analyzed the main countries of trafficking, in other words **Georgia, Armenia and Turkey**.

Georgia

As confirmed by M. Fitzpatrick (2007) «Georgia may be particularly attractive to smugglers due to its geographical position, which allows them to move their illicit goods using both land and sea routes» (128). In according to Georgian authorities and researchers the nuclear and radiological materials pass through into **Georgia** from **North Ossetia** and continue passing for **South Ossetia**, in fact «this channel for nuclear smuggling is considered the most common» (Zaitseva and Steinhäusler 2014, 15). Therefore, Georgia can be considered relevant and strategic country for nuclear smuggling in all Caucasus also for the maritime routes. In other words, Georgian authorities believe that Georgia has become a transit nation mainly for trafficking radi-

¹ In all three incidents «the uranium powder was in a glass ampoule inside a cylindrical lead container, suggesting that it may have been supplied by the same sellers» (Zaitseva and Steinhäusler 2014, 17).

² Acronym for highly enriched uranium.

³ As reported in Zaitseva and Steinhäusler 2014, 14.

ological materials⁴. More specifically, «coming from **Russia** or **Central Asia** across the Caspian Sea, illicit radioactive materials are brought to Georgian ports through **Azerbaijan** and **Armenia**» (Delanoe 2015, 7). There are one main starting-port used for smuggling materials from Georgia: the port of Batumi, in the autonomous **Republic of Adjara**, the traffickers use it as a transit area. From port in Georgia the smuggled materials are directed to **Turkey** (via land or sea) or **Ukraine** (via sea) (Delanoe 2015; (M.P.P.) Fitzpatrick 2007). In the light of this, is interesting to show the Georgian route with a real cases presented below.

Tamaz Demetradze, a former officer with military experience in the Soviet and Georgian armies, was arrested on August 1, 2006 in **Adjaria** for possessing 1 kg of yellowcake⁵. According to interviews with the case investigators, Demetradze was an established smuggler of illicit goods with especially strong business interests and contacts in **Abkhazia** (a breakaway region of **Georgia**), including among law enforcement agencies and organized crime groups, both of which often cooperate with each other in the disputed region. The investigators stated that the uranium originated in **Russia** and was smuggled by unknown Russian organized criminals first to Sochi, a Russian Black Sea resort, and then into **Abkhazia**, where it was stored for two weeks. Demetradze apparently was a long-time smuggling and business associate of these criminal groups and therefore was hired to transport the uranium from **Abkhazia** to **Turkey**, where he was to find a buyer for the material. In Adjaria he contacted two local residents, Aslan Miqueladze and Nodar Dzneldze, who also claimed to have access to radioactive materials. (Kupatadze 2010, 222–23)

In the same way, another case happened in June 2007.

In June 2007, Georgian law enforcement officials arrested a Ukrainian citizen of Azeri origin, Mazhdun Shikhmamedov, and his Georgian accomplice, Emzar Saparidze, in Adjaria, an autonomous coastal region of Georgia bordering **Turkey**. The police recovered natural uranium (yellowcake) and an empty container – emitting an unspecified amount of ionized radiation – that was part of some specialized equipment. Investigation revealed that Shikhmamedov obtained the metal container and the uranium in **Kaliningrad** in 1991

⁴ *Ivi*.

⁵ The *yellowcake* is «the solid form of mixed uranium oxide, which is produced from uranium ore in the uranium recovery (milling) process. The material is a mixture of uranium oxides, which can vary in proportion and color from yellow to orange to dark green (blackish) depending on the temperature at which the material is dried (which affects the level of hydration and impurities), with higher drying temperatures producing a darker and less soluble material [...]» (NRC Library 2016).

from a **Russian citizen**. He stored the materials in **Azerbaijan** until 2007 and then decided to sell them to a **Turkish citizen**⁶.

Considering HEU smuggling in the Georgian route, it is highlighted an incident happened on February 1, 2006 in Tbilisi (the capital and the largest city of Georgia) where MIA authorities arrested four traffickers for trying to sell 100gr of highly enriched uranium. MIA, U.S. FBI and CIA conducted the operation. The main smuggler was *Oleg Khintsagov* a Russian citizens involved in illicit trafficking, with others three traffickers: *Revaz Kurkumuli*, a small businessman and drug-dealer; *Badri Chikhashvili*, a government security guard; *Henri Sujashvili* a contraband trader.

Khintsagov attempted to sell around 3kg of HEU for \$30 million. Beyond this, he bought 80gr of uranium for \$10.000 in Novosibirsk from Rashid in the winter of 1999. Khintsagov stored the uranium in Vladikavkaz (**Russia**) (Bronner 2008; Kupatadze 2010). In the same way, in 2010 two Armenians were arrested by authorities in Georgia for attempting to sell enriched uranium into country. The two smugglers travelled by train from **Yerevan** to **Tbilisi** with 18gr of HEU to a level of 89.4% sufficient for building a nuclear weapon (German 2016).

Others incidents happened have involved the Georgian route, for instance on April 2000 Georgian authorities arrested four persons in **Batumi** for the possession of around 1kg of HEU, the material could have been smuggled from Russia. On September 2000, three persons were arrested by police at Tbilisi airport for attempting to sell a quantity of mixed material (Plutonium and low enriched uranium). The smugglers (one Armenian and two Georgian citizens) said that they brought the material from Russia and Ukraine for selling it in Georgia. On December 2001, 300gr of uranium were seized by authorities in Georgia where probably the material was originated from Armenia (Mutua 2015).

Finally, another element that supports the existence of the **Georgian route** concerns the convictions in Georgia. Indeed, the Supreme Court of Georgia has recorded that since 2002 the smugglers involved in a court cases were twenty-seven, more specific twenty individuals were Georgian⁷.

Armenia

Considering the repeated seizures at the Armenia border and the high number of Armenian traffickers implicated in illicit smuggling cases in Caucasus, it can be confirmed the existence of an **Armenian route** (Badalova 2016) as extension of the **Georgian route**.

⁶ *Ibidem*.

⁷ *Ibidem*.

Armenia is considered another point of entry of the nuclear and radiological materials in the black market. Indeed Armenia's nuclear smuggling starts mainly from *Metsamor nuclear power plant*. Metsamor is one of the most ancient and dangerous nuclear power plant, it was built in the 1960s and 70s and it has a high probability of accidents. In addition to this, Metsamor is dangerous also for the proliferation of nuclear and radiological materials, in fact «in Georgia several members of the gang of Armenian nationality were detained for smuggling of radioactive substances. It revealed the smuggling and transit of radioactive material on the “black market” from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant [...]»(APA foreign 2016). In this way, arrests of Armenians smugglers who have entered into Georgia for trying to sell nuclear and radiological materials have increased in the past two years. The first Armenian trafficker was arrested in 2003 by Georgian authorities for trying to sell HEU that it could have been used for making a bomb. Usually, Armenian traffickers try to enter in Georgia with the materials because Armenia is a landlocked country. In this way, they can use the Black Sea ports for smuggling nuclear material to the Middle East (Sahakyan 2016) or Balkan Peninsula. In the final analysis, «the Armenian-Turkish border is closed, while Russian border guards stand on the border between Iran and Armenia. That is why Armenian smugglers try to use the territory of Georgia and its access to sea, which allows seeking buyers from larger region» (Dadashova 2016).

Turkey

In according to different researches (Lawlor 2011; Zaitseva and Steinhäuler 2014) Turkey represents the main destination inside the nuclear smuggling chain, mainly for the use of maritime routes. Considering the relevance of Turkey in the smuggling chain, the Turkish government has taken a series of measures in order to increase the control and reinforce the borders. In order to this, as described by Dr. M. Kibaroglu (2015) in the last decade the government has produced the following security measures.

The first measures concern the inter-agency cooperation between Turkey and allied nations. Secondly, the measures also regard professionals training for the civil and military personnel. Both Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) and Ankara Nuclear Research and Training Center (ANAEM) have organized regular training courses about various aspects of nuclear security for law enforcement personnel, nuclear industry personnel and academic institutions. More specifically ANAEM has organized courses about radiation protection, radiation safety, nuclear power, nuclear security, nuclear application and nuclear safety. Lastly, training courses on WMD and terrorism are habitually organized in collaboration with NATO Center of Excellence-Defense Against Terrorism (COE-DAT). A practical case of this cooperation concern the in-

stallation of the system for detecting radioactive materials in different border points. The first radioactive detectors were installed at the beginning of the 2000s with the collaboration of the U.S. Now, around 48 border gates are installed. Turkish Atomic Energy Authority (TAEK) continuously monitors these radioactive detectors in real time in order to respond to potential emergency.

Other measures concern the Turkey's membership in international conventions. For instance, Turkey collaborates with the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) for the organization of workshop and meeting on nuclear security. To conclude, Turkey takes part in different international initiatives against nuclear smuggling. For example, Turkey is a partner in the Global Initiative to Combat Nuclear Terrorism (GICNT) and participant in the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI). Furthermore, for avoiding the spread of radiological and nuclear materials, Turkey discourages the use of highly enriched uranium (HEU) and plutonium (Pu) and it encourages the use of alternative materials such as low enriched uranium (LEU). After all, Turkey surely represents a key country for opposing the nuclear and radiological trafficking in the Black Sea region.

The following are reported the main nuclear and radiological smuggling cases recorded from 2010 to 2016 in Caucasus, specifically in Armenia, Georgia and Turkey with the respective summary table (appendix 1).

- **March 2010 (Tbilisi).** Georgian authorities arrested two Armenians men, Sumbat Tonoyan and Hrant Ohanyan. They were trying to sell 18 grams of enriched uranium (HEU) to a buyer who was a Georgian undercover agent. Authorities said the smugglers received the sample from *Garik Dadaian*, another Armenian, who was arrested in 2003 for the sale of 180 grams of HEU into Georgia (European Dialogue 2010). Prosecutor said that the traffickers «had smuggled 18 grams of HEU by train from the capital of Armenia (Yerevan) to the capital of Georgia (Tbilisi), in a lead-lined cigarette box. Such a quantity was nowhere near enough to make a nuclear bomb but was meant as a “taster sample” with more HEU available if the buyer was satisfied» (Moscow 2010).
- **September 16, 2010 (Tbilisi).** Three traffickers were arrested at airport for attempting to sell a sample of uranium and plutonium (Azerbaijani Vision 2016).
- **April 5, 2011 (Batumi).** The Nuclear and Radiation Security Service of Georgia recovered a metal containing Caesium-137. It has been located on board a cargo train at Batumi International Container Terminal (SCHMID and SPENCER-SMITH 2012).
- **April 4, 2013 (Tbilisi).** Georgian authorities arrested three man involved in radioactive materials' sale (AM241). The authorities said the smugglers did not have enough materials for building a dirty bomb (CNS 2016b).

- **December 14, 2013 (Tbilisi).** Georgian border authorities arrested citizens that were transporting Radium-226 for selling it⁸.
- **August 1, 2014 (Sadkhlo).** Georgian authorities arrested two Armenian smugglers, Samuel V. and Artun X. while they attempted to smuggle Caesium-137 into Georgia⁹.
- **June 19, 2015 (Akcakale).** Turkish authorities arrested two Georgian smugglers at the Tel Abyad border in Sanliurfa province. They tried to cross into Turkish territory with 1.24kg of Caesium-137 and 48.23 grams of a mercury all valued at \$2.5 million¹⁰.
- **January 2016 (Sadkhlo).** Georgian border authorities arrested three Armenians traffickers for trying to bring Cesium-137 across the border (Badalova 2016).
- **April 2016 (Tsibili).** At the beginning of April, Georgian authorities arrested six Georgian and Armenian citizens. They were trying to sell Uranium-238 isotope for \$200 million (Antidze 2016). At the end of April, Georgian security services arrested five Georgian citizens who were trying «to sell [\$3 million] nuclear material with total weights of 1 kilograms and 665 grams, which contained two radioactive isotopes – Uranium-238 and a small amount, 0.23 percent, of Uranium-235» (CNS 2016b).

2.1.2 Main countries in nuclear smuggling routes in the Balkan Peninsula

Ukraine

After the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR), Ukraine became «the third largest nuclear weapon stockpile after Russia and the United States» (Buelles 2013). In this way, Ukraine's border is a sensitive position in relation to the smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials, for this reason there is a real security risk about it. If Russia is considered a first supplier state in nuclear smuggling, Ukraine represents the first country that open the nuclear smuggling chain until the Balkan Peninsula or Middle East. The main route from Ukraine to Turkey starts by sea from the famous port of **Odessa** that it is used by smugglers also as a hub for the human and drug trafficking. In addition to this, likely the port of **Ilichiovsk** could be used for smuggling radiological materials, given that it is used for the drug trafficking. For example, «the seaports of **Odessa** and **Ilichiovsk** alone had two tons of cocaine and 759kg of hashish confiscated in 2010. A considerable part of this shipment was destined for EU markets and was supposed to travel through the Republic of Moldova's territory, including its eastern border [...]» (Cornell and Jonsson 2014, 143). Another likely port for trafficking are the

⁸ *Ibidem.*

⁹ *Ibidem.*

¹⁰ *Ibidem.*

port of **Batumi** that it is located near the Turkish border in **Adjara**. In according to Europol Organized Threat Assessment (OCTA) report published in 2011, Black Sea ports are defined as key points of transit and entry for drug, especially cocaine from South America. The Moldovan-Ukrainian border is an important point for storage and processing drug. However, Moldovan authorities have declined these claims despite the different evidences. For instance, in February 2012 in the Ilichiovsk port was intercepted a large cocaine load, around 40kg, that was decided to be received by two Moldovan smugglers¹¹. The consolidated existence of the routes for drug trafficking and the several nuclear smuggling recorded cases in Ukraine allow to affirm with large probability the use of drug smuggling routes for smuggling radiological and nuclear material.

Although most of the illegal nuclear trade in Ukraine regards materials coming from Russia, some of the smuggled materials come mainly from abandoned Černobyl' nuclear power plant. After the accident in 1986 the power plant has become a very window of opportunity for smugglers. To confirm that, on April 5 and 6, 2015, different persons were arrested for attempting to take approximately 600kg (CNS 2016b) of radioactive materials from the exclusion area of the Černobyl'. In the same way, in one of the operations managed by FBI and Moldovan authorities in 2015, they suspected «but couldn't prove, that the uranium had come from the melted down Chernobyl reactor in Ukraine» (Butler, Ghirda, and Dearden 2015).

Aware of the situation in June 24, 2015 U.S. and Ukrainian authorities met in Kyiv in order to define a bilateral agreement to strengthen the prevention, detection and the capacity to respond to nuclear and radiological smuggling. The action plan concerns the securitization of nuclear materials in Ukraine with a greater strengthening of the regulatory and legal infrastructures that control their posses and use. Finally, it is important the securitization of the Ukraine's borders and the U.S. support with the investigations and prosecutions of the nuclear trafficking cases (U. S. Embassy 2015).

Considering the smuggling routes direct to the Balkan countries, **Transnistria** is a very strategic “*tunnel*” in the smuggling chain that connect Ukraine to the other countries in the Balkan. The following it will be explain the different Transnistria's characteristics that make it a key country for many illegal trafficking including the smuggling of radiological and nuclear materials.

Transnistria:
a key country for illegal trade in nuclear and radiological materials

The **Transnistria**, also called **Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic (PMR)** is a republic that was born in 1991 from Moldova. The crisis between the Republic of Moldova and Transnistria started in 1990 after the Tiraspol's dec-

¹¹ *Ibidem*.

laration of independence from Chişinău, the capital of Moldova. Under the USSR, this strip of land was one of the most economical developed part of Republic of Moldova, it specialized in electricity production and heavy industry. Actually, Transnistria is also a fount of radiological materials used in metallurgical plants and other research centers (Gheorghe 2015). In this way, after the declaration Transnistria has progressively become the main center for all kind of illegal smuggling, such as trafficking in human, drugs and arms. Arms trafficking is the main source of revenue for the Transnistrian organized crime in collaboration with Tiraspol authorities. Similarly with the Ukraine's situation, during the conflict in 1990s many stockpile of weapons, such as the most important called Kobasna arsenal, were stolen by criminal groups. This claim was confirmed by different evidences. For instance one of the commanders of the Tiraspol army called *General Mihail Bergman* explained that arms used during the Transnistrian crisis later appeared in Ukraine, specifically in port of Odessa. In addition to this, General M. Bergman also highlighted that the organized crime is not the only ones implicated in the illegal trade arms, indeed also the Transnistrian separatists hide these illegal trafficking and sometimes they directly handle the trades (Cornell and Jonsson 2014).

Considering the nuclear and radiological illegal trade, the Transnistria region represent a reference point for all smugglers of this sector. In according to Gheorghe (2015), Cornell and Jonsson (2014), this claim is confirmed by different evidences in relation to smuggling cases.

On 8 May 2005, the *London Times* reported that a weapons dealer in **Bender (Transnistria)** tried to sell three Alazan rockets¹² equipped with radioactive warheads to an "undercover" journalist. The radioactive materials were Sr-90 and Caesium-137¹³.

Another case regards the nuclear smuggling in Transnistria was revealed by *Washington Post* in 2003, where a journalist uncovered a document from 2001 reporting that Col. V. Kireyev, a commander in Transnistria, revealed the nuclear leakage of the armaments stocked in Transnistria. Linking the previous information, it is interesting to highlight that also the Colonel Kireyev warned that a large amount of Alazan rockets had been changed with radioactive materials¹⁴. The link between Transnistria region and Balkan Peninsula with nuclear smuggling was highlighted from other relevant cases. In July 2010, Moldovan authorities in collaboration with F.B.I. seized 1.8kg of U-238 in Moldova's capital (Perez and Martinez 2015). The smugglers would

¹² «The Alazan was originally designed by Soviet scientists as a weather control rocket to prevent hail. After the weather control experiment failed, the rocket was later used for military purposes. It has a maximum length of 1.4 meters and range of 10 km» (Thomas and Franchetti 2005).

¹³ *Ibidem*.

¹⁴ *Ibidem*.

have sold the enriched uranium in **Transnistria** (Cornell and Jonsson 2014) for €5 million. In 2011, seven people were arrested trying to sell 1kg of U-235, the weapons-grade isotope of uranium, which it had come from Moldova's side in **Transnistria**. Indeed, for this illegal operation the traffickers received orders from their leader, *Aleksandr Ageenko*, while he remained in **Tiraspol**. It is confirmed that uranium entered in **Moldova** through Transnistria region, and later was discovered that the traffickers were planning to manage in others nuclear materials such as plutonium¹⁵.

In this way, is evident that the Transnistria is a center for the nuclear black market because the region includes different **facilitators**:

1. The presence of TOC (transnational organized crime);
2. High level of corruption;
3. Precarious political situation;
4. Precarious or non-existent collaboration with other authorities;

In other words, the political situation does not permit a real collaboration with other countries, especially with the neighboring countries. It is confirmed that «Transnistria amounts to more than a corridor for moving nuclear materials; it is also a choke point for law enforcement. Its police force does not share its records with international law enforcement agencies, because the Republic of Moldova cannot allow the PMR to become a member of Europol or Interpol, lest it amount to international recognition [...]. The anonymity that separatist regions offer, knowingly or not, increases the chances that smuggling groups survive and continue their activities» (Gheorghe 2015, 15). We have many effects of this system, for instance, after the operation in June 2011 all traffickers were arrested except the leader *A. Ageenko*, because Moldovan authorities does not have jurisdiction in Transnistria¹⁶.

Regarding the presence of the transnational organized crime in Transnistria, in according to Cornell and Jonsson (2014) the main crime group derived by criminal networks of the *Vory v zakone*¹⁷ (*thieves in law*). The *Vory v zakone* are a secret criminal brotherhood originating in the Soviet prison system. The thieves in law see themselves as the elite of the underworld brotherhood and the highest status in the hierarchy of “qualified” criminals. The main goal of a *Vor* is to provide protection to lower-level criminals (Lampe 2015).

The second category of criminal group in Transnistria is «organized criminal activity controlled by political and economic elites, partially a remnant of the leadership of the Communist Party in Moldova» (Cornell and Jonsson

¹⁵ *Ibidem*.

¹⁶ *Ibidem*.

¹⁷ *VORY V ZAKONE* is translated in “thieves in law” where *VOR* is the singular and *VORY* the plural form. *Vory v zakone* has also been translated more loosely as “thieves professing the code” or “thieves-with-a-code-of-honor” (Lampe 2015).*vor*.

2014, 138). In this way, the *thieves in law* started becoming involved in the political dimension of the region by starting beneficial relations with political parties and the most important leading personalities. To take an example, the thief in law *Grigore Caramalac* (known under the alias “Bulgarian”) during an interview in the Russian newspaper *Komsomolskaya Pravda* admitted to supporting the Communist party in 1997 during the election campaign with a donation of \$500.000. Furthermore, Caramalac also admitted that he used his influence in order to obtain support for the Communist party in 2001 elections in the South of Moldova. In the 1990s until 2001 there were six criminal networks in Moldova managed by *thieves in law* for generating profits in illegal activities and obtaining power from the economic and political dimension. In this direction, the leaders of *thieves in law* were able to intensify their influences in order to increase the closer monitoring of territory of Moldova and in the closest neighbours including Transnistria (Cornell and Jonsson 2014).

Concerning the terrorist organizations, can be identified four elements that compose the smuggling network in Transnistria. Indeed, we have a combination of transnational organized crime, the State’s support, the access to radiological and nuclear material and the general will to negotiate with terrorist organizations. On that connection, is interesting to highlight the figure of Semyon Mogilevich, who works closely with the Solntsevskaya Bratva organized crime. Osama bin Laden asked Mogilevich for obtaining a nuclear weapon or enough materials to build a dirty bomb. In this way, some sources confirmed that on November 2005 bin Laden purchased seven HEU rods from Mogilevich (Hagger 2013). Despite it is not clear if Ukrainian arms dealer Mogilevich provided Osama bin Laden with uranium (Gheorghe 2015), there is no doubt that from 1993, Al-Qā‘ida started to search for nuclear and radiological materials in order to build a dirty bomb (Evans 2007).

In any case, Mogilevich represents a key figure link between the Russian-Ukraine organized crime, terrorist organizations and Transnistria, in fact «Mogilevich became involved in the privatization of various industrial complexes in Transnistria, including Metallurgical Plant in Rîbnița which contained unsecured radioactive sources» (Gheorghe 2015, 19).

Romania

Another main point of trafficking is the Romania. Many Islamic organizations are present in Romania, some of them reported of having connections with jihadist terrorist organizations, historically Muslim Brotherhood and Al-Qā‘ida. Another evidence about the link between terrorism and Romania concerns that some of the terrorists involved in the 2004 Madrid attacks has passed through Romania (Dronzina and Houdaïgui 2012). In the same way, on the 6th of November 2007 the Italian authorities have delivered arrests mandates

for 20 persons accused of terrorism inside an investigation for discovering a terrorist cell of Islamic fundamentalists originating in Italy with connections in other European states. During this inquiry the links between Romania and Italy were revealed when Kamel Abbachi was arrested in Romania in relation to other suspects who were arrested in Italy and other countries¹⁸. Furthermore, in the same inquiry, the Carabinieri Special Operative Group have highlighted the possible connections between Al-Qā'ida and Romanian groups, we can think that this happened before the phenomenon of the foreign fighters and the above all, the rise of the self-declared Islamic State.

It can be affirm that Romania represents a reference point of criminals and terrorists from states in Asia, Middle East, Central and North Africa that want to acquire materials for building nuclear weapons (Vreja 2007). More specifically Romania could be considered a “*bridge*” for passing in the Balkans Peninsula and vice versa, however Romania is also a meeting point of sellers and buyers, an instance of this concerns a case where two Ukrainian citizens tried to smuggle radiological materials into Romania (Ukraine News Agency 2015).

The importance of Romania as bridge and point of smuggling for nuclear and radiological materials in the Balkan scenario is proved by the collaboration between U.S. Embassy in Bucharest, the Romania's Ministry of Internal Affairs and the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) for the installation of the radiation detection system located at Henri Coandă International Airport in Bucharest. In fact this program is a significant point of the them cooperation in order «to preventing unlawful nuclear transit through [the Romania, and for the] future to keep dangerous nuclear materials out of the hands of proliferators, smugglers and terrorists» (NNSA 2015).

Finally, as described by a National Progress Report, Romania is a State Party to different preventive measures following summed (Nuclear Security Summit 2016):

- *Multilateral instruments* for promoting nuclear security (e.g., the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism);
- *Reinforcement of national legislation* also for preventing terrorists from obtaining nuclear materials;
- *Collaboration with International Organizations* (e.g., IAEA);
- After the Nuclear Security Summit 2014, Romania has undertaken a series of *unilateral commitments*, some of these are currently being implemented;
- Restitution to the country of origin (Russia) the entire quantities of uranium;

¹⁸ *Ibidem*.

- *Cooperation* with U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) for enhancing the physical security of infrastructures that use radiological materials (e.g., hospital and oncological institutes);
- *Support and implementation* of the Nuclear Security Culture.

Moldova

In according to L. Zaitseva and F. Steinhausler (2014) **Moldova** is another key country inside the nuclear trade, in fact this country has been used as a *trans-shipment territory* for nuclear and radiological materials. In this way, there are some evidences that shown the strategic relevance of Moldova, indeed as declared by Nuclear Security Summit¹⁹ in 2016, Ukranian-Moldovan border are absolutely a hot line referring to the nuclear trafficking in the Balkans. Different smuggling cases and the repeated efforts to sell nuclear materials signal that a «thriving nuclear black market has emerged in an impoverished corner of Eastern Europe on the fringes of the former Soviet Union. Moldova, which borders Romania, is a former Soviet republic» (Butler and Ghirda 2015).

One of the case that it can be considered as representative of the situation in Moldova happened in 2010. A Moldovan police agent called Malic, was working in an anti-fraud unit in Chişinău when an informant of him received an offer for radioactive material. From this first notice three persons were arrested by Moldovan police in collaboration with FBI on August 20, 2010. Months later the Malic's source, a Moldovan businessman called *Teodor Chetrus* with the role of middleman was looking for a buyer in the Middle East and specifically he said different times that «this substance must have a real buyer from the Islamic states to make a dirty bomb²⁰» (as referred by Malic). Chetrus would sell 10gr of highly enriched uranium for 320.000€, in this way the buyer could try it and after eventually buy a large quantity. The mastermind of this deal was *Aleksandr Ageenko*, as highlighted before, with a double Russian and Ukrainian citizenship he lived in Transnistria. In June 2011, he organized the uranium exchange, with the support of his wife *Galina Ageenko* and a Transnistrian policeman to smuggle the material in Moldova. Galina Ageenko delivered the box with the material to the policeman, after that, when *Aleksandr Ageenko* controlled the deposit money by the undercover agent during the material exchange the smugglers were arrested. During the investigations is found a contract by authorities made out with a doctor named *Yosif Fiasal Ibrahim*, and the tests of the material suggest that it was high-grade uranium that could be used for building a nuclear weapon. Furthermore, the tests shown a link of this material with other two earlier

¹⁹ Focus on Romania.

²⁰ *Ibidem*.

seizures of highly enriched uranium, in fact the authorities believed that *Aleksandr Ageenko* was behind²¹.

In order to prevent the smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials at the Ukrainian-Moldovan border in June 2014, the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) in collaboration with the Department of Energy of the U.S. (DOE) signed the “Cooperation on Nonproliferation Assistance”. The main aim of this collaboration is the detection and the deterrence of illicit smuggling of nuclear and radiological materials across the borders. For this project, were installed different detection devices that delivers Custom and Border Protection (CBP) in order to screen any means of transport for revealing the presence of nuclear and radiological materials without intrusive methods. The installations have not yet been completed and it will be installed at ferry outbound and inbound border crossings, then at international interstate (Norwegian Radiation Protection Authority 2015).

The following are listed the different seizures from 2010 to 2015 in Moldova and Ukraine (see summary table appendix 2).

- **August 20, 2010 (Chişinău).** Authorities seized 1.8kg of uranium (U-238) from a garage in Chisinau (Moldova). Two of the persons arrested were officers in the ex-Soviet army, indeed Moldovan investigators suspected that the uranium originated from the Černobyl’ reactor in Ukraine (Zolotukhina 2015).
- **July 27, 2011 (Chişinău).** Aleksandr Ageenko, Teodor Chetrus and others three people were arrested in Moldova for the organization of the sale of 1kg uranium (U-235) and blueprints for developing a dirty bomb to a man in South Sudan²² who police believe was Yosif Fiasal Ibrahim (Reynolds 2015).
- **April 30, 2014 (Chernivsti).** The Security Service of Ukraine (SBU) seized radiological materials, probably U-235 with a weight of 1.5Kg. The car from which it was seized had the license plates from Transnistria (Moldova). For this reason, a Russian citizen and nine Ukrainian citizens were arrested in relation to the trafficking. The investigation are still open (CNS 2016b).
- **December 2014 (Chişinău).** Moldovan authorities arrested seven persons suspected of trafficking uranium (U-238) from Russia. The authorities discovered 200 grams of uranium-238 mixed with 1 kg of uranium-235 and 1kg of mercury value of about €2.1 million (Davenport 2015).
- **February 19, 2015 (Chişinău).** A trafficking was interrupted by the collaboration between FBI and Moldova authorities, where an undercover agent bought caesium (C-135) in order to discover the head of organi-

²¹ *Ibidem.*

²² *Ibidem.*

zation. The arrest was done after the suspects sold a sample of 83gr for €100.000. (BBC News 2015). A recent annual report (CNS 2016a, 12) underlines that «one of the smugglers expressed his hope that the material would be used by ISIS for a dirty bomb against U.S. citizens [...]».

- **August 05, 2015 (Vorokhta)**. The Ukrainian authorities arrested four members of the organized crime for the tried sale of uranium-238. Authorities seized the material during its transportation across Ukraine's border from Ivano-Frankivsk region to Romania in a car (CNS 2016b).
- **September 21, 2015 (Chişinău)**. An unspecified quantity of caesium (C-137) was noticed near a building on St. Andrey Street. The representative of the National Agency for the Regulation of Radiation and Nuclear Activities discovered the material with a portable docimeter. The authorities are investigating for understanding how a radioactive material was found in that area.

2.2 Final analysis: the routes of the nuclear and radiological smuggling

Summarizing, we can identify different roles of the countries inside the nuclear smuggling chain. In this way, Russia is considered the main State of origin of the radiological and nuclear material. Furthermore, Zaitseva and Steinhäusler (2014) suggest that Armenia (e.g., from the Metsamor Nuclear Power Plant), Kazakhstan and Ukraine (e.g., from the Černobyl' Exclusion Zone) are the more likely States of origin of the materials as well as Russia.

From Russia the radioactive material can follow two types of routes:

1. *The Georgian and Armenian route* (see image n. 1);
2. *The Balkan route* (see image n. 2);

In the *Georgian route*, coming from **Russia**, the material goes through the **North Ossetia** and the **South Ossetia** in order to enter in **Georgia**. In other cases, for entering in Georgia the traffickers have passed through the **Azerbaijan**. In Georgia the material generally is sold to buyers on the Georgian territory (as shown by cases **Tbilisi** is the main smuggling point). Alternatively, the material can be brought by traffickers to the Balkan Peninsula using a sea route, specifically from the **port of Batumi** in the **Republic of Adjara** to the Ukraine port of **Odessa** or **Illichevsk**. Finally, from the port of Adjara the material can be brought to Turkish ports for selling it in **Turkey**.

Fig. 1: Nuclear Smuggling: Georgian and Armenian route





Fig. 2: Nuclear Smuggling: Balkan route
(Author's Representation)



Considering the Balkan route, from **Russia** the material enters in **Ukraine** in order to reach Transnistria. In many seizures the smuggled material came from the **Černobyl' Exclusion Zone**. As said in the previous paragraph, Transnistria region and its capital city, **Tiraspol**, are a very strategic tunnel in the smuggling chain. Transnistria represents also a storage country, in fact the smuggler from this region can manage and prepare any kind of smuggling without interferences by authorities. After that the material can continue its route crossing Transnistria to the main countries where evidences suggest them as principal selling points, in other words **Moldova**, **Romania** and **Bulgaria**. Finally, these countries could be used by traffickers or terrorists to reach the scene of the negotiation and in the same way for entering to the Balkan region.

3. Conclusive threat assessment

3.1 The main facilitators of the threat: Jihadist infiltration and criminal groups link in the Balkan Peninsula

Considering the **first facilitator**, we can affirm that **Bosnia-Herzegovina**, **Kosovo**, **Albania**, **Macedonia**, **Montenegro** and **Serbia** are countries which presents a very high ISIS infiltration (BIRN 2016). In relation to this, The Soufan Group (2015) suggests that at least 875 fighters have traveled to Syria from the Balkans Peninsula, specifically almost 800 of them come from four main countries, in other word, Bosnia, Albania, Kosovo and Macedonia. In addition, another research confirms as Black Sea region is an area which represents a supplier and transit zone for the black market of nuclear materials, therefore a real threat of nuclear terrorism (Delanoe 2015). In this way, it is very important to consider the link between these routes and the terrorist's infiltrations in the Balkan region. There are specific evidences about these infiltrations in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Albania and Kosovo.

Considering **Bosnia-Herzegovina**, the Islamic State has a strict link to this region, indeed in some villages in the north of country the people practice Sharia law, and they show the Islamic State's black flag (Dyer 2016). Bosnia-Herzegovina can be considered a true jihadist hub inside the Balkan with different connections in Europe. For instance, after the *Charlie Hebdo attack* the French and Bosnian authorities confirmed that the weapons used for attacking the headquarters of a newspaper could have come from Bosnia-Herzegovina (Bardos 2015). In the same way, another Bosnian connection concerns *Djamel Beghal* who had linked with the famous imam of London's Finsbury Park mosque, called *Abu Hamza al-Masri*. *Djamel Beghal* was the mentor of *Amedy Coulibaly* and *Chérif Kouachi* (two French attackers), moreover he was connected with Al-Qā'ida because he was recruited

by *Zayn al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn*, who was one of the most famous lieutenants of *Osama bin Laden*, with both Bosnian citizenship and a Bosnian passport²³. Bosnia-Herzegovina's jihadist groups are also connected with **Italy**. Indeed, the Islamic Wahhabi preacher *Husein "Bilal" Bosnic* before his arrest he has preached in 2011 in Bergamo (with the Islamko Dzemat group) and in Pordenone, specifically in the Cremona's mosque. He came from the north-western Buzim a small area in Bosnia, and he was called the main Islamic State headhunter in Europe (Spaic 2015; Foschini and Tonacci 2014). All these shows as there is a concrete connection between the jihadist chain in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Europe.

On the same way, **Albania** is another jihadist hub in the Balkan region. This connection (Albania and jihadism phenomenon) was shown by different counter-terrorism operations, one example of these concern an operation conducted in July 2014, when the Italian and Albanian authorities carried an operation against a group of Islamic State who had recruited different foreign fighters to cross over to Turkey in order to reach the ranks of the Islamic State in Siraq (Spahiu 2015). The Albanian jihadist web is very interconnected with the Italian peninsula. In according to islamologist Giacalone (2015) the different police operations²⁴ in 2014 and 2015 have demonstrated as the Italy presents different small cells dislocated on the Italian territory with strong connection with the jihadist hubs in the Albanian region, where these cells have the main goal of recruitment and doing propaganda for the Islamic State. The Albanian region is in a strategic position in relation to the jihadist routes for three main reasons²⁵:

1. Albania has a strategic position because it is one of the main transit point to Europe. A lot of foreign fighters have utilized Albania as a base before to go to Syria trough Turkey region;
2. Albania have many cities with a high level of radicalization (e.g., Tirana, Kavaja, Cerrik, Librazhd, Elbasan) because there are many mosques and different imam fundamentalist-inclined;
3. As in other part of the Balkan peninsula, the Albanian region presents a strong link between criminal syndicates and Islamic fundamentalist groups²⁶.

Finally, Romania «is the focus of criminal activities entities from states in Asia, the Middle East, and North Africa that are trying to acquire weap-

²³ *Ibidem*.

²⁴ For instance, Balkan Connection and Martese operation.

²⁵ *Ibidem*.

²⁶ An evidence of this, concerns the convergence between the Islamic State and the UCK (Ushtria Çlirimtare e Kosovës) famous also as KLA (Kosovo Liberation Army) criminal syndicate who operates also in Kosovo and Macedonia. Furthermore, different Albanian and Kosovar foreign fighters who are dead in Syria were member of the KLA (Cominetti 2015).

ons of mass destruction (WMD) and other dangerous substances. Moreover, Romania might still be a transit country for arms exports to countries under embargo or to EU countries» (Vreja 2007, 35).

In relation to **Kosovo**, «the bad economic situation should be regarded [...] as an indirect factor which creates an advantageous environment for recruitment. The lack of opportunities, lack of occupation and simply an excess of free time is some of the reasons that push young people into the radical's arms. Another crucial reason – an identity crisis – is more a complex one» (Orzechowska 2014). On September 2015, the Kosovar government aware of this situation has published a document called “*Strategy on Prevention of Violent Extremism and Radicalization Leading to Terrorism 2015-2020*” with the aim of implementing four strategic objectives and different measures which aim to be achieved from 2015 to 2020. Specifically, the document reports that this big strategy will focus on the following objectives (18):

- *Early identification* – of the causes, factors and target groups;
- *Prevention* – of violent extremism and radicalization;
- *Intervention* – with the aim of preventing the risk from violent radicalization;
- *De-radicalization* and reintegration – of radicalized persons.

This strategy was thought in order to mitigate the threats within Kosovo. Indeed, in addition to the violent extremism presents in the North of Kosovo since at least 1999, there is a significant problem that regards the threat of the Islamic extremism. There were many «citizens of Republic of Kosovo who have joined to the conflicts in Syria and Iraq and some of whom have returned to Kosovo. Although from the estimates conducted so far, it appears that a number of about 300 Kosovars have joined in various phases the conflicts in Syria and Iraq [...]» (11). In addition to the presence of the foreign fighters in this region, another relevant characteristic in relation to the nuclear and radiological smuggling material is the presence of the Islamic Charities. This network of charities was founded during the war in Bosnia-Herzegovina and it plays a central role in supporting Islamists. As affirmed by Shay (2011, 88) «the establishment of a network of “charities” which served as logistic backup (financial support) and covered the penetration of Islamic activists into the Kosovo arena». In this way, this dense network could help an eventual smuggled material to pass point by point, state by state, into the Balkan region in order to enter in the hearth of Europe.

The **second facilitator** concerns the link between Islamic terrorist organizations and organized crime. In the previous chapter was shown as in the Transnistria region there is a mix of organized crime and politics that support any kind of illicit trafficking. This connection is a real threat for different reasons. In according to Shelley, the very «dangerous today are the connections between corrupt officials [mainly in Russia] who have access to nuclear ma-

terials, criminal groups that already control transit networks for illegal goods, and terrorist groups that want to acquire nuclear materials» (Hofmann 2011). Besides, it is highlighted as this strict link have been formed when criminal membership of organized crime and Islamic fundamentalists have been imprisoned together in European jails²⁷. In this way, we have a convergence of interests between criminal groups and terrorists. An evidence of this, concerns a Moldovan operation where the authorities arrested

Following the summary map (image 3, at the bottom), that graphically it shows the positions of the different countries. The arrows represent the smuggling routes concern nuclear and radiological materials trafficking. Regarding both the Georgian and Balkan routes, the materials arrive to *storage countries*, such as Romania, Moldova, Bulgaria, Georgia, Azerbaijan and the Turkish northern border, for being selling to different buyers. Specifically, as said before, the radiological materials (e.g., EHU, LHU, Hg, Pu²⁸) come from Russia, Ukraine and Kazakhstan. These countries are considered also as *bridge zone*. Indeed, to the left of the Black Sea when the radiological materials are sold in Romania, Moldova and Bulgaria, the ISIS's potential planning of nuclear attack can count on jihadist infiltrations in Balkan countries such as Albania, Kosovo, Bosnia e Macedonia. In the same way from Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan or Turkish northern border the smuggled materials could pass through Turkey to territories of ISIS. In the map it has also been reported two possible main routes that terrorists could use to bring the material in Italy. Specifically, it has been shown two main routes, one maritime route from Albania's ports to **Bari** and **Ancona** port; the second through **Trieste** and **Gorizia** used several times by well-known figures (e.g., Bilal Bosnic).

Concluding, in the Balkan region there is a real background that surely can support the smuggling of the nuclear and radiological material. The presence of a high level of jihadists infiltration could support the purchase, transportation and the coverage of the material in order to achieve a European state. In the following paragraph we will focus on the real threat about the use of a nuclear or radiological weapon, in order to rationalize the threat in relation to a hypothetical attack to a European city.

3.2 What is the real threat to European cities?

In the previous part of this paper we have described the background in relation to the nuclear and radiological smuggling and the relative link with the

²⁷ *Ibidem*.

²⁸ HEU= Highly Enriched Uranium; LHU= Low Enriched Uranium; Hg = Mercury; Pu = Plutonium.

Islamic fundamentalism. When the smuggling routes has been shown, considering a hypothetical attack the question is what is the risk to which it is exposed?

On the basis of previous attacks in Europe and U.S. claimed by the self-declared Islamic State, we can identify a trend that relates the objectives of the attacks, in other words the *soft target*, *crowded places* inside major cities. Which can be concretely the damage caused by the use of nuclear or radiological material into a bomb against soft targets in a crowded place?

First of all, as outlined by Bunn et al. (2016) in “*Preventing Nuclear Terrorism*” we can consider three types of nuclear or radiological terrorist attack, where each of these pose different risks (4):

- Detonation of an actual nuclear bomb, either a nuclear weapon acquired from a state’s arsenal or an improvised nuclear device made from stolen weapons-usable nuclear material;
- Use of a radiological dispersal device or “dirty bomb” to spread radioactive material and create panic and disruption;
- Sabotage of a nuclear facility causing a large release of radioactivity.

In relation to the first point, the reality of the situation is that an attack with a **nuclear bomb**²⁹ is almost impossible. In any case very unlikely, for different reasons. Firstly, it is very difficult for a terrorist organization acquires, mainly through theft, a comprehensive nuclear bomb ready to detonate. Considering simple the acquisition of the uranium, before it can be used by terrorists in an explosive device, the uranium must be enriched. Uranium ore in nature contains a large quantity of a stable isotope U-238 and a very few quantity of isotope U-235 that it is highly fissile than U-238. The isotope U-235 with its high fissile capacity permits to release a large quantity of energy. Without getting too specific, the process of enrichment consists in the increase of the U-235 fissile material and in the decrease of the non-fissile material U-238. More uranium has been enriched with a high percentage of isotope U-235 less material is required to make a nuclear bomb. Experts affirms that generally uranium can be considered highly enriched when the percentage of U-235 is at least 20% (Crowley 2005). Regarding the process of enrichment, it is evident that it is complex, and requires expensive instrumentation that it is extremely difficult of finding also in the black market, in this way terrorists «cannot make this themselves – that requires huge, high-tech facilities that only nations can construct» (Cirincione 2016). Even if ISIS with its network attracts scientists for building a nuclear device it surely would has problem to enrich nuclear materials, in fact «for uranium to be useful in a nucle-

²⁹ «Nuclear weapons, which are completely different from radiological weapons, refer specifically to true nuclear warheads [that generate an atomic explosion] as opposed to nuclear material» (Ward, Kiernan, and Mabrey 2006, 222).

ar weapon it needs to be highly enriched [, where the] enrichment can be achieved through gas centrifuge cascades, gaseous diffusion, laser separation or other less common techniques» (Eweiss 2016, 4). Furthermore, «if stolen in some forms [, uranium] would require industrial processes to convert to a form useful for weapons³⁰». Another material that terrorists could use in addition to uranium for creating a nuclear bomb is plutonium. Crowley (2005) suggests that this is even more complicated because plutonium is produced by irradiating uranium in a nuclear reactor, in other words a difficult task for any terrorist organization even as the ISIS. It can be confirmed in according to different analysis (e.g., Eweiss 2016) that a terroristic organization as ISIS clearly has one main complication: the *expertise*.

Indeed, if ISIS acquires nuclear or radiological materials it probably could build an *improvised nuclear device (IND)*, also called *dirty bomb* or *radioactive IED*. A dirty bomb consists in a bomb «that uses a conventional explosion to disperse radioactive material over a targeted area [...] could also include other means of dispersal such as placing a container of radioactive material in a public space, or using an airplane to disperse powdered or aerosolized forms of radioactive material» (DHS 2004, 1).

ISIS could use the nuclear and radiological material acquired with the smuggling network for creating a *radiological dispersal device (radioactive IED)*, which is more accessible for any terrorist organization. Even if ISIS could not cause mass casualties with RDD, potentially the strong point of this type of weapon is the advantage of having a psychological impact on population, with the spread of terror. In addition to this, there is a more likely of preparing and planning a radiological attack in Europe using a RDD in terms of assembly, in fact, «the construction of a dirty bomb is also relatively simple, and no enrichment processes are involved in the making of a dirty bomb, eliminating a huge obstacle necessary for nuclear weapons. Additionally, the radiological material is greatly accessible and can be used directly without the need for any adjustments. The material can even be strapped to conventional explosives and disguised in the form of a suitcase» (Eweiss 2016, 5). Thinking a hypothetical attack with a radioactive IED, for example in a busy square in a city, what could be the total damage?

We would have two types of impact.

1. *First order impacts*

- It would have a considerable number of casualties and injuries with the explosion in the immediate vicinity;
- The explosion immediately spreads the radioactive dust, indeed «if the radioactive material is release as fine particles, the plume would

³⁰ *Ibidem*.

spread roughly with the speed and direction of the wind. As a radioactive plume spreads over a large area, the radioactivity becomes less concentrated» (2);

- It would have an immediate impact to human health. The health effects of radiation tend to be directly proportional to radiation dose³¹. For instance, «a 10-pound satchel of dynamite mixed with less than 2 ounces of cesium (about the size of a pencil eraser) could spew a radioactive cloud over tens of square blocks. No one would die, unless they were right next to the explosion. But the material would stick to the buildings. Inhaling just a speck would greatly increase your risk of getting cancer» (Cirincione 2016).

2. *Second order impacts*

- The affected area would be circumscribed and quarantined;
- Direct economic impact in the affected area. Closure of businesses, with repercussions on tourism that for characteristics of attack would extend for a long time;
- Psychological effects, as the fear, after the attack. «Fear is not only significant as an individual emotional reaction [...] fear can translate into responses that put people at risk and make managing the incident even more difficult» (Becker 2012, 178) in fact when an attack involves radiation, the attack «produce widespread fear, a profound sense of vulnerability, and a continuing sense of alarm and dread. A combination of many perceived characteristics is thought to contribute to radiation's power to create apprehension and anxiety: the agent is invisible, odorless, colorless, and unable to be apprehended by the use of the unaided senses [...]»³²;
- Probably, the attack reported by the media would create more confusion and panic for the improper use of terms such as “nuclear attack”, considering that the goal of the media is spreading the news using many times irresponsible communication.
- Political instability.

3.3 Conclusions and limitation of the research

In conclusion, it can confirm that there is a concrete and real threat about the use of radiological material by ISIS in order to use a RDD in Europe. ISIS fighters in June 2014 have approximately stolen 40kg of low enriched uranium from scientific department at the Mosul University in Iraq. Despite

³¹ *Ibidem.*

³² *Ibidem.*

experts have minimized any superior threat in relation to the quantity and quality of uranium (NATO 2015), «looking at the level of brutality of ISIS, there is a clear signal that they would not hesitate to use [RDD] against their opponents» (K. Lalbiakchhunga 2015, 16). Otherwise, despite the network and thus the availability of resources of ISIS, it is very unlikely a purely nuclear attack for the reasons described above. In the same way, is also unlikely the success of an attack against a nuclear power plants because «are militarily hardened facilities with several layers of physical and armed security, as described by the Nuclear Energy Institute, that make them extremely difficult to attack with anything but an actual military. This is why terrorist targets are softer and include airports, open markets, sporting events and metro stations [...]» (Conca 2016). For this reasons, is essential to monitor continuously the nuclear and radiological smuggling through Europe and Middle East for avoiding the acquisition by terrorists of the materials.

It can be said that in relation to a radiological terrorist attack it should not make more reference to a “**game of possibility**” but it must place the threat within a paradigm of a “**game of opportunity**”. In other words, all the elements necessary to realize the threat of a radiological attack are present.

As described above:

- Evidence in the motivational dimension;
- Possibility of finding radiological material;
- Possibility of getting support from organized crime and from the jihadist hub mainly in the Balkan region;
- Porosity of borders by the sales areas of radiological materials to European cities;
- The simplicity both technical and logistics of assembling a RDD.

As said before, the existence of these elements involves moving toward a “game of opportunity” that is to exploit the *windows of opportunity* that they would allow the alignment of these elements to the target. All the pieces of the puzzle are already available, or readily available, the “game” is to put them in the right direction and right combination. The task of the institutions and authorities is to ensure that these pieces are never put in the right way. In order to contrast the opportunity to concretize this threat is fundamental the collaboration between States and the intelligence services with the purpose of controlling the Balkan region in order to reduce as much as possible the two main facilitators described previously, to put in another way: the jihadist infiltrations and the connections between terrorist organizations and criminal groups regarding the acquisition of the materials useful for the assembly of a dirty bomb. After the ISIS’ motivation to attack Europe, this work has tried to show more clearly in a descriptive manner the main smuggling routes also considering the main seizures and smuggling cases mainly in the Balkan and

Caucasus region. One of the main limitations of this work has been the *lack of information* (black number) in relation to the real number of nuclear and radiological smuggling incidents. Indeed, the only institution that holds a continuously updated database and directly connected with the States participating in the project is the *IAEA* (International Atomic Energy Agency). Called *ITDB* (Incident and Trafficking Database), it is the IAEA's information system on incidents of illicit trafficking involving nuclear and radiological material outside of regulatory control, however it is a classified information system sharing only among State authorities and the IAEA. Knowing all cases of illicit trafficking allows to reconstruct precisely the entire network of smuggling routes and the identification of the hot areas. This would also help to define more effective prevention policies in order to fight the trafficking and the nuclear and radiological terrorism threat. Moreover, another limitation is that this work has analyzed the smuggling routes only in the Balkan and Caucasus region, however, no observations has been done in relation to other regions and the associated radiological and nuclear trafficking. Finally, it has not been done any kind of consideration in relation to the economic capacity of ISIS in relation to the acquisition of radiological material and the planning an attack in Europe.

Appendix 1: Summary table of main seizures in Caucasus' region
(Armenia, Georgia and Turkey) from 2000-2016
(Source: Author's collection)

Year	Date	Country	City	Type of smuggled material
2000	April	Georgia	Batumi	HEU
2000	September	Georgia	Tbilisi Airport	Pu/LEU
2000	October 6	Turkey	–	LEU
2001	July 20	Georgia	Batumi (Adzhariya)	LEU
2001	October 15	Georgia	Tbilisi	Pu
2001	November 6	Turkey	Istanbul	LEU
2001	December 19	Georgia	Samtskhe-Javakheti	LEU
2002	January 27	Turkey	Avcilar	Red Mercury
2003	March 13	Armenia-Georgian border	Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint	–
2004	November 8	Georgia	Tbilisi	Cobalt-60
2005	August 16	Turkey	Istanbul	U-235
2005	August 18	Turkey	–	U-235/U-238


2006	February 5	Georgia	South Ossetia border	HEU
2007	October 24	Georgia	Georgian-Turkish border	Lawrencium-103
2007	November 2	Georgia	Zugdidi	C-137
2010	March	Georgia	Tbilisi	HEU
2010	September 16	Georgia	Tbilisi Airport	LEU/Pu
2011	April 5	Georgia	Batumi International Container Terminal	C-137
2013	April 4	Georgia	Tbilisi	AM241
2013	December 14	Georgia	Tbilisi	R226
2014	August 1	Armenia-Georgian border	Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint	C-137
2015	June 19	Turkey	Akcakale	C-137/Mercury
2016	January	Armenia-Georgian border	Sadakhlo-Bagratashen checkpoint	C-137
2016	April	Georgia	Tbilisi	U-238
2016	April	Georgia	Tbilisi	U-238/U-235

Appendix 2: Summary table of main seizures in the Balkan Peninsula (Moldova, Ukraine and Bulgaria) from 2000 to 2015
(Source: Author's collection)

Year	Date	Country	City	Type of smuggled material
2000	January 14	Romania	Bucharest	Depleted Uranium
2000	January 20	Bulgaria	Dupnitsa	Depleted Uranium
2000	February 5	Romania	Bucharest	Radioactive material
2000	February 23	Ukraine	Donetsk	Sr-90/Y-90
2002	May 16	Bulgaria	Turnovo	Radioactive instruments
2002	December 6	Bulgaria	Kremikovtzi Metallurgical Plant	C-137/Am-241
2003	December 7	Moldova	Tiraspol	Radioactive rocket
2004	April	Ukraine	Armyansk (North Crimea)	C-137
2004	May 18	Ukraine	–	Mercury
2004	August 16	Ukraine	Kodyma	Stronzium/Pu
2004	September 2	Ukraine	Kyiv	Am-241
2005	January 22	Ukraine	Ishun (Krasnope-rekopskyi)	C-137
2005	March 1	Ukraine	Boryspil International Airport	U-238

2005	June 23	Ukraine	Khershon (Oblast)	Yttrium/Sr-90
2005	September 19	Bulgaria	Bulgarian border	Hafnium
2006	April 20	Ukraine	Smilnyytsa	Radioactive material
2007	November 11	Ukraine	Lugansk	C-137
2008	July 7	Ukraine	Kyiv Boryspil	HEU-Caesium
2008	July 8	Ukraine	Dnepropetrovsk	HEU-Caesium
2009	March 12	Ukraine	Ukraine-Moldova border	–
2009	September 11	Ukraine	Pripyat	Radioactive scrap material
2010	August 20	Moldova	Chisinau	U-238
2011	July 27	Moldova	Chisinau	U-235
2014	April 30	Ukraine	Cernivci	–
2014	December	Moldova	Chisinau	U-235/U-238/Hg
2015	February 19	Moldova	Chisinau	C-135
2015	August 5	Ukraine	Vorokhta	–
2015	September 21	Moldova	Chisinau	C-137

Fig. 3



Author's Representation

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Protezione civile e rischio terrorismo: quale coinvolgimento?

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Abstract

Negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l'Italia può considerarsi un paese "a rischio zero" e deve quindi predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia. Questo fatto stimola una riflessione sul ruolo che il sistema di Protezione civile (PC) potrebbe assumere di fronte al rischio terrorismo. È del tutto evidente che la PC non è chiamata a operare in prima linea. Anche all'interno del sistema di sicurezza civile italiano, disastri antropici come il terrorismo e il rilascio intenzionale di agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici e radiologici (NBCR) ricadono innanzitutto sotto la competenza della Difesa civile. Nondimeno anche la PC, forte delle sue capacità e delle esperienze maturate sul campo, potrebbe offrire un contributo rilevante in caso di attacchi terroristici, per quanto sempre entro i limiti dei suoi compiti e delle sue competenze. Rimane da definire in che cosa possa consistere effettivamente tale contributo nel contesto attuale. Di fronte a una questione che non ha ancora ricevuto una risposta univoca, appare utile avanzare alcune considerazioni preliminari. Innanzitutto, è chiaro che eventi gravi come quelli di tipo terroristico devono essere gestiti dalle istituzioni ai massimi livelli di competenza, per evitare problemi di coordinamento e trarre il massimo beneficio dalle risorse e capacità disponibili. In questo contesto, l'intervento della PC deve essere richiesto dalle autorità competenti e non può che seguire le direttive da queste impartite, proprio per assicurare il massimo livello di coordinamento e sinergia.

Il ruolo della Protezione Civile potrebbe collocarsi prevalentemente nelle fasi della gestione del post-emergenza e, se possibile, della prevenzione. A seconda delle circostanze, la PC potrebbe essere coinvolta per svolgere una gamma di compiti specifici, come il salvataggio, lo sgombero e l'assistenza degli scampati dall'evento; il presidio degli spazi e il diradamento e sfollamento dei presenti; l'assistenza di supporto alle forze in prima linea; l'aiuto alla messa in sicurezza di edifici danneggiati. Di particolare interesse potrebbe essere la partecipazione attiva al processo di comunicazione dell'emergenza, grazie alla presenza capillare sul territorio che la PC può vantare. Queste attività di intervento presentano elementi diversi da quelli che caratterizzano l'operato tradizionale della PC e per questa ragione richiedono una formazione adeguata e mirata.

In conclusione, appare evidente che il tema del coinvolgimento della PC nell'ambito di disastri causati da attacchi terroristici merita attenzione, specialmente nella presente fase storica.

Key words

Terrorismo; Protezione civile; gestione della crisi; comunicazione del rischio; formazione; Italia

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1. Introduzione

Com'è noto, negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa, assumendo caratteri tipici dei disastri. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l'Italia può considerarsi un paese "a rischio zero" e deve quindi predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia. Questo fatto stimola una riflessione sul ruolo che il sistema di Protezione Civile (PC) potrebbe assumere di fronte al rischio terrorismo, a fronte di un'adeguata formazione.

L'articolo presenta alcune considerazioni introduttive sul possibile coinvolgimento del sistema di PC in caso di attacchi terroristici. Il testo si divide in quattro sezioni principali. La prima tratteggia la portata dell'attuale minaccia terroristica. La seconda presenta il sistema della Protezione civile italiano, inquadrandolo nell'ambito del più ampio sistema di sicurezza civile. La terza sezione esplora il possibile coinvolgimento della PC in relazione al rischio terrorismo. La quarta si sofferma sul ruolo saliente della formazione in questo settore.

2. La minaccia del terrorismo

Gli ultimi anni hanno conosciuto la drammatica ascesa del terrorismo di matrice jihadista, amplificata dalla comunicazione mediatica (Lombardi 2016). La violenza ha colpito duramente anche in Europa. Basti pensare, per esempio, ai gravi attacchi a Parigi del 7-9 gennaio e del 17 novembre 2015, a Bruxelles del 22 marzo 2016 e a Nizza del 14 luglio 2016.

Mentre l'eliminazione di Osama Bin Laden e lo scoppio della cosiddetta "Primavera araba" nel 2011 avevano suscitato l'aspettativa che il terrorismo di matrice jihadista potesse essere in declino, gli ultimi anni hanno mostrato un notevole incremento nel numero di piani terroristici organizzati sul continente (cfr. Nesser 2015). L'ascesa dell'auto-proclamato Stato Islamico (*Islamic State*, IS) / *Daesh* ha poi svolto una funzione di catalizzatore della radicalizzazione.

L'attuale minaccia terroristica ha natura fluida e presenta strette connessioni con altre forme di violenza. Il cosiddetto Stato Islamico, in particolare, è impegnato in un'audace impresa tanto di carattere bellico quanto di carattere terroristico.

Com'è stato notato, il «terrorismo nel nuovo millennio» si manifesta nel contesto della «guerra ibrida», ovvero una «nuova forma di guerra diffusa, pervasiva e delocalizzata, di cui né l'inizio né la fine sono dichiarati, e in cui tutte le armi sono possibilmente impiegate, da compagini con o senza

uniformi, della quale il terrorismo è attore importante. Si tratta della nuova modalità di conflitto del mondo globalizzato» (Lombardi 2016, p. 40).

Il pericolo grava anche sull'Italia. La minaccia, oltretutto, proviene non soltanto “dall'esterno”, ma anche “dall'interno”. Infatti negli ultimi anni, una scena jihadista “autoctona” (*home-grown*), formata da convertiti e “immigrati di seconda generazione”, è emersa anche nel nostro Paese, per quanto sia ancora di dimensioni relativamente ridotte e piuttosto eterogenea e non strutturata (in particolare, Vidino 2014; vedi anche Marone 2016). In breve, nemmeno l'Italia può considerarsi un paese “a rischio zero”, come dichiarato più volte anche dal Ministro dell'Interno Alfano (Martirano 2016), e deve quindi deve predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia.

Il concetto di terrorismo è notoriamente problematico e in letteratura non esiste un accordo sulla definizione di questo fenomeno (tra gli altri, Schmid 2011; Lombardi 2016). In questa sede è utile notare semplicemente che il terrorismo in senso proprio, a differenza di altre forme di violenza, non prevede uno scontro con l'avversario sul campo di battaglia. I “terroristi”, consapevoli della loro posizione di inferiorità militare e politica, preferiscono portare a termine atti di violenza che suscitino paura, disorientamento e, appunto, come suggerisce la radice etimologica della parola, terrore in un pubblico vasto allo scopo di condizionare le decisioni e i comportamenti dello Stato nemico. Il carattere distintivo del terrorismo sembra risiedere, in ultima istanza, nell'uso di una manovra indiretta, volta a piegare la resistenza o la volontà dell'avversario, esercitando una pressione di carattere prevalentemente psicologico: in effetti, come è stato spesso ripetuto, il terrorismo è, in larga misura, una «forma psicologica di combattimento». L'impatto della minaccia terroristica, a sua volta, può essere facilmente amplificato, per quanto involontariamente, dai media.

In questo senso, si può sostenere che la violenza terroristica svolga deliberatamente due funzioni distinte: la funzione materiale, relativa alla causazione di danni fisici immediati, e la funzione simbolica, concernente la comunicazione o rappresentazione di messaggi (Marone 2013).

Per quanto riguarda la prima funzione, è evidente che i danni materiali, alle persone e alle cose, possono essere tragicamente elevati (cfr. Krueger 2007). Per esempio, è stato osservato che nell'anno 2015 nel mondo sono stati portati a termine 11.774 attacchi terroristici, che hanno provocato 28.329 morti, di cui 175 in Europa occidentale (0,6% del totale), e 35.320 feriti². Peraltro, alcuni studiosi ed esperti hanno sostenuto, soprattutto dopo l'11 settembre 2001, che il terrorismo abbia assunto una nuova forma (*new terrorism*,

² Dati tratti dal Global Terrorism Database (GTD), generalmente considerato il più ampio nel settore (START 2016, p. 4).

appunto), caratterizzata da un incremento tanto della motivazione quanto della capacità di distruggere (cfr. Crenshaw 2011).

Nondimeno si può sostenere che, in termini quantitativi, i danni materiali prodotti dagli attacchi terroristici siano, a ben vedere, relativamente limitati, quantomeno rispetto a molti altri rischi della società moderna³. Per esempio, è stato stimato che in Occidente la probabilità di essere ucciso in un attacco terroristico non soltanto è molto più bassa di quella di perdere la vita in un incidente stradale, ma sarebbe anche inferiore a quella di morire in casa per la caduta di un mobile o di un televisore instabile (Shaver 2015; vedi anche Mueller 2004).

Interessante, specie in questa sede, è un confronto con i disastri naturali a livello globale (tra gli altri, cfr. Alexander 2002b)⁴. Gli atti di terrorismo provocano sensibilmente meno vittime di disastri come terremoti o alluvioni. Il più grave attacco terroristico della storia moderna, quello dell'11 settembre 2001 a New York e Washington, ha causato quasi 3000 vittime, mentre disastri naturali di grande portata possono causare decine o addirittura centinaia di migliaia di morti. Per esempio, lo tsunami nell'Oceano Indiano del 26 dicembre 2004 ha provocato la morte di più di 230.000 persone in almeno 14 Stati diversi. Per restare all'Italia, si possono ricordare il catastrofico terremoto di Messina e Reggio Calabria del 28 dicembre 1908 (oltre 90.000 morti) e più recentemente il terremoto dell'Irpinia del 23 novembre 1980 (circa 2900 morti).

Accanto alla funzione materiale della violenza, occorre considerare anche la funzione simbolica. Come detto, il terrorismo, per sua natura, ha lo scopo di seminare paura e disorientamento nel pubblico. Oltretutto, è opportuno sottolineare che recentemente gruppi jihadisti come l'auto-proclamato Stato Islamico si sono spinti molto avanti in questa direzione, arrivando a specializzarsi, tanto nell'azione quanto nella comunicazione, nell'uso di elementi orrendi e raccapriccianti. Si pensi, per citare soltanto un esempio noto, alla pratica delle decapitazioni di ostaggi, riprese dalle telecamere e diffuse online (Maggioni e Magri 2015; Lombardi 2016).

Stati d'animo di paura, disorientamento e incertezza, causati dalla violenza terroristica, a loro volta, possono produrre, indirettamente, costi molto ingenti (per esempio, Mueller 2005). Per esempio, secondo alcune stime approssimative, i costi materiali diretti dell'11 settembre sono stati pari a 55 miliardi di dollari, ma nel 2011, a dieci anni dagli eventi, i costi complessivi,

³ Escludendo naturalmente il ricorso al terrorismo "catastrofico", legato, in particolare, all'uso di armi di distruzione di massa (in particolare, nucleari, biologiche, chimiche o radiologiche); ad oggi una preoccupante possibilità.

⁴ Vale la pena di notare che recentemente persino al-Qaeda, con un articolo di Muhammad As-Sana'ani sulle pagine della rivista in inglese *Inspire* (Issue 15, Spring 2016, pp. 48-49), ha tratteggiato un confronto tra terrorismo e calamità naturali (Lucini 2016).

diretti e indiretti, avevano toccato quota 3.300 miliardi di dollari (di cui 123 per l'impatto economico degli attentati) (Carter e Cox 2011).

Ovviamente anche i disastri naturali provocano rilevanti conseguenze psicologiche. Tuttavia in questo caso non è possibile individuare una vera e propria funzione simbolica, nella misura in cui le vittime non credono che la natura, percepita come «imparziale» (Alexander 2002b), si ponga l'obiettivo deliberato di trasmettere messaggi alle vittime. In questo senso, si può congetturare che l'impatto psicologico di gravi attacchi terroristici possa essere più profondo di quello provocato da calamità naturali, proprio perché nei secondi non si rintraccia un'intenzione deliberata di danneggiare e di terrorizzare le persone coinvolte nel disastro⁵. Nondimeno al momento mancano ricerche sistematiche sulle conseguenze psicologiche dei disastri naturali e antropici.

Uno degli effetti dell'elevata valenza simbolica del terrorismo può essere la tendenza ad assegnare priorità politica alla lotta contro questa minaccia rispetto alla gestione dei rischi naturali, anche a prescindere da un calcolo rigoroso di costi e benefici.

Osservazioni critiche su questa asimmetria sono state sollevate in più occasioni dopo l'11 settembre; in particolare, dopo il devastante impatto dell'uragano Katrina negli Stati Uniti nell'agosto del 2005 (oltre 1800 morti), aggravato dalla risposta inadeguata delle autorità (Chung 2013). Vale la pena di ricordare che nel 2003 l'agenzia del governo statunitense che svolge funzione di protezione civile, la *Federal Emergency Management Agency* (FEMA), creata nel 1979, venne assorbita dal nuovo *Department of Homeland Security* (DHS), istituito nel 2002 in risposta agli attacchi dell'11 settembre. La FEMA, prima indipendente, dipende ora dal DHS per il proprio budget e per la definizione delle proprie attività e priorità. Inoltre, dopo l'11 settembre il bilancio si è ridotto e una parte del personale è stata trasferita ai programmi di antiterrorismo (Waugh 2006).

⁵ Vale la pena di ricordare che nelle società pre-moderne era possibile rintracciare una sorta di funzione simbolica, nel momento in cui le vittime potevano individuare una volontà precisa dietro il disastro: un terremoto, per esempio, poteva essere interpretato come una forma di punizione divina per alcune presunte colpe e, in quanto tale, veicolava un messaggio. Atteggamenti di tale natura non sono scomparsi del tutto, come dimostrano le dichiarazioni degli stessi gruppi armati jihadisti. Per esempio, nell'articolo di *Inspire* citato in precedenza, l'autore, As-Sana'ani, interpreta tanto le calamità naturali quanto gli atti di violenza jihadisti come forme di punizione divina contro l'America: le prime «da Allah», le seconde «per mano dei credenti». Più recentemente, è stato documentato che subito dopo il terremoto nel Centro Italia del 24 agosto 2016 alcuni sostenitori dell'IS su internet hanno salutato il disastro come una «punizione» di Allah nei confronti dell'Italia per il suo coinvolgimento nella coalizione militare contro l'auto-proclamato «califfato» (Site 2016).

3. Il sistema di sicurezza civile e la Protezione civile in Italia

Gli sviluppi drammatici degli ultimi anni, inclusa l'ascesa dell'IS / Daesh, hanno aumentato la possibilità che la violenza terroristica produca effetti tipici di un disastro (Waugh 2007, p. 388).

Ovviamente la prevenzione e il contrasto della minaccia terroristica naturalmente sono prerogativa delle forze dell'ordine, della magistratura e delle altre autorità preposte. Nondimeno, in caso di attacco terroristico, è utile ricordare che in Italia, in linea generale, la gestione delle crisi comprende prevalentemente attività di carattere civile. Gli attori che possono essere concretamente coinvolti nella gestione di tali crisi sono molteplici. In questo contesto, appare utile avviare una riflessione preliminare sul ruolo che potrebbe assumere il sistema di Protezione civile (PC) in caso di un'emergenza dovuta ad un attacco terroristico.

È del tutto evidente che la PC non è chiamata a operare in prima linea. Nel caso di eventi terroristici la risposta è di solito affidata alle forze dell'ordine e alle forze armate. Si tratta di una reazione logica ed efficiente, dal momento che occorre innanzitutto neutralizzare la minaccia e proteggere i civili (Alexander 2002a, p. 212).

Oltretutto, anche all'interno dello stesso sistema di sicurezza civile italiano (Di Camillo *et al.* 2014) disastri antropici come il rilascio intenzionale di agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici e radiologici (NBCR) e, appunto, il terrorismo ricadono innanzitutto sotto la competenza della Difesa civile. La struttura del sistema di sicurezza civile italiano, infatti, è caratterizzata dall'interazione tra i due ambiti principali della Protezione civile e della Difesa civile.

Questa distinzione generale ha portato allo sviluppo di un sistema di gestione delle crisi che presenta distinti dipartimenti per la Protezione civile e per la Difesa civile, dotati di una certa complementarità tra i rispettivi attori a livello operativo. Il Servizio nazionale della Protezione civile è stato posto sotto il coordinamento del Dipartimento della Protezione civile all'interno della Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri. Il Dipartimento di Difesa civile fa invece parte del Ministero dell'Interno. Questa dualità inoltre implica l'esistenza di due differenti bilanci.

Da un lato, il Servizio nazionale della Protezione civile, istituito nel 1992, è un sistema in cui diversi attori istituzionali a livello comunale, provinciale, regionale e nazionale agiscono in collaborazione con organizzazioni di volontariato e altri operatori per fornire una preparazione efficiente e una risposta efficace alle crisi. Le attività di coordinamento e promozione a livello nazionale vengono svolte dal Dipartimento della Protezione civile.

La Protezione civile italiana è quindi raffigurabile come un sistema aperto, decentrato, partecipato e radicato nel territorio. Ciò determina la presenza

capillare di numerose “unità” di protezione civile a livello comunale, provinciale e regionale, aventi dimensioni e talora anche capacità differenti.

In particolare, le Regioni, inizialmente orientate prevalentemente alla prevenzione e alla formazione, hanno assunto nel corso degli anni sempre maggiori responsabilità nella gestione dell'emergenza⁶.

Per molti versi, si può sostenere che il primo componente del sistema di Protezione civile italiana sia il cittadino. I cittadini infatti sono chiamati a informarsi e a prepararsi, specialmente per quanto riguarda le attività di allerta e di prevenzione. I cittadini possono poi aderire alle differenti organizzazioni di volontariato. Più in generale, il ruolo dei singoli individui chiama poi in causa il tema generale della resilienza ai disastri (Lucini 2014).

Considerata anche la marcata diffusione ed estensione dei rischi presenti sul territorio nazionale, l'Italia ha sviluppato un sistema di risposta imperniato sul principio di sussidiarietà: in breve, l'azione di risposta inizia a livello locale e coinvolge le amministrazioni competenti in senso verticale, secondo una classificazione del tipo di crisi basata sulla sua estensione ed intensità, nonché sulla risposta da parte della Protezione civile stessa. Solo nel caso in cui una crisi tocchi più entità amministrative e/o richieda capacità particolari, le autorità competenti si attivano attraverso un processo di coinvolgimento verticale, dal basso verso l'alto (Di Camillo et al. 2014, p. 24).

La Protezione civile italiana, oltretutto, è diventata espressamente materia di legislazione concorrente tra Stato e Regioni con la riforma del Titolo V della Costituzione, nel 2001 (L. Cost. 3/2001), prima del passaggio alla legislazione esclusiva dello Stato con la recente riforma costituzionale del 2016, ora oggetto di referendum confermativo.

Inoltre, la normativa italiana prevede l'intervento di un notevole numero di altri organi; sono considerate strutture operative nazionali del Servizio nazionale della Protezione civile il Corpo nazionale dei vigili del fuoco, le forze armate, le forze di polizia, il Corpo forestale dello Stato, i Servizi tecnici nazionali, gruppi nazionali di ricerca scientifica, la Croce rossa italiana, le strutture del Servizio sanitario nazionale, le organizzazioni di volontariato ed il Corpo nazionale soccorso alpino.

⁶ «Nello specifico, la regione cura l'organizzazione del “sistema regionale di protezione civile”, inteso come coordinamento delle strutture tecniche dell'amministrazione regionale, di enti e amministrazioni, anche diverse da quella regionale, per: attuare interventi urgenti; definire le linee guida e i principi a cui devono attenersi gli enti locali; promuovere attività di studio, censimento e identificazione dei rischi sul territorio; realizzare sistemi di monitoraggio per la rilevazione e il controllo dei fenomeni naturali o connessi con l'attività dell'uomo; valorizzare il volontariato mediante l'erogazione di finanziamenti o cessione di beni e attrezzature a titolo gratuito» (Regione Lombardia 2011, pp. 4-5).

In Italia, quindi, la Protezione civile non è una funzione affidata ad un unico ministero, come avviene nella gran parte degli altri Paesi (dove è spesso affidata al Ministero dell'interno) (cfr. Furiozzi 2010).

L'attività del sistema di PC italiano si fonda essenzialmente sul cosiddetto Metodo Augustus⁷, ideato dalle autorità italiane negli anni Novanta, ovvero un sistema di pianificazione e gestione delle emergenze semplice e flessibile che richiede l'elaborazione di piani d'emergenza che distinguono differenti "funzioni di supporto".

Il sistema della Protezione civile ha assunto importanza crescente negli ultimi anni per ragioni di flessibilità e dinamismo, di presenza capillare sul territorio, di disponibilità di bilancio e di vicinanza alla Presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri.

Con l'affermazione dell'esigenza di disporre di un adeguato sistema di gestione del territorio, la funzione di Protezione civile ha acquisito una sua autonomia, sia sotto il profilo organizzativo, sia sotto quello della separazione da altre funzioni alle quali era stata in passato attribuita (come quelle relative alla sicurezza pubblica ed alla tutela dell'ambiente) (Gnes 2011, pp. 20-21).

Inoltre, le attività di Protezione civile, specie in Italia, possono essere potenzialmente molto ampie. Per esempio, dal 2001 (legge n. 401 del 9 novembre 2001) al 2012 (legge n. 27 del 24 marzo 2012) tra le competenze della Protezione civile rientrava anche la gestione dei cosiddetti "grandi eventi".

Ad un così avanzato sistema di Protezione civile non ha fatto riscontro, dall'altro lato, un altrettanto sviluppato sistema di Difesa civile.

Al contrario, lo stesso concetto di difesa civile (che, insieme alla difesa militare, costituisce la cosiddetta "difesa nazionale"), rimane ad oggi piuttosto sfuggente. D'altra parte, come ha enfatizzato uno studioso (Gnes 2011, p. 19), almeno fino agli eventi terroristici dell'11 settembre 2001, il tema era considerato "politicamente scorretto", generalmente ignorato dall'opinione pubblica e trattato esclusivamente in ristrette cerchie di specialisti della materia.

Nell'ordinamento italiano la materia è disciplinata da pochi atti normativi e da documenti coperti in gran parte coperti dal segreto di Stato ("manuali", nazionali ed internazionali, in particolare della NATO, di carattere militare, spesso classificati come "riservati" o "riservatissimi") (Gnes 2011).

Se la Protezione civile si basa su un sistema decentrato e partecipato, specialmente in Italia, che valorizza la collaborazione e lo scambio di informazioni, la Difesa civile si caratterizza per una struttura rigidamente gerarchica e un approccio verticistico e tende a essere associata alla restrizione delle libertà individuali (Alexander 2002a).

⁷ Il nome si deve all'imperatore romano Ottaviano Augusto, cui è attribuita la frase "il valore della pianificazione diminuisce con la complessità dello stato delle cose".

Inoltre, mentre il sistema di Protezione civile, com'è noto, ha affrontato numerose e varie crisi, il sistema di Difesa civile sotto il profilo operativo è stato attivato per la prima volta soltanto in vista del cosiddetto *Millennium Bug* del 1999-2000 e poi a seguito degli attacchi terroristici dell'11 settembre 2001.

In Italia il rapporto tra Protezione civile, da una parte, e Difesa civile, dall'altra, è oggetto di un dibattito che scaturisce in parte dall'assenza, soprattutto in dottrina ma anche nella prassi, di una nozione univoca e pienamente condivisa di difesa civile. Come è stato rilevato, «tale assenza sembra non favorire una sicura distinzione tra la quest'ultima e la Protezione civile, la cui nozione viene invece stabilita dall'ordinamento italiano» (Bonfanti 2015, p. 3).

Nel corso del tempo, seguendo una tendenza diffusa a livello internazionale, il sistema italiano ha progressivamente raggiunto un nuovo equilibrio tra i due ambiti, passando dal primato della Difesa civile nel periodo della Guerra Fredda a un ruolo sempre più incisivo della Protezione civile.

Chiaramente tale equilibrio può mutare, come è già successo in altri Paesi. Per esempio, negli Stati Uniti dopo gli attacchi terroristici dell'11 settembre l'ambito della difesa civile ha riguadagnato spazio e salienza ai danni della protezione civile (Alexander 2002a); si è già fatto cenno, in particolare, alla costituzione del DHS nel 2002 e al conseguente ridimensionamento della FEMA.

In Italia l'evoluzione dei due sistemi non è stata priva di attriti tra i diversi soggetti istituzionali che si sono trovati coinvolti nel trasferimento di competenze e di poteri⁸. Oggi il sistema di sicurezza civile continua a mostrare un

⁸ Si veda, per esempio, *Difesa civile: schermaglie giuridiche Bertolaso-Morcone*, Agi, 6 aprile 2004 (Agi 2004). Il resoconto giornalistico rilevava vividamente che: “sui contenuti il capo della Protezione Civile, Guido Bertolaso e il responsabile dei Vigili del Fuoco, il prefetto Mario Morcone, sono lontani, lontanissimi. Su posizioni diametralmente opposte. Il tema in discussione, nel corso di un convegno a Palazzo Salviati a Roma, non è di quelli facili facili: chi comanda in caso di emergenza grave, magari per un attacco terroristico? Per Morcone la responsabilità è del ministero dell'Interno – quindi direttamente sua –, per Bertolaso della Presidenza del Consiglio – quindi direttamente sua –. Entrambi però fanno un richiamo alla necessità di non dividersi su temi così delicati come quello della sicurezza dei cittadini. Ed entrambi ricordano che esiste una legge che attribuisce la responsabilità della difesa civile uno alla Protezione Civile, l'altro al Dipartimento dei Vigili del Fuoco. Bertolaso ricorda la legge 3275 [si tratta, in realtà, dell'Ordinanza del Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri del 28 marzo 2003 n. 3275, Art. 1] che contiene disposizioni urgenti di protezione civile per fronteggiare l'emergenza derivante dalla attuale situazione internazionale che recita: il capo del dipartimento della protezione civile della presidenza del Consiglio dei Ministri – commissario delegato, nell'ambito delle competenze istituzionali di protezione civile, provvede, anche avvalendosi di uno o più soggetti attuatori cui assegnare specifici settori di intervento, all'assunzione urgente di tutte le iniziative necessarie a ridurre al minimo le possibilità che si verificano danni all'incolumità pubblica e privata, conseguenti ad eventi calamitosi di natura terroristica”. Chiarissimo. Ma Morcone è altrettanto chiaro: “dal ministero dell'Interno dipendono la sicurezza, le forze dell'ordine e i vigili del fuoco e alla stessa autorità è direttamente riconducibile l'attività dei Prefetti, ai quali fa capo sul territorio il

certo grado di sovrapposizione tra le due componenti, che si aggiunge alla sostanziale complementarità a livello operativo (Di Camillo *et al.* 2014).

Il problema specifico delle minacce derivanti da agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici o radiologici (NBCR nell'acronimo inglese) (Bonfanti 2015) consente di approfondire utilmente i rapporti, per alcuni versi complessi, tra Protezione civile e Difesa civile.

Nel caso di incidenti NBCR non intenzionali è il sistema di Protezione civile a essere di norma attivato. Per quanto riguarda invece gli eventi NBCR generati da attività umane di tipo intenzionale o dolose, che integrano una situazione di crisi, è invece il sistema di Difesa civile a definire in via esclusiva le modalità di risposta e le strutture che ne sono responsabili.

Nondimeno sembrano permanere alcune difficoltà potenziali nelle relazioni tra i due sistemi. Per esempio, qualora la natura e la portata della minaccia non risultassero tali da essere qualificabili nell'immediatezza dell'evento (in particolare, si tratta di incidente di origine colposa oppure di un attentato terroristico intenzionale?), la determinazione e scelta del meccanismo da attivare, Difesa o Protezione civile, potrebbero non essere scontate (Bonfanti 2015, p. 30). Come è stato notato recentemente, potrebbe essere utile procedere a una migliore definizione delle circostanze determinanti l'attivazione di un meccanismo piuttosto che dell'altro oppure stabilire alcuni criteri di massima o linee guida che facilitino la configurazione di una data situazione come emergenziale o critica (*ivi*, pp. 30-31).

4. Protezione civile e terrorismo

È chiaro che eventi gravi come quelli di tipo terroristico devono essere gestiti dalle istituzioni ai massimi livelli di competenza, per evitare problemi di coordinamento e trarre il massimo beneficio dalle risorse e capacità disponibili. In questo contesto, l'intervento della Protezione civile (PC) deve essere richiesto dalle autorità competenti e non può che seguire le direttive da queste impartite, proprio per assicurare il massimo livello di coordinamento e sinergia.

Si può congetturare peraltro che il sovraccarico di lavoro delle autorità pubbliche preposte, specie in fasi in cui il livello di rischio associato al terrorismo o ad altri fattori è elevato⁹, possa lasciare spazio, entro certi limiti, all'intervento del sistema della PC.

coordinamento degli interventi di soccorso e di polizia, nell'eventualità di un attacco terroristico". Finisce che ognuno rimane sulle proprie posizioni".

⁹ Per esempio, nella seconda metà del mese di giugno 2016, nel corso del Campionato europeo di calcio in Francia, le autorità transalpine sono state impegnate contemporaneamente nella lotta alla minaccia terroristica di matrice jihadista (particolarmente seria nel Paese, dopo

Il ruolo della Protezione civile potrebbe collocarsi innanzitutto nella fase della risposta all'emergenza. Tra i compiti specifici che la PC potrebbe svolgere in caso di attacco terroristico si possono indicare: il salvataggio, lo sgombero e l'assistenza degli scampati dall'evento; il presidio degli spazi e il diradamento e sfollamento dei presenti; l'assistenza di supporto alle forze in prima linea; l'aiuto alla messa in sicurezza di edifici danneggiati.

Per esempio, in occasione dei gravi attentati terroristici del 13 novembre 2015 nell'area di Parigi, i volontari della Protezione civile della capitale e dei Dipartimenti limitrofi sono intervenuti a fianco delle autorità allo scopo di soccorrere ed evacuare le vittime¹⁰.

Di particolare interesse potrebbe essere anche la partecipazione al processo di comunicazione dell'emergenza, grazie alla presenza capillare sul territorio che la PC italiana può vantare; in particolare, con la trasmissione di informazioni salienti e aggiornate alle autorità oppure con la diffusione, previa autorizzazione, di informazioni alla popolazione circa i possibili pericoli e i relativi stati d'emergenza e di allarme e circa i modi di proteggersi secondo i vari tipi di pericoli. Rilevante e delicata è diventata, sotto questo profilo, la gestione dei *social media* (cfr. Burato 2015).

In aggiunta, si può immaginare che la PC svolga anche alcuni compiti circoscritti nella fase di prevenzione del rischio, specialmente nel campo della comunicazione e della sensibilizzazione al rischio, anche sul *web*.

In generale, i problemi da affrontare nella gestione delle emergenze, pur nella grande diversità delle circostanze, presentano alcune affinità e ruotano principalmente intorno alla presa delle decisioni, al coordinamento e alla comunicazione. La gestione della crisi in caso di attacchi terroristici tende però ad assumere aspetti peculiari ai quali è opportuno prestare attenzione.

In generale, a differenza delle forze della natura, il "terrorista" è un attore che agisce in maniera intenzionale e, oltretutto, in maniera strategica (in altri termini, è in grado di prendere in considerazione le azioni degli altri attori e di comportarsi di conseguenza). Anche per questo nel caso di attacchi terroristici occorre prendere in considerazione rischi ulteriori per la sicurezza; dovuti, per esempio, al fatto che i "terroristi", celati dietro la clandestinità (e quindi difficili da identificare, specialmente nell'immediato) (cfr. Marone 2014) potrebbero approfittare della situazione di emergenza per realizzare subito altri attacchi.

la recente sequenza di attentati), nel contrasto della violenza di alcune bande di *hooligans* stranieri, nella gestione di alcuni gravi episodi di disordini legati a scioperi contro la riforma del lavoro. Oltretutto alcuni giorni prima le autorità avevano dovuto gestire le inondazioni della Senna, anche nella capitale.

¹⁰ Vedi, in particolare, Protection Civile – Association nationale agréée de sécurité civile, <http://www.protection-civile.org/actualite/2015/attentats-de-paris>.

Inoltre, l'azione terroristica di norma si basa sul fattore sorpresa (Morris 2009). Peraltro, la partecipazione di singoli individui con probabili disturbi psicologici, come avvenuto di recente anche in Europa, può aggiungere un ulteriore elemento di imprevedibilità. L'interesse del "terrorista" per la mossa inaspettata incoraggia, a sua volta, l'innovazione nell'uso di metodi e tattiche (Marone 2013; 2014). Appare quindi difficile predisporre scenari di rischio, sulla base di stime probabilistiche. Al contrario, alcuni tipi di calamità naturale, come gli uragani e altri eventi meteorologici estremi, – ma non altri tipi, come i terremoti, per esempio – possono essere previsti grazie alle tecniche attualmente disponibili.

Inoltre, vale la pena di ricordare che il luogo dell'attacco diventa anche "scena del crimine" e richiede quindi particolare attenzione e speciali accorgimenti, allo scopo di conservare e raccogliere possibili prove.

In caso di attacco terroristico, gli operatori di Protezione civile si trovano poi ad agire in un contesto sociale peculiare. In particolare, la ricerca empirica sul tema ha tratteggiato alcune differenze salienti tra disastri naturali e disastri antropici, come attacchi terroristici.

Nelle situazioni di disastro naturale, gli individui reagiscono prevalentemente in modo «pro-sociale», ovvero a beneficio degli altri (Peek e Sutton 2003; Webb 2002; Perry e Lindell 2003). Si è rilevato, per esempio, che i sopravvissuti alla calamità provano paura, ma di solito non sono colti da panico (in senso proprio, associato cioè alla perdita del controllo di sé) né cadono in uno stato di passività e profondo disorientamento, ma, al contrario, sono generalmente in grado di impegnarsi nelle operazioni iniziali di ricerca e soccorso e di svolgere altre azioni legate alla risposta immediata all'emergenza, nei limiti delle informazioni a disposizione. I cittadini coinvolti nel disastro sono anche capaci di costituire spontaneamente gruppi (*emergent groups*) che si dedichino ai soccorsi e ad altre mansioni sulla scena del disastro.

Inoltre, a dispetto di «miti» diffusi (Quarantelli 1994), i comportamenti devianti (per esempio, gli atti di sciacallaggio) sono relativamente limitati. Gli stessi tassi di criminalità tendono a declinare a seguito di un disastro (Perry e Lindell 2003, p. 50)¹¹.

In generale, i comportamenti sono meno irrazionali, disorganizzati e conflittuali di quanto si potrebbe immaginare, per quanto possano sorgere divergenze e tensioni tra gruppi sociali e tra agenzie. Alcuni studiosi influenti

¹¹ Peraltro, questi «miti», rafforzati da film e romanzi "catastrofici" ed eventualmente amplificati da media interessati ad aspetti sensazionalistici, non sono soltanto erronei, ma possono anche avere l'effetto pratico di ridurre l'efficacia della risposta all'emergenza, indirizzando malamente l'allocatione delle risorse e la distribuzione delle informazioni; per esempio, la diffusione di informazioni incomplete o vaghe da parte delle autorità, giustificata da aspettative erronee circa la diffusione di atteggiamenti di panico nella popolazione, tende a ridurre la propensione dei cittadini a conformarsi alle misure disposte (Perry e Lindell 2003, pp. 49-50).

hanno addirittura sostenuto che i disastri naturali possono condurre alla costituzione di una sorta di «comunità terapeutica» (C. E. Fritz) o «altruistica» (A. H. Barton) (citati, tra gli altri, in Peek e Sutton 2003, p. 321).

D'altra parte, paradossalmente l'offerta immediata di sostegno e solidarietà (per esempio, in termini di partecipazione di volontari non organizzati oppure di donazione di derrate alimentari) può essere così ampia da creare potenzialmente problemi di gestione e di coordinamento sulla scena del disastro. Per citare un esempio recente, già due giorni dopo il grave terremoto nel Centro Italia del 24 agosto 2016, il Dipartimento della Protezione Civile aveva chiesto di interrompere tanto l'afflusso di nuovi volontari quanto l'invio di cibo, abiti e coperte nei luoghi colpiti dalla calamità, anche per ragioni organizzative e gestionali (Il Tempo 2016).

Al contrario, nelle «crisi di tipo conflittuale» (*conflict-type crises*), per dirla con Quarantelli (1993), come attacchi terroristici, i comportamenti appaiono più vari. In generale, gli atti di terrorismo possono provocare reazioni di carattere tanto «pro-sociale» quanto «anti-sociale». Per esempio, nel caso degli attentati terroristici dell'11 settembre si possono trovare entrambe le modalità. Da un lato, si possono menzionare il grande impegno profuso dai volontari, anche in modo spontaneo, e lo scarso livello di sciacallaggio o vandalismo nella città di New York. Dall'altro lato, occorre però ricordare l'escalation di atti di discriminazione, di intolleranza e addirittura di violenza ai danni di individui che venivano associati, anche erroneamente, al Medio Oriente e/o alla religione islamica, dopo gli attacchi. Peraltro, in un arco di tempo più lungo, l'ostilità ebbe modo di riversarsi anche contro chi contestava la risposta del governo al disastro (Peek e Sutton 2003, pp. 321-322).

5. Il ruolo della formazione

Gli operatori della PC devono essere consapevoli di tali peculiarità del contesto sociale e delle possibili differenze rispetto ad interventi di tipo più tradizionale nell'ambito di disastri di origine naturale. Occorrono quindi particolari accorgimenti e, a monte, una formazione adeguata.

In Italia, come accennato, le Regioni giocano un ruolo cruciale nel campo della formazione per la Protezione civile. Regione Lombardia, in particolare, ha investito notevolmente nella formazione in questo settore. Ha, infatti, deciso di affidare a Éupolis Lombardia – Istituto superiore per la ricerca, la statistica e la formazione (ente strumentale della Regione) la gestione della Scuola Superiore di Protezione Civile (SSPC), in collaborazione con l'Università Cattolica del Sacro Cuore, al fine di accrescere una maggiore consapevolezza sulla protezione civile e di sollecitare nella comunità locale una rinnovata coscienza

di difesa del territorio. La Scuola si propone prioritariamente l'obiettivo di formare personale che abbia compiti gestionali e tecnico – operativi di supporto agli organi preposti alla gestione dell'emergenza e di informare gruppi sociali e professionali per fornire un contributo alla creazione di una cultura della prevenzione del rischio e della corretta risposta alle emergenze.

I destinatari delle attività formative sono gli attori del sistema di protezione civile lombardo: un sistema ampio e articolato in cui, come detto, convergono le strutture statali, le strutture regionali, gli Enti locali e le organizzazioni di volontariato. In Lombardia, in particolare, sono presenti circa 25.000 volontari che necessitano di essere supportati da specifiche competenze all'interno di un percorso formativo in crescita.

Per meglio gestire la formazione regionale di protezione civile, Regione Lombardia nel 2014 (d.g.r. del 14 febbraio 2014, n. X/137) ha introdotto uno strumento metodologico, sotto forma di matrice, che identifica per ogni soggetto appartenente al sistema di protezione civile: i percorsi di formazione, i ruoli, i livelli, la durata indicativa, i prerequisiti richiesti per l'accesso ai corsi anche ai fini della progressione verticale e dell'aggiornamento¹².

Il ruolo dei volontari, in particolare, è di grande interesse. Com'è noto, le organizzazioni di volontariato rappresentano uno strumento importante nella gestione delle emergenze, specialmente in Italia. Nondimeno è evidente che il ricorso al volontariato richiede un'attenta attività di preparazione, organizzazione e coordinamento; in caso contrario, la presenza dei volontari potenzialmente rischia addirittura di produrre effetti negativi. È evidente che ogni soggetto che interviene nell'ambito di un'emergenza deve avere un compito preciso, per evitare sovrapposizioni e confusioni di attività e ruoli. Inoltre occorre verificare con attenzione il numero dei soggetti che devono chiamati a operare, per evitare sia lacune sia intralci nella operazioni.

Tra le funzioni generali più rilevanti che i volontari possono svolgere vi è quella di offrire supporto, nella forma di assistenza pratica, ma anche di trasmissione delle informazioni e di sostegno psicologico ed emotivo.

Per quanto riguarda quest'ultimo aspetto, vale la pena di sottolineare che il terrorismo può essere interpretato come un attacco a un'intera collettività. Il trauma causato dalla violenza tende ad isolare e minaccia di compromettere i legami tra individui e società. In questo senso, il lavoro dei volontari può essere di particolare importanza in caso di attacco terroristico. D'altronde, è stato sostenuto che il supporto sociale che i volontari possono fornire è presu-

¹² Si veda il sito web della Scuola Superiore di Protezione Civile (SSPC), <http://www.eupolis.regione.lombardia.it/cs/Satellite?c=Page&childpagename=Regione%2FMILLayout&cid=1213584595873&p=1213584595873&pagename=RGNWrapper>.

mibilmente più rilevante nei disastri antropici (come il terrorismo, appunto) che nei disastri naturali (Pardess 2005, p. 610).

In particolare, il fatto di sapere che altri cittadini sono preparati a dedicare volontariamente tempo ed energie a beneficio di altre persone (che verosimilmente non conoscono personalmente) può contribuire a restaurare la fiducia negli altri. La presenza dei volontari infatti trasmette un messaggio di apertura, di attenzione e di cura. D'altra parte, il senso di appartenenza è saliente per il processo di ricostruzione di senso e per il superamento del trauma nelle vittime.

Inoltre, è importante notare che in alcune circostanze la violenza terroristica, specie se ricorrente, può provocare, a tutto beneficio dei terroristi, sentimenti di ira dei cittadini nei confronti dello Stato e/o del governo, accusato o quantomeno sospettato di non fare abbastanza per proteggere la popolazione. In tale contesto, l'ira rischia di riversarsi anche contro le autorità pubbliche o altri soggetti, mentre i volontari possono essere accettati con maggior facilità e prontezza (Pardess 2005, pp. 610-611).

L'operato dei volontari richiede sempre, a monte, l'assenso e il sostegno delle autorità pubbliche. Per certi versi, proprio alcune delle caratteristiche che spesso rendono l'operato dei volontari prezioso, come l'empatia e l'assenza di distanza professionale rispetto alle vittime, li rende particolarmente vulnerabili a rischi associati al contatto con individui traumatizzati così come alla sindrome di *burnout* (esito patologico di un processo stressogeno) e ad altre conseguenze negative. L'impatto di tali fattori è peraltro socialmente segmentato, poiché esistono gruppi o categorie di persone più vulnerabili di altri, specialmente in caso di attacchi terroristici che presentino motivazioni di carattere etnico e/o religioso.

La formazione e l'addestramento hanno un ruolo fondamentale nell'orientare positivamente l'azione dei volontari e degli altri operatori della PC. Fondamentale è innanzitutto la formazione sugli aspetti organizzativi, gestionali e tecnico-operativi. In aggiunta, la formazione potrebbe riguardare anche la promozione della sensibilità alle differenze culturali, il potenziamento delle capacità comunicative, e persino la preparazione al confronto con l'esperienza della perdita e del trauma, come già avviene in Israele, Paese con una lunga esperienza di terrorismo (Pardess 2005).

6. Conclusioni

L'articolo ha esplorato il tema del possibile coinvolgimento del sistema di Protezione civile in caso di attacchi terroristici, in un'epoca in cui tale minaccia ha assunto caratteri disastrosi, anche in Europa. La PC, su richiesta delle autorità competenti, potrebbe svolgere compiti utili sia nella fase della

risposta all'emergenza sia nella fase di prevenzione. Cruciale rimane, a monte, il ruolo di una formazione mirata.

Il testo si è quindi posto l'obiettivo di offrire un primo contributo alla riflessione su un tema delicato e complesso che richiede particolare attenzione nella nostra epoca.

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**FOCUS:
GRANDI EVENTI**

Major Sport Events Safety and Security Framework's Core Elements

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Abstract

Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique challenge and opportunity for any host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number of client groups. Athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators all have specific and demanding expectations, with distinctive desires and requirements. In addition, local residents and businesses' requirements have to be attended too, with the aim of ensuring host cities continue to function properly during the event for all its citizens and visitors.

It is clear that each host city, in conjunction with relevant law enforcement agencies, has a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.

The aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies, of a sensible safety and security framework for major sport events, which identifies the strategic path to achieve a successful, well-managed and resilient event. The article also provides some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning complex safety and security projects. Clearly, each event is different because of its specific idiosyncrasies related to the local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political and economic characteristics. However, the proposed framework, which would need to be tailor-made in line with the specific local characteristics, is an effective blueprint for planning major events through a single set of documentations (e.g. risk assessment, strategy, concept of operations) which cuts across different partners and directs the work of many role-players, assisting with the drafting of integrated operational plans. Such set up provides the necessary controls and reassurances locally, nationally and internationally, about the ability to deal effectively with public safety-related risks and to host a successful and peaceful event.

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Keywords

Safety and security, major sport events, risk assessment and management, security operations.

1. Introduction

Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique occasion for any host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number of client groups such as athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators. All these clients have specific and demanding expectations, characterized by different desires and requirements. In addition, local residents and businesses' obligations have to be attended to with the aim of ensuring the host city continues to function during the event for all its citizens and visitors.

It is clear that each responsible law enforcement agencies, in conjunction with the relevant host city, have a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive public safety strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.

The hosting of major event heightens and increases already existing public safety-related threats, but does not fundamentally change their nature. In general, the most relevant threat to an event is a terrorist attack, followed by criminal activities towards its client groups and the citizens and visitors at large. In this context, it is required the development of a well-balanced strategy to articulate the difference scale of threats major events introduce to public safety and how they would be managed.

In this context, there are three strategic principles from where to start to secure a major event: Firstly, safety and security needs to be built within the existing, business as usual public safety governance and processes in place, which need to be augmented, because of the complexity of the project, with further "additionalities", required to deliver the event². Thus, the first step is to set up the correct structure, processes and governance to enable the "business as usual" structure to deliver the project efficiently. Secondly, an intelligence-led, risk-based approach is required to adopt any safety and security measure to ensure the peacefulness of the event. This is the only practicable

² For example, for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the City of Johannesburg instituted a 2010 Conveyors Committee at strategic planning level and the attuned 2010 Office to deliver the project in cooperation with other local government departments. The task of the 2010 Office, which coordinated the delivery of the event, was to facilitate the successful implementation of the project within the existing local government structures and agencies (City of Johannesburg, 2011).

avenue to ensure efficient governance and clear transparency in the decision-making processes related to the implementation of security measures for the event. Thirdly, because of the complexity of the project, there is the need for factual coordination between all partners, including the cooperation between government agencies and departments with the organizing committee and other relevant stakeholders. Because of the vastness of the project, the sheer number of partners, which need to be consulted and coordinated during the planning phase, requires the setting up of robust structures that can support the integrated planning efforts. Failing to do so, stakeholders might feel placed aside, which could affect negatively the success of the event. It is thus required the coordinating of all partners' efforts in an effective and productive fashion.

These three principles mark the foundation of the event's safety and security strategic planning and operational delivery, sustaining the need to implement proportionate safety and security measures to ensure a reasonable and effective use of costly resources.

Within this context, the aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies, of an effective safety and security framework for major sport events, which enables the control over the costs of staging a secure event, both for planning and operational purposes that could spiral without control³ without a sensible approach. The article also provides some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning and implementing complex safety and security projects.

Clearly, each event is different because of its specific context: Local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political and economic characteristics⁴. The proposed framework, shaped through the review of different event's safety and security planning documentation and lessons learned, is a blueprint that defines the fundamental elements that

³ Major event's budget usually are established at national government level, and then costs for each agency or department are claimed back as part of exceptional expenses, not business as usual to fulfil daily obligations. However, in each major event, specific local arrangements are done to cover the costs of safety and security, in particular the use of resources from law enforcement agencies and military structures.

⁴ For example, each country has different regulations on how safety and security is carried out during events: In the UK, the Guide to Safety at Sports Grounds, colloquially known as the Green Guide, provides guidance on spectator safety at sports grounds. It places the responsibility for venues' safety and security (named routine security) to the event organizer and not the police, which might not have neither capacity nor expertise to deal with the matter (Department for Culture, Media and Sport, 2008). The suggestion of having all elements of safety and security during the London 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games being planned and managed by law enforcement agencies was deemed, even though appealing, not practical nor feasible because of limited resources and expertise available, thus confirming what the regulation already stipulated.

should be applied to future events, to be tailor-made in accordance with the specific characteristics of a location. This framework is detailed in the figure below and is composed of different core elements, which are explained throughout the article.

Fig. 1: Safety and Security Framework for Major Sport Events



Furthermore, each framework’s core element would need to be completed in a specific timeframe, which is detailed in the figure below (Figure 2).

Fig. 2: Safety and Security Framework’s Timeline for Major Sport Events



2. Event-Wide Safety and Security Risks Methodology

The safety and security planning for a major sport event starts very early, already from the bid phase, where would-be host cities compile documentation for the right to host an event and when observer missions to other major events take place to understand opportunities and challenges ahead. Usually, from the outset of the project, a security planner is seconded from the responsible law enforcement agency to the bid team to influence the security aspect of the initial plan.

For an event to be assigned to a host city, the national government, in particular the responsible minister, needs to issue written guarantees, among others, for the provision, coordination and implementation of safety, security and emergency services to host major sport events⁵. To ensure the guarantees are met, a methodology is necessary to identify the risks from a national, event-wide

⁵ As an example, for the 2010 FIFA World Cup, the South African national government agreed to the delivery of seventeen guarantees made to FIFA, which were detailed in the Bid Book. The seventeen guarantees, provided by various South African government departments, covered facilitated access to South Africa, a supportive financial environment, intellectual property and marketing rights, healthcare services, transport, telecommunications and safety and security. These guarantees were consolidated into an Act of Parliament in September 2006,

perspective. Such methodology provides the context for a whole set of efforts which need to be reflected in the event strategic and operational plans.

An important aspect to consider is that the international reputation of hosting countries is at stake when staging a major event: it is thus of outmost importance the successful staging of the event, in particular from a safety and security perspective. The protection of the lives and properties of the event's client groups (e.g. athletes, federations' representatives) is of paramount importance. It is thus vital to minimize existing risks and best utilize the time and resources available and the existing structures to ensure the peacefulness of the event. With national reputation at stake, governments usually employ a risk-averse approach, where even residual, low-probability risks are attended to with the aim of avoiding possible "hindsight critiques" in case an incident occurs. From these considerations stems the importance of drafting, at the earliest stages as possible, a practical, holistic event-wide risk assessment methodology.

Terrorism remains the fundamental security threat to major sport events, as these provide an attractive and high profile target for terrorist attacks. Other risks consist in criminal activity, such as ticket fraud and attempts to disrupt the games. In addition, the scale of such events, over multiple days and locations, pose significant policing and public safety challenges in terms of necessary resources, risks mitigation measures and logistical requirements.

From a risks assessment perspective, it is necessary to define a process to analyse thoroughly possible threats and to determine their levels to stage a peaceful and successful event. These risks will then inform the strategic and operational plans for major events. In this regard, it is important to acknowledge the difference in the risk appetite between government agencies and the private sector (e.g. organizing committee), as this informs the decisions to be taken to secure the event. While the former has logically a very low risk appetite, having produced guarantees and since the country's reputation is at stake, the latter operates with other principles in mind (mainly profit), which might not align with a desire to minimize risks at all costs. Such difference impacts directly on decision-making and, ultimately, on the event's security budget.

For example, the UK Government set up a specific methodology to identify the types and relative levels of risk which could have impacted negatively on the effective delivering of safe and secure 2012 Olympic and Paralympic Games. The Olympic Safety and Security Strategic Risk Assessment (OS-SRA) informed strategic-level decision making by identifying and prioritising risks and the corresponding mitigation measures for London 2012 (UK Home Office, 2011a).

the Special Measures Act, as per FIFA requirements (Government Communication and Information System – GCIS).

The OSSRA, a classified cross-government document that incorporated expertise from a wide range of government departments and agencies, contained assessments of the relative severity of a wide range of major accidents or natural events (collectively known as hazards), malicious attacks (known as threats), serious and organised crime, public disorder, and domestic extremism. Crucially, the OSSRA identified those aspects of safety and security that were unique to the hosting of the Games and that required specific planning, over and above what was carried out under normal circumstances through the government's and other agencies' existing efforts (UK Home Office, 2011a).

The OSSRA considered threats and hazards to safety and security during the Games emanating from five distinct areas. For each area, specific types of risks were considered:

- Terrorism, including attacks on crowded places, attacks on transport systems and non-conventional attacks
- Serious and organised crime, including cyber-attacks
- Domestic extremism
- Public disorder
- Major accidents and natural events, including severe weather and human disease

In assessing the impacts of any potential risk, the OSSRA measured not only the harm to individuals, for example through injury, death or damage to personal property. The disruption to the critical services and infrastructure that supported the overall ability to ensure a safe and secure event, such as the transport systems and the emergency services was assessed, including the reputational damage to the UK should a particular incident occurred (UK Home Office, 2011a). The risk assessment and management process followed three different stages:

- Identifying the risks – which included as a sub set also risk identification, assessment and comparison through the completion of a risk matrix to ensure resources and time were effectively used to tackle higher, more serious risks, mapped through an impact/likelihood estimation;
- Mitigating the risks – which included the adoption of strategic design requirements needed to mitigate a particular risk by either reducing its likelihood or impact;
- Understanding residual risks – which ensured that, even though risks could not be eliminated, decision-makers acknowledged and accepted the residual level of risks, which was in line with the necessity of meeting the safety and security government guarantees;

The OSSRA was refreshed on a regular basis though the input of all relevant role-players (UK Home Office, 2011a). While the strategic risk assessment and management is unfolding, already from the onset of the project, law

enforcement agencies provide input into the early design of venues through the work of experienced crime prevention and counter terrorist advisers. These personnel assist in the early stages of the event planning by informing the security elements of the venue design aspects, to ensure it supports the implementation, at a later stage, of security operations during the event, forging early partnerships with the event designers and organizers.

3. Event Safety and Security Strategy

Each major sport event requires the drafting of a single safety and security strategy, which cuts across different role-players, such as law enforcement agencies, local organizing committee, government departments and other delivery partners, to ensure all contributing organizations share the same purposes, objectives and planning principles.

Usually, both the event-wide risk methodology and by the country's national security strategy inform the event's strategic objectives and thus the structure of the entire framework, helping to determine different projects; how to prioritize resources, efforts and attention; risk mitigation and residual; linking the broader event-wide risks with the strategic objectives aiming at mitigating them.

London 2012 provides us with a practical example of this process: In 2010, the UK Government released the national security strategy (UK Government, 2010), which defined the top priority risks from a security perspective: International terrorism, cyber-attack, international military crises and major accidents or natural hazards. Those risks were reflected upon in the London 2012 strategy (UK Home Office, 2011b). The latter overall aim was to “...*deliver a safe and secure Games, in keeping with the Olympic culture and spirit*”. To achieve such aim, the event strategy provided five different objectives or themes, each with different operational outcomes, which defined what was needed to be achieved throughout the planning phase of the entire project (UK Home Office, 2011b):

- Protect the event's venues and supporting transport infrastructure:
 - Stop people who would cause harm from entering the country
 - Ensure a safe and secure transport system
 - Ensure the protection of VIPs
 - Ensure venues were safe and secure
- Prepare for incidents that might disrupt the event:
 - Plan and prepare responses to mitigate the impact of disruptive incidents
- Identify and disrupt threats:

- Gather intelligence to identify threats
- Disrupt assessed threats
- Command, control, plan and resource the operation:
 - Ensure availability and deploy appropriate resources with the right skills and support
 - Maintain effective command and control
 - Ensure parallel events are safe
- Engage with partners and communities:
 - Reassure the public
 - Obtain effective support from partners

In particular, each strategic theme had a programme built around it with a team and governance structure. Each theme included different projects (Figure 3 below) and had a specific organization leading it.

Fig. 3: Safety and Security Strategic Themes and Related Projects



The Strategy also defined its governance structure, planning phases and the roles and responsibilities of each role-player, including for example, the role of the local organizing committee, the Department for Transport, the Olympic Delivery Agency (ODA), and all law enforcement authorities involved in policing the event, to ensure clarity of each partner’s duties and tasks for the event. Briefly, the Strategy provided the necessary process to assure the government guarantees to host a safe and secure event were met effectively.

From a planning assumption perspective, the national threat level from terrorism was set as severe, which required that measures which would ordinarily be deployed in response to the national threat level being at severe

were in place during the Games. This assumption provided the context for planning at operational level⁶ (UK Home Office, 2011b).

4. Event Safety and Security Concept of Operations (ConOps)

In line with the Strategy's guidelines, the Safety and Security Concept of Operations (ConOps) details the approach and responsibilities of each agency to contribute to a "safe and secure" event, as per the stipulated roles. For each agency, the ConOps defines the operational requirements and the planning principles to conduct games-time operations, which include, for example, search and screening, physical security measures (e.g. CCTV system, pedestrian intrusion detection systems – PIDs, fencing and hostile vehicle mitigations – HVM) and asset protection.

The drafting of the ConOps is the last opportunity to reflect on concepts to be adopted to direct the operations of the event. Such principles are utilized to draft the specific venue security plans and the safety and security policies, procedures (e.g. searching & screening processes, access control) and contingency plans. It is of interest on the latter the decision, in many major events, to move from contingency planning to reasonable eventuality some risks to enable a more thorough planning and implementation of comprehensive security measures to ensure the appropriateness of the plans in place. This approach reflects the risk averse stand of governments and the assurance concerning the safety and security guarantees to host major events.

The importance of the ConOps is to ensure a common understanding and knowledge of the planning requirements, stemming from the strategy's guidelines to organizations' different management levels. As individuals have different backgrounds, it is of paramount importance to ensure a common understanding of the actions to be taken during the planning of the event within and across organizations. In addition, it is important to ensure that all role-players are ready to move ahead with the plans in unison, ensuring nobody is left behind and guaranteeing that the plans advance homogeneously across partners. Thus, the ConOps needs to be in place as soon as possible to ensure that all planning principles are understood before the planning tempo increases, as the event approaches. Nevertheless, to ensure the planning progresses effectively, in addition to having the ConOps readily available, there is the need to have all management positions in each organization related to the event appointed. This to ensure that the people that will manage the operations on the ground

⁶ The threat level for the UK from international terrorism is set by the Joint Terrorism Analysis Centre (JTAC). MI5 is responsible for setting the threat levels from Irish and other domestic terrorism both in Northern Ireland and in Great Britain (MI5, 2016).

are able to build in time a common understanding and knowledge on how to run such operations in conjunction with other partners.

In addition, the ConOps should include a first appreciation of estimated resources required during the planning and operational phases of the project⁷. This aspect is one of paramount importance. To give an example of the enormity of the task, for London 2012 it was estimated that approximately 14000 police officers were working specifically on the event on a peak day⁸, in addition to an overall number of 20000 British Army personnel and 24000 private security contract staff utilized throughout the entire event.

Once the ConOps is in place, the next step is the designing and the implementation of the event site-specific risk methodology, aimed at streamline the risk-based approach to implementing security measures for the event.

5. Venue Risk Assessment and Management Methodology

The fourth element consists in drafting the specific venues' security risk assessment. This constitutes an important aspect of the entire framework as all security measures implemented at venue level from a tactical perspective need to be proportionate to the estimated terrorism/crime-related threats and informed by the venue-specific risk assessment.

While the event-wide risk methodology provided the top-down approach to draft the event's strategy, the venue-specific risk assessment methodology provides the sites' risk information, for official and parallel venues, to define specific countermeasures. Therefore, the strategic risk assessment does not inform the specific security measures to be implemented at event's sites. Instead, it provides the overall context to draw risks typologies for the venue-specific risk assessment.

The event specific sites' methodology consists in a pre-determined and agreed process by all relevant partners, including the responsible law enforcement authorities and the local organizing committee. The important elements that such methodology needs to include are (Pisapia, 2016):

- An objective rationale
- A consistent approach and evaluation of risk across transport infrastructure assets, including routes for example
- A rationalized basis for security planning

⁷ One of the method to ensure the highest number of workforce is available during the event for government departments is to declare a moratorium of annual leave requests close to and during the event.

⁸ These officers do not include business as usual policing roles, which were maintained throughout the event theatre.

- Prioritization of resources and mitigation across transport assets through a comparative process

Such methodology informs security planning at venue level through a numerically based assessment of the risks against each event's venue by the most likely terrorist attacks modus operandi (e.g. improvised explosive devices – IED) and crime incidents (e.g. theft, vandalisms) and takes into consideration the following elements: capability, intent, vulnerability, likelihood, impact, asset attractiveness and overall risk. To ensure consistency, so that similar assets with similar risk score are protected through analogous security measures, the risk assessments need to be conducted by a single project team composed by a core of permanent members. It is important that subject matter experts from law enforcement agencies and the private sector (e.g. organizing committee), are present consistently when the scoring takes place. Whilst the scorings do not need to be a unanimous between the members of the group, there must be agreed consensus of the outcome.

Based on the outcome of the risk assessment, the event's sites are categorized into appropriate tier levels, which inform the level of security measures required for each venue. The sites' tier is then linked to the various security measures through the event security standard plan document.

6. Event Security Standard Plan

The recommended security elements stemming from the venue risk assessment and management methodology need to be aligned with the agreed standard security measures for the event, which detail the costs and modelling of each possible security option, agreed by all stakeholders before the start of the risk assessment. This ensures a standardized approach, guaranteeing that similar sites with similar estimated risks are protected through similar agreed security measures.

However, the level of protection and the related security measures are calibrated on the site's tier level, which is defined through the venues' risk assessment methodology. The tier level informs the security requirements, thus ensuring consistency across similar venues. It is unreasonable to assume that the same overlay can be installed at every venue of the same tier for a number of reasons. Therefore, it is important for security planners to understand firstly what level of protection each venue aims to achieve, based on the four security principles of deter, detect, delay and respond (Table 1 below). An example on how these levels translate into practical security measures to be implemented is provided in Table 2 below (Deniece MacDonald, 2014).

Table 1: Security Levels per Venues' Tiers

Tier	Level of Protection
1	Moderate to high level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective security arrangements is to deter an attack and be able to detect incursions, provide a short delay to an attack and to intercept the attacker before they are able to penetrate the most important areas of the site.
2	Moderate level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective security arrangements is to provide a strong level of deterrence with an ability to detect incursions, provide a short delay to an attack and to intercept the attacker before they are able to penetrate the most important areas of the site.
3	Limited to moderate level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective security arrangements is to provide a reasonable deterrence by using low security physical measures supplemented with operational security staff.
4	Limited level of protective security assurance: The aim of the protective security arrangements is to provide a basic level of deterrence by using or adapting existing security measures, supplemented with limited operational overlay.

Table 2: Protective Security Assurance per Venues' Tier Level 1

Tier 1 Level of Security Assurance: Moderate to High	
Search & Screening	Capability to search and screen all people, vehicles and materials, entering site.
	Detection: High level of assurance for selected types of explosive, firearms and other conventional weapons.
	High confidence level of deterrence for all other weapons (e.g. knives) and component parts
Perimeter Security	Physical security systems comprising of security fences and active surveillance/detection systems (either people, technology or both, covering perimeter and access points). Initial response force to intercept intruders at the perimeter or at predetermined interception points.
	Perimeter to be illuminated to permit effective surveillance and to provide safe environment for mobile patrols/response force. Lighting to assist in deterring an attack.
	Medium-high confidence level that security breach(s) of the perimeter will be immediately detected.

Access Control	Robust access control measures at all times.
	Entry limited to event ticket holders and/or those with official accreditation to allow access to that specific venue.
	Accreditation to be checked visually and if possible electronically to ensure (a) it is authentic & unmodified (b) it belongs to the owner (c) it is valid for venue (d) it is current/not withdrawn.
	Further access control measures required for areas of high risk.
HVM	All key vulnerabilities to be mitigated (e.g. access points) by hard and soft measures.
	May involve creating standoff from venue and controlling adjacent access routes
Guard Force - Perimeter	Dedicated and appropriately trained perimeter guard force with patrol and response functions.
	Perimeter patrols (all areas) at least once every 30 minutes.
	Initial response capability to be maximum of 2 minutes from detection of breach to deployment to scene /interception.
	Areas of the perimeter not under constant surveillance (using technology or people) will require additional manned guarding.
Guard Force – Search and Screening	Dedicated search & screening staff that are well trained (to recognised standards), with some experience (gained either operational deployments or through exercises) and are well supervised. All staff must have participated in event specific training.
Guard Force – Other	Additional manned guarding will be required for the protection of high-risk assets for in venue security.
	Additional manned guarding will be required for HVM measures, both hard and soft.
	Additional security functions to be conducted by non-security staff (e.g. stewards), such as ‘routine search pre/post sporting session, detecting possible hostile reconnaissance particularly at vulnerable points.
	Additional training to be provided to non-security staff.
Command, Control & Communication (C3)	Facility to be established to enable live monitoring of perimeter and venue security systems, alarm verification/assessment and control of initial guard force response (as defined in guarding requirement).
	Facility to be capable of managing incidents and liaison with emergency services.
	C2 capability to have good levels of resilience.

Defensive Search	Defensive search (lockdown) to give high levels of assurance that there are no IED's or firearms in a venue. Venue security staff and stewards may to be used for some search areas (i.e. public areas). Search and screening security to be implemented and maintained during and following search to ensure integrity. Further maintenance searches of key vulnerable areas (red areas) during events.
	For new buildings and for overlay, non-accessible voids to be subject to a formal and auditable inspection regime prior to closure.
Blast Mitigation	All new build venues will be subject to structural blast mitigation design measures and / or siting of asset to minimise impact of blast considerations
	Existing venues by exception may be subject to retrofitting of blast mitigation measures following risk assessment.
	Subject to risk assessment, the most robust temporary grandstands available will be selected for use.

Once the tier levels and the attendant protective security assurance are defined, the Standard Plan provides the detailed design guidance and specifications for each of the identified security spaces and functions required for the operations. Where the standard design could not meet the site's specific requirements, adaptations can be made providing they adhere to the protective security assurance per each venue's tier. The elements detailed in the Standard Plan can be divided into physical, technological and procedural, such as:

- Fencing: to ensure the integrity of sites after security measures are implemented;
- Vehicle search area: to screen all vehicles entering a games' site and ensuring they are free of prohibited and illegal items;
- Pedestrian search area: to screen all persons entering the games' site to ensure they are not in possession of prohibited or illegal item;
- Security technology equipment to deter and detect a possible adversary, namely CCTV surveillance system, pedestrian intrusion detection system (PIDS) and public lighting;
- Law enforcement personnel and private contract security staff deployment to deter, detect and respond to a criminal act;
- Vehicle dispatch center: area where all vehicles and materials are subjected to search before materials are delivered to a venue;
- Vendor secure certification scheme: suppliers allowed to pre-screen materials for direct delivery to venues;
- Accreditation and access control: to manage, monitor and allow accredited persons access to the venue or controlled area;

- Security awareness training for operators (e.g. drivers, loading personnel): see something/say something policy;
- Security elements related to vehicle access to venues: road closures, parking restrictions, hostile vehicle mitigation (HVM) measures and automatic number plate recognition (ANPR) cameras for the protection from an unauthorized vehicle entry to games' site;

The standard plan provides a clear indication of the approved security mitigations, detailed in the venue security plans, with a concrete estimation of the related costs.

7. Event Venue Security Plans

An intelligence-led, risk-based approach is the foundation to define appropriate and proportionate safety and security measures linked to ascertained risks and envisaged countermeasures. This approach is the foundation for the drafting of effective security plans, which are informed by the venues' risk assessment and management exercise and the indications of the security elements detailed in the Standard Plan.

The key component of the venue security plans are the following:

- Asset protection, pre games-time;
- Physical infrastructure (e.g. fencing, CCTV, PIDs and HVM);
- Security personnel requirements, delivered through multiple supply sources to meet the security needs, managed usually through three major supply routes: law enforcement agencies, private contract security and military⁹;
- Technological equipment for search and screening;
- Command, control & communication (C3) structure and operations;
- Policy, procedures and contingency plans variations;
- Daily Run Sheets;
- Venue countermeasures, as per the risk assessment and management exercise;
- Operational equipment requirements and provision;
- Resources requirements overview;

Once the security plans are drafted, before they are implemented during games-time, these are tested in part or entirely to ensure they are reliable and accurate, in particular when implemented in cooperation with other role-players.

⁹ To increase capacity, usually agreements are established beforehand to ensure military forces assist with Games' security operations for such role as static protection of sites or search and screening operatives, in case threat increases or if private contract security personnel is not sufficiently available to conduct those operations during the Games. Another aspect to bear in mind is the pressure on law enforcement agencies to provide additional resources for business as usual policing during the event, which limit the number of officers available for event-related roles.

8. Event Operational Testing and Readiness Programme

The venue security operational testing and readiness phase consists in ensuring that the security plans are finalized, understood and can be implemented effectively at each site.

Test events can range from small, unadvertised private invitational events, with no public spectators, to world championship with significant public interest and attendance. In each test, different elements can be tested, depending on the requirements and appropriateness of each event. Thus, irrespective of the threat and risk level, usually security measures (e.g. vehicle screening, access control, communications) are implemented to test and exercise staff, systems and processes. This phase consists in making sure all the integrated security measures are ready for the operations in cooperation and coordination with other role-players.

Part of the readiness element consists in conducting table-top exercises, where operational plans are reviewed with all relevant stakeholder to ensure alignment and seamless implementation among partners. Instead, testing refers specifically to the implementation of operations by more than one role-player to ensure the effective delivery during games-time. Part of this endeavour is the setting up of effective performance management principles for key contractors, such as private security personnel, and the support for all staff to fulfil their role during the event.

9. Event Debriefing Report

The rounding up of a major sport event is probably one of the most important elements of the framework as it looks at the event's legacy and allows the retention of best practices after the games.

During the planning phase, some of the organizations involved in the event have to go through a steep learning curve to absorb new techniques to plan complex projects. For example, law enforcement agencies have experience in managing security during sport events but might lack knowledge in long-term strategic planning. Skills in the police environment consist, from a standard policing approach, to respond promptly to issues, while there is a lacking of capability in long-term planning through the drafting of complex documentation and the effective coordination of many stakeholders with specific objectives and purposes.

The learned new techniques utilized to organize effectively a well-managed and peaceful event can be transferred to other endeavours in the complex public safety environment. It is thus important, during this last phase of the framework, to detail all strengths, weaknesses, opportunities and threats of staging a major event to build capabilities for the organization going forward.

10. Conclusions

This article highlights the main elements required for the planning and operational delivery of a safe and well-managed major sport event through the identification of a comprehensive and sound framework. However, as the framework is a general blueprint to approach the safety and security planning of a major event, it cannot be identically implemented in different contexts. Instead, it provides a guidance for the development of specific approaches to safety and security planning for future major sport events. Therefore, in order to implement it effectively, there is the need to understand the idiosyncrasies of the location where events take place, in particular the safety and security setting within the host city, and then fully tailor-made the framework in line with the local context, characterized by specific governance, processes, social, political and economic characteristics. It is thus of outmost importance the understanding of the host city's governmental structure and its relation with the local organizing committee and law enforcement agencies, who are ultimately responsible for organizing a peaceful event.

The three basic principles to host peaceful major events for future host cities consist in approaching the planning as business as usual, employing an intelligence-led/risk-based approach to adopt any safety and security measure, and effective coordination between all partners, including the cooperation between government agencies and departments with the organizing committee and other relevant stakeholders.

As detailed in the article, the foundation of the security strategy for a major event consists in how public safety obligations are already delivered and who is responsible to address specific risks within a host city. However, because of the sheer scale of the project, specific additionalities would need to be incorporated within the already existing governance structure, to ensure ad hoc requirements are identified, sourced and allocated. Thus, those who have responsibility to manage public safety and address specific types of risks on a daily basis should not change during the event. Instead, these should be the ones responsible for the delivery of the event. The event's magnitude and its requirements necessitates specific additionalities, which would need to be addressed during the planning phase with adequate resources, knowledge and funding.

In addition, the use an intelligence-led/risk-based approach to determine practical safety and security operational objectives is of outmost importance to ensure the resources to secure the event are correctly identified, sourced and provided when needed. Once the necessary countermeasures are identified, the framework supports the processes of translating needs into factual requirements and turn them into actual resources to be sourced and allocated.

Furthermore, it is of outmost importance to ensure that single pieces of the operational jigsaw come together into a single holistic and integrated strategic and operational plan. This requires additional efforts to enhance and achieve cooperation between partners. Such coordination necessitate the creation of a clear framework and process to ensure all plans are integrated and all resources, required to secure the event, are made available to address specific risks.

For a new project, it is thus important to clearly understand the framework within which public safety is being delivered, the risk approach and the co-operation between agencies before it is possible to establish new supporting structures, such as committees, to facilitate the successful delivery of the event.

The challenge to host a successful event remains the need to ensure an integrated approach to the execution of operational tasks. The ability to understand the nuisances of different client groups from various parts of the world, with different languages, cultures and expectations, is important to ensure effective service delivery during the operations.

The framework presented in this paper allows decision-making to keep the planning and ultimately the operations running at the pace required to deliver a well-managed event. However, the human element remains of outmost importance: A fundamental part of successfully planning and executing safety and security operations for a major sport event is to build strong relationships and trust between different partners from the outset of the project to be able to move faster with the deliverables as the event approaches. The difficulty of such endeavour is the sheer amount of representatives of public and private organizations that need to be included within the planning of the event and that need to be consulted and have their input taken into consideration when drafting operational documentation such as policies and procedures. This represent one of the main challenges to stage a successful major event.

Annex: List of Acronyms

Full Name	Acronym
Automatic Number Plate Recognition	ANPR
Command, Control and Communications	C3
Department for Transport (UK)	DfT
Hostile Vehicle Mitigation	HVM
Improvised Explosive Device	IED
Italian Team for Security, Terroristic Issues & Managing Emergencies	ITSTIME
Major Sport Events	MSE
Olympic Safety & Security Strategic Risk Assessment	OSSSRA
Organizing Committee	OC

Pedestrian Intrusion Detection System	PIDS
Pedestrian Screening Areas	PSA
Suicide Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Device	SVBIED
United Kingdom	UK
Vehicle Screening Areas	VSA

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Executive Summary

Framing AQAP's intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen: shifting patterns of governance and the importance of being local – Eleonora Ardemagni

Questo contributo contestualizza e investiga il fenomeno jihadista in Yemen. La rivalità fra Al-Qa'ida nella Penisola Arabica (AQAP) e le cellule locali del sedicente Stato Islamico (IS) è in crescita, data la graduale convergenza di obiettivi e aree operative fra le due organizzazioni. Tre fattori delineano l'egemonia di AQAP all'interno della galassia jihadista yemenita, evidenziando allo stesso tempo i limiti di IS in Yemen: l'esperienza dei proto-emirati di Abyan nel 2010-11, la fitta rete di alleanze, basate anche sull'economia informale, intrecciate con le tribù locali, la capacità di raccogliere il consenso delle popolazioni locali attraverso una propaganda incentrata su questioni/tradizioni del territorio. La prima parte dell'articolo offre un'analisi sincronica fra AQAP e IS nello Yemen (genealogia, struttura delle organizzazioni, geografia e target, narrazioni), mentre la seconda parte del contributo si sofferma sull'analisi dell'evoluzione del modello di *governance* di AQAP nelle città del sud dello Yemen che hanno sperimentato forme di governo jihadista tra il 2011 e il 2016. Infatti, lo schema che AQAP aveva seguito durante l'esperienza dei proto-emirati di Jaar e Zinjibar (regione di Abyan) si era contraddistinto per l'imposizione rigida della *shar'ia* sulla popolazione locale e per il controllo prettamente militare del territorio. Al contrario, il mini-stato di Mukalla (2015-16) nella regione petrolifera dell' Hadhramaut, ha visto prevalere l'applicazione del nuovo modello di *governance* di AQAP (che non ha caso ha qui scelto di chiamarsi "Sons of Hadhramaut") e che privilegia il rapporto con il tessuto sociale preesistente attraverso la co-gestione politica, welfare capillare e propaganda mirata su temi locali. Tale schema di governo si presenta assai più resiliente del precedente, anche in termini di contro-insorgenza, poiché adattabile e capace di intrecciarsi fino a mimetizzarsi con le realtà indigene. Inoltre, la possibile introduzione della nuova riforma federale, approvata nel 2014 e osteggiata da molte tribù del sud dello Yemen, potrebbe spingere alcuni leader tribali ad alleanze tattiche con i jiha-

disti contro i clan rivali delle regioni limitrofe. Il contributo, focalizzato sulle vicende politiche intra-yemenite nelle quali trovano spazio anche gli attori jihadisti, tiene però in costante considerazione due dinamiche regionali: la competizione fra Arabia Saudita e Iran per l'egemonia in Medio Oriente, inserendo al contempo l'instabilità dello Yemen all'interno dell'area di insicurezza del Golfo di Aden.

From Nuclear and Radiological Smugglin to Nuclear Terrorism: Understanding the threat to the European cities – Nicolò Giuseppe Spagna

Dopo gli attacchi terroristici a Parigi, Bruxelles e Nizza reclamati dallo Stato Islamico (ISIS) una delle questioni che viene sollevata riguarda il possibile utilizzo da parte di ISIS di un'arma nucleare o radiologica oltre alle armi convenzionali. Questo lavoro ha l'obiettivo di fornire una maggior comprensione della minaccia, cercando di rispondere alla seguente domanda: *Esiste una concreta minaccia nell'uso di un'arma radiologica o nucleare contro una città Europea da parte di ISIS?* La prima parte del lavoro si sofferma sulla dimensione della motivazione di ISIS e sulle evidenze che fino ad oggi hanno mostrato il suo interesse nei confronti dell'utilizzo di armi CBRN. Successivamente sono state descritte le rotte principali di contrabbando del materiale nucleare e radiologico e gli stati implicati. L'ultima parte riguarda la valutazione della minaccia evidenziando due facilitatori, ovvero l'alto livello di infiltrazione jihadista nella regione dei Balcani e il collegamento tra terrorismo e gruppi criminali. La conclusione si soffermerà sull'esistenza di una concreta minaccia nell'utilizzo di una bomba sporca radiologica da parte di ISIS. Diversamente l'utilizzo di un ordigno nucleare propriamente detto per un attacco atomico è altamente improbabile per motivazioni logistiche e tecniche.

Major Sport Events Safety and Security Framework's Core Elements – Giovanni Pisapia

Ospitare un grande evento sportivo come la Coppa del Mondo, i Giochi Olimpici e Paralimpici o i Giochi del Commonwealth, è una sfida unica per ogni città a causa della vastità e la complessità di un mega evento con molteplici clienti. Atleti, funzionari del team, media, VIPs e spettatori hanno tutti aspettative specifiche. Inoltre, le esigenze dei residenti e delle imprese locali devono essere incluse nella pianificazione, con l'obiettivo di garantire la normale mobilità e funzionalità delle città durante l'evento per tutti i cittadini e visitatori.

È chiaro che ogni città che ospita un grande evento sportivo, in collaborazione con le forze dell'ordine, ha la necessità di valutare i rischi, definire una strategia di pianificazione, designare una struttura organizzativa efficiente, ed individuare risorse disponibili per sostenere l'implementazione efficace delle misure di sicurezza al fine di garantire che l'evento sia un successo.

In questo contesto, lo scopo di questo articolo è quello di elencare e delineare gli elementi principali, e le relative interdipendenze, necessari al quadro di sicurezza da approntare per grandi eventi sportivi, allo scopo di identificare il percorso strategico da intraprendere per realizzare un progetto ben gestito. L'articolo fornisce anche alcuni approfondimenti sugli insegnamenti più rilevanti derivanti da una appropriata esperienza fatta nel pianificare progetti complessi relativi alla sicurezza in ambito internazionale.

Chiaramente, ogni evento è diverso a causa delle idiosincrasie locali specifiche relative al sistema legale, ai diversi ruoli e responsabilità nella gestione della sicurezza ed alle caratteristiche socio-economiche. Tuttavia, il quadro proposto, che avrebbe bisogno di essere ritoccato in linea con le specifiche caratteristiche locali, è un modello generale efficace per la pianificazione di grandi eventi attraverso un unico insieme di elementi (ad esempio la valutazione del rischio, la strategia di pianificazione, il piano operativo) che riguardano trasversalmente diversi partner per coordinare l'integrazione sia durante la pianificazione che nelle operazioni nel corso dei giochi. Tale quadro di sicurezza fornisce i controlli e le assicurazioni necessarie a livello locale, nazionale e internazionale, circa la capacità di affrontare con efficacia i rischi relativi alla sicurezza pubblica durante un grande evento.

finito di stampare
nel mese di novembre 2016
presso la LITOGRAFIA SOLARI
Peschiera Borromeo (MI)

La Rivista semestrale *Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società* intende la *Sicurezza* come una condizione che risulta dallo stabilizzarsi e dal mantenersi di misure proattive capaci di promuovere il benessere e la qualità della vita dei cittadini e la vitalità democratica delle istituzioni; affronta il fenomeno del *Terrorismo* come un processo complesso, di lungo periodo, che affonda le sue radici nelle dimensioni culturale, religiosa, politica ed economica che caratterizzano i sistemi sociali; propone alla *Società* – quella degli studiosi e degli operatori e quella ampia di cittadini e istituzioni – strumenti di comprensione, analisi e scenari di tali fenomeni e indirizzi di gestione delle crisi.

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EDUCatt - Ente per il Diritto allo Studio Universitario dell'Università Cattolica
Largo Gemelli 1, 20123 Milano - tel. 02.72342235 - fax 02.80.53.215
e-mail: editoriale.dsu@educatt.it (produzione) - librario.dsu@educatt.it (distribuzione)
redazione: redazione@itstime.it
web: www.sicurezzaerrorismosocieta.it
ISBN: 978-88-9335-108-9



Euro 20,00