Home » News@en
Category Archives: News@en
I. Perspectives on terrorism
Tiziano Li Piani, Progettazione strutturale e funzione sociale dello spazio (quale) vulnerabilità e soluzione al terrorismo urbano. Perché serve e come è possibile proteggere l’edificio dall’uomo (oltre che dal terremoto)
This article presents the knowledge gaps and the methodological steps inherent the process of standardization of the terrorist threat in urban environments within the structural design and rehabilitation of buildings for civil use. The necessity for a revision of the current technical codes for building constructions which shall include also the terrorist threat, appears as cogent in light of the progression, in number and harshness, of the terrorist attacks recently involving soft targets inserted in highly urbanized environments of European cities, with the aim of provoking the highest number of civilian victims within their everyday life. The normative integration of the terrorist threat in the design process of civil constructions implies the performing of a number of delicate steps. In fact, the physical-mechanical nature of impact waves referred to explosions or hyper-velocity impacts is different from the one associated to dynamic loadings already known and properly treated within the design codes for civil buildings, such as earthquakes (or more rarely wind). The diversity of the treat is reflected in the different behaviour which the different types of dynamic loadings provoke on the same structure, requiring an update not simply to the validations currently employed within the structural design, but also including the approach itself of the anti-seismic philosophy of design when dealing with terrorism. However, the unique phenomenology of the terrorist treat with reference to the involved target, primarily lies in the social function of the spatial distributions and relative interactions of the urban fabric of the city in which the target is inserted, that the terrorist attack is primarily aimed to disaggregate. This unique feature requires the comprehension and subsequent quali-quantitative assessment also of the social function of the target and of the social dimension of the attacker (the carrier of the terrorist threat), within the standardization process of the terrorist input. However, this source of vulnerability to man-made threat, intrinsic to most of the buildings and constructions in Europe, can potentially rise as strategical promoter of the recovery of an urban harmony often neglected within the Architecture of the modern city, toward a philosophy of design of the single building which includes the humanist function of the architectural and urbanistic elements in which it is inserted.
Terrorism, city, urban, explosion, impact, earthquake, space of influence, attacker, target, input, space, social, humanism.
International Islamic terrorist organizations have become fully recognized actors of globalization, whit no borders to group their activities, except through their ideology, rooted in their interpretation of Islam. Their financial resources branch out in the management of physical territories, a global illegal network, organized or small crimes, extortions, donations and they are more and more shifting in the online realm. Indeed, modern financial tools and, in particular, cryptocurrencies, are covering an emerging role in terrorism financing and money laundering.
Starting from documented cases of jihadists’ use of cryptocurrencies and the most recent developments either in global Islamic terrorism or in modern finance, this paper is aimed at analysing where institutions should intervene in this field and which aspects should be accurately monitored in order to prevent terrorists’ illegal use of such an innovative financial resource as cryptocurrencies.
Terrorism, jihad, Financing, Cryptocurrency, bitcoin
The presence of women in Islamic terrorism has been studied by different scholars, however, from the literature emerged a cognitive gap on the concrete functions assumed by them. The purpose of this research is to understand the roles played by women, if there are differences in role between women affiliated with Al Qaeda and Daesh and what are the relevant intervening variables. The study was conducted on a sample of 176 women and the approach adopted was that of a qualitative analysis. The first part of the research highlights, for each role that emerged, the socio-relational variables that influences acquisition of role. The second part of the study analysis the semiotics of two magazines that following the birth of the Islamic State with the aim of understanding if and in what terms the online propaganda promoted female mobilization. The results obtained from the study showed that there was both a gradual implementation and diversification of female support with the beginning of Daesh.
Women, Islamic terrorism, roles, socio-relational influences, propaganda, Daesh.
During the months between 2017 and 2018 it was possible to witness the shift of Islamic State (IS) from a semi-State group to wide insurgency. It thus becomes imperative to acknowledge the threat posed by the “new IS” and the influence that the group excercises over violent extremism and our own society. This paper focuses on the operative dimension of IS’ legacy by analyzing its forms – heritage and method – inside our “media society”.
The heritage regards a direct link between the group and its followers, a continuum both ideological and operative which collects the know-how made by IS with the aim of continuing the war against its enemies; the method aims to exploit such operative knowledge which in truth remains open to whoever desires to use its best practices for its own aims, even ones not linked to violent jihadism. Such approach marks the shift from an “open source jihad” to an “open source extremism”, potentially leading to attacks and threats simultaneous and/or parallel to jihadi ones.
Stato Islamico, Daesh, legacy, eredità, estremismo violento, comunicazione, propaganda, new normal.
II. Perspectives on security
Contemporary international system is at a political turning point due to security issues partially related to the concept of irregular warfare. Over the last three decades, several theories have emerged around the idea that war has changed and should no longer be considered in some areas and contexts state versus state. The goal of the essay is to analyse the nature of contemporary irregular warfare, showing, on the one hand, the continuities of the current debate with old strategic ideas (mainly related to the notion of insurgency) and, on the other hand, its consequences for politics and security.
Irregular Warfare, Transformation of War, Security Studies, Hybrid Warfare, Terrorism.
This article deals with the cultural development and general perception of the concept of “intelligence” and “economic intelligence” in France. After the Cold War, finance and markets assumed a greater importance in determining the relations between countries; however, it took a long time for the French elite to be convinced of the existence of “economic warfare” and to define a culture of its own in the field of intelligence. Still, when all the international analyses were strongly related to the Cold War ideology and talking about economic warfare seemed like an abuse of language, C. Harbulot and P. Baumard urged the need to reconsider intelligence activities and to apply them in the national economy, overcoming the negative connotation that “renseignement” had. Researching, processing and spreading any piece of information that can be considered strategic is the only formula we can rely on in order to face the last challenges posed by globalization. Between 1992 and 1994, the expression “economic intelligence” officially entered the French public debate on national competiveness, together with the request for public intervention in the national economy. Harbulot and Baumard kept recommending the systematic search and interpretation of the information available to everyone, showing a new way to interpret the markets. The new approach is different from traditional intelligence by the nature of its field of application (open information); the nature of its actors (inserted in a collective information culture context), and its cultural specificities (each nation’s economy generates its own specific model of economic intelligence).
Economic Intelligence, Economic Warfare, Intelligence Culture, Information; Globalization.
In the southwestern regions of the Arabian Peninsula, overlooking the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden, there is a country that has been oppressed by war for almost four years. Its name is Yemen. A silent and invisible crisis, aggravated by one of the worst humanitarian disasters in recent history. This conflict fully reflects the thought and the theories of those who have contributed, after the end of Bipolarism, to a paradigm shift in the whole phenomenology of war, from the Clausewitzian paradigm to modern warfare. The scientific literature designed to expound the features of unconventional warfare and asymmetric engagement offers a valid interpretative lens through which observe, analyze and explain Yemeni civil war, which can be advisedly defined the emblem of modern warfare.
Medio Oriente, guerra civile dello Yemen, nuove guerre, guerra non convenzionale, guerra asimmetrica, stato fallito.
Middle East, Yemeni civil war, new wars, asymmetric warfare, modern warfare, failed state.
In recent years, with the intent to shed a light on contextual factors that correlate with the presence of specific crime categories, there has been a growing interest in the development of techniques that use spatial analysis programs to identify the areas in which crime occurs. One of these is certainly the methodology called ‘Risk Terrain Modelling’ (RTM) (Caplan et al., 2010), oriented to a strategic analysis of the context within which future offences could happen, integrating conceptual elements coming from the environmental criminology such as the ‘criminogenic triggers’, to identify the areas of greatest concentration and diffusion of crime. In this regard, the present study aimed to investigate the predictive efficacy of the RTM through a real case study: the burglaries in the city of Ancona. In support of the pre-existing literature, the results of this research showed that the places where drug dealing, prostitution and finally the ATMs are concentrated make it possible to forecast up to 72.5% of burglaries in the first four months of 2018, identifying 87% of the prospectively vulnerable urban areas. Furthermore, this study shows that even in a confined space, the same risk factors can be combined in different ways, giving rise to areas of variable risk over time. In addition, these results provide a rather effective set of information to be potentially used by both the local community and the police forces to develop countermeasures aimed at tackling urban crime including burglaries, robberies, drug dealing and so on. A similar approach could also provide operators, policy-makers and local administrators with significant support to understand and counterattack other forms of criminal behaviour committed by gangs or antisocial groups. In fact, it would guarantee the application of the RTM as a tool for a better predictive policing strategy aimed at both a deeper crime analysis level and a risk assessment that could be fundamental to forecast the areas with the highest risk of criminal conducts in the entire city.
RTM, GIS, Risk, Prevention, Crime, Ancona.
III. Perspectives on resilience
Faced with a world in which the number of people living in the city is increasing, the theme of urban resilience becomes central. However, we are faced with numerous definitions that contribute to making a general evaluation process difficult, creating different models based on different interpretations of the term. In this study, different models of urban resilience evaluation will be presented and confronted, the ones produced by scholars or private organizations. Starting from this comparison, one of the model, the one of Cutter et al. (2008), will be used for analysing the case of Mariana (MG). The dam collapse, one of the worst environmental disaster in Brazil, caused damages in two States, along the course of Rio Doce, spreading pollutant for over 600 km. A final evaluation is carried out considering 6 different dimensions – ecological, social, economic, institutional, infrastructural and community – each of them divided into multiple variables.
Urban resilience, complex systems, practical measurement, urban resilience index.
It is possible to download the entire journal as PDF file by clicking here, as ePub file by clicking here and also as mobi file (Kindle format) by clicking here.
Il terrorismo di oggi è frammentato e globalizzato e successivamente all’avvento dell’autoproclamato Stato Islamico (ISIS) è divenuto multipolare, estremamente dinamico ed in costante cambiamento. All’interno di questo quadro bellico la cosiddetta Information Warfare diviene sempre più primaria, per questo è essenziale approfondire lo studio dei network terroristici in funzione dei sistemi di comando e controllo. Questa ricerca tenta di fornire una maggiore comprensione del comando e del controllo utilizzando due casi di studio: gli attentati terroristici di Parigi e Bruxelles compiuti e rivendicati da ISIS. Questo studio con l’applicazione della social network analysis (SNA) analizza la struttura funzionale e morfologica della rete che ha operato per l’attuazione degli attacchi. A tale scopo, i dati relazionali utilizzati per l’analisi sono stati raccolti attraverso un processo di open source intelligence. Utilizzando la SNA, l’analisi locale e globale ha rivelato che la rete antistante gli attacchi presentava un pattern molto simile ad una struttura ibrida, in altre parole un mix tra una struttura gerarchica tradizionale e un’organizzazione completamente connessa. Mentre, l’analisi funzionale ha rivelato l’esistenza di un sistema decisionale rigido e gerarchico all’interno del quale veniva esercitata la funzione di comando. Tale funzione è stata esercitata attraverso diversi key players che sono emersi dall’analisi come cruciali per l’architettura della rete e quindi per la pianificazione degli attacchi terroristici.
Rete terroristica, ISIS, analisi delle reti sociali, comando e controllo, C2, attacchi terroristici di Parigi e Bruxelles, terrorismo.
During 2017 the Islamic State (IS) had to cope with the fall of its main strongholds. Moreover, the crisis that followed the loss of Raqqa (October 2017) resulted in a huge drop of communication and propaganda materials. This resulted in an almost comatose state of the IS communication apparatus: the official propaganda was reduced dramatically after the fall of Raqqa and Marawi and it had to be kept alive by an “iron lung” consisted above all in the al-Naba gazzette and the Amaq Agency. Meanwhile, unofficial authors entered the fray with their own production, thus keeping IS communication active – although not at the same level as the official media majors – until late 2017 when IS climbed out of its crisis both on the quantitative and the qualitative levels. The analysis aims to delineate IS communication efforts from mid 2017 to early 2018 focusing in particular on the Inside the Khilafah video series. It tries also to look at the potential evolution of the IS state for what concerns its legacy and heritage and how this could enhance the threats posed not just by terrorism but by the wide spectrum of extremism.
Islamic State, extremist communication, Inside the Khilafah, terrorism, Islamic State’s heritage
L’avvento del terrorismo internazionale, l’emergere del fondamentalismo islamico e l’incremento dei flussi migratori regolari e irregolari hanno reso le carceri italiane zone ad alto rischio di radicalizzazione. Ad oggi non è, però, chiaro in che modo e perché questo accada. Attraverso un’analisi accurata della realtà carceraria in Italia, il seguente paper ha studiato il fenomeno della radicalizzazione in Italia, identificando quattro variabili che tendono a favorire tale processo: il livello di frustrazione dei detenuti, le problematiche organizzative (quali, sovraffollamento, scarsità di personale e assidui trasferimenti di staff e detenuti), l’esposizione dei detenuti a idee radicali e, infine, l’adozione di inappropriate misure anti-radicalizzazione da parte delle autorità italiane.
Islamic extremism, Italy, Prison Radicalisation, Penitentiary System, estremismo islamico, Italia, radicalizzazione, sistema penitenziario.
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARIES
La stabilità e la sicurezza delle infrastrutture critiche all’interno dell’Unione Europea si basa sulla definizione di queste ultime proposta dalla Commissione europea con la Comunicazione numero 704 del 2004, sul Programma Europeo per la Protezione delle Infrastrutture Critiche (EPCIP) lanciato nel 2006 e sulla Direttiva inerente la Sicurezza delle Reti e dei Sistemi Informativi (NIS) del 2016. Questi pilastri della sicurezza delle IC hanno tuttavia dato vita ad un sistema frammentato caratterizzato da soluzioni nazionali tra loro assai eterogenee e da istituzioni incapaci di garantire un controllo in tempo reale degli scenari o una gestione efficacie delle minacce potenziali. Analizzando la situazione venutasi a creare, questo articolo desidera far notare che le autorità preposte alla sicurezza delle infrastrutture, il cui funzionamento è oggigiorno in massima parte garantito da sistemi cibernetici, devono adottare una strategia di costante presenza nel dominio cyber e, implementando il principio di sussidiarietà, prevedere una cooperazione a livello sovranazionale che possa, anticipando i problemi, garantire la stabilità delle IC di rilevanza regionale. Solo autorità regionali, ove queste risultassero necessarie a causa dell’interdipendenza infrastrutturali di diversi Paesi, potrebbero agire in tempo reale manipolando a proprio favore gli eventi cibernetici ovvero gestendo al meglio la resilienza delle IC.
Aubsidiarity, critical infrstructures, cyberdefence, constant presence, common market
The connection between Western Balkans and Daesh is real, still represent a huge problem and it is related to the big amount of arms trafficked every year, by criminal groups or local governments, directly or thanks to the collaboration of third countries, as Saudi Arabia, Turkey and United States, whose provide armaments to certain Syrian supported groups of fighters. Facts demonstrate that the same military equipment risk to be diverted to jihadist groups, or Daesh affiliates, through different pipelines: on the battlefield, due to corrupted functionals, or by thefts.
The arms trade has not only an “illegal aspect” but also a “legal” one, as most of the States who were part of former Jugoslavia, are now involved in a business without precedent. Lots of the old communist stockpiles have been rehabilitated and the arms industries work a full regime to meet the market demand.
The main importer is Saudi Arabia, who do not compare in any “black register” of arms and who can reroute the armaments to Syria or Yemen.
The threat is not only rectricted to conflict areas, as Syria and Iraq, but concerns also the European Community itself, in particular for the alarming presence of the so-called “lone wolves”, able to spread panic and death.
European authorities are trying to take measures to counter terrorism in all its forms, but this struggle still affects the region and its citizens.
Western Balkans, arms trafficking, jihadism, terrorism, Daesh.
In the last decade, Europe has been affected by an unprecedented migratory flow: millions of people fleeing civil wars, poverty, persecution and continuing violations of fundamental human rights have crossed European borders in search of better living conditions. Europe, which does not provide for the possibility of legal entry for asylum seekers, has responded to the humanitarian crisis by increasing controls at external borders and implementing agreements with countries such as Turkey and Libya, with the aim of reducing arrivals. The impossibility to enter legally in the European territory has meant that migrants are forced to turn to networks of human traffickers who, in agreement with the criminal gangs in the European destination countries, take care of the journey and the subsequent exploitation of migrants. The implementation of long-term solutions in Europe, combined with development programs to improve the living conditions in the countries of origin, are necessary to make migration a safe phenomenon, both for host countries and for the thousands of victims of conflicts and environmental disasters.
Migration, trafficking, exploitation, criminal networks.
It is possible to download the entire journal as PDF file by clicking here, as ePub file by clicking here and also as mobi file (Kindle format) by clicking here.
This paper focuses on the analysis of the concepts and forms of radicalisation which lead peo¬ple to join or adhere to a specific extremist group.
The analysis has been carried out according to a secondary data analysis, providing interesting insights on the way the concept of radicalization can be understood.
Specifically, the analysis considers three forms of radicalization: organized terrorism and polit¬ical extremisms; hate crime and alternative movements.
All these three sociological groups cannot be considered such as a single social phenomenon without interconnection with other types of groups, but there is the possibility that many of them could be interrelated, making possible what has been defined “hybrid radicalization”. The findings of this preliminary research lead to a new scenario and approaches in understand¬ing the current extremist backdrops.
Radicalisation, political extremisms, terrorism, hate crime.
The jihadist propaganda of the Islamic State takes advantage of many creative solutions, ranging from social networks and other web strategies to more traditional media. Sociologists, psychologists and most analysts investigating this matter have focused their attention on the Internet, neglecting the role of informal visual communication in urban context. The main goal of this contribution is to offer a scenario of ISIS graffiti role, focused in the western countries and to test the hypothesis that ISIS graffiti represent a weak signal of dangerous radicalization. I present a wide open ISIS graffiti inventory in western urban places. I analyze graffiti localization – from a geographical and a territorial point of view – graffiti language, and graffiti content, both textual and iconic. The analysis of almost eighty cases of western ISIS graffiti presents many interesting findings. Shortly the ISIS graffiti scenario presents mostly spray-vandalic writings and show aggressive messages against the western democracies and communities. Intriguingly, regression analysis suggests that the appearance of ISIS is a warning indicator of dangerous radicalization and a weak predictor of possible terrorist attacks under specific conditions.
Graffiti warfare, Islamic State, ISIS graffiti, propaganda, weak signals
In recent years some of the most visited destinations in South Mediterranean such as Egypt and Tunisia have been targeted by a series of terrorist incidents that attacked symbolic spots of tourism industry such as museums, resorts, heritage sites and airports. As a consequence of the attacks the number of visitors have drastically fallen and tourism sector plunged into crisis. In order to cope with the loss of tourism demand, the authorities of those countries have taken a series of security measures in order to ensure the visitors’ safety in the most visited spots. Such security measures have been accompanied by a series of marketing campaigns aimed at reducing the risk perception by promoting a sort of “vicarious” resilience.
Through the sociological and semiotic analysis of the elements that characterize the main marketing campaigns lead by Tunisia affected by terrorism attacks in recent years, the present article highlights the communication strategies adopted for restoring the image of the safe destination and by doing so attract new flows.
Tourism, Terrorism, Communication, Travel safety, Resilience
ANALYSIS AND COMMENTARIES
Global competition based on economic intelligence must be aware that critical infrastruc¬tures are the prerequisite for a state’s stability and competitiveness. In Italy, in spite of the openings of Law 124/2007, the implementation of an economic intelligence policy that can help the country to regain international competitiveness, has not yet been implement¬ed. However – despite the lack of a systemic approach – the decision makers have shown interest for cyber security sector. This article seeks to emphasize how the defense of critical infrastructures is connected to cyber security and how it should always be drawn on national priorities given the lack of a standard definitions of critical infrastructures at international level. Cyber threats are multifaceted and each state must handle it according to its own pri¬orities and according to its own institutional framework. With the Gentiloni Decree dated February 2017, the government has entrusted Security Intelligence Department (DIS) with the task of managing vulnerabilities and establishing the necessary collaboration for greater country-system resilience.
economic intelligence, critical infrastructure, cybersecurity
In the last few years a growing attention on illicit antiquities has risen from the white towers of the academic world to the wide public. The Islamic State (IS), as well as other terroris¬tic and insurgent groups, exploited the cultural heritage at their disposal both as a tool of propaganda and a source of income. However, they could count on a solid network in the region that has been in the business for decades now. This leads to the question: how do such networks work?
The aim of this article is to shed light on the illicit market of art and specifically antiquities, with particular focus on the structures, agents and techniques of the various criminal orga¬nizations and dealers in the field. This will be done by giving practical examples for each dimension analyzed, from low-level so called “tombaroli” (grave robbers and alike) to power¬ful international dealers, from the trenches of war-thorn countries to the highest skyscrapers of the industrialized world.
Moreover, since the “great raid” against MENA region antiquities is facing one of the most brutal pages of its history, an analysis of the Islamic State “department of antiquities” and modus operandi will be given. Finally, the study will provide indicators for a better under¬standing of this complex phenomenon and the menaces that threat our society.
patrimonio culturale, traffico illecito, antichità, Stato Islamico
It is possible to download the entire journal as PDF file by clicking here, as ePub file by clicking here and also as mobi file (Kindle format) by clicking here.
ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES
Il testo prende spunto da una pubblicazione realizzata nel 2015 dal CoE-DAT (Center of Excellence- Defence Against Terrorism) della NATO, riguardante possibili profili di modellazione del rischio terroristico nello scenario contemporaneo. All’analisi testuale del Paper vengono associate alcune riflessioni, originanti dalla corrente letteratura esistente sul fenomeno terroristico e da casi empirici di studio tratti dalla cronaca recente. In conclusione, l’indirizzo programmatico auspicato è che tanto le scienze sociali di tipo “soft” quanto le scienze “dure” possano concorrere sempre maggiormente ed in modo integrato per la clinical recognition, change detection, diagnosi e possibile prognosi e contrasto del fenomeno terroristico inteso quale modalità di combattimento.
Terrorism; Risk Modeling; Anthropology; Asymmetric Warfare
According to the US National Intelligence Council (NIC) publication Global Trends 20301, the current and future world is and will be shaped by a number of influential factors:
– Individual empowerment is rising, thanks to the reduction of poverty, growing middle-class¬es, level of education, discovery and use of new technologies and improving sanitation.
– The patterns of global power will change, we are already observing an ongoing power tran-sition from a hegemonic to a multipolar world, where states are and will not be the sole power brokers, other actors will step up on the international stage.
– Demography will demonstrate to be crucial, growing against ageing populations, statistics foresee a 60% of the global population living in urban areas by 2030 and migrations will stabilise as a constant and growing phenomenon.
– Moreover, the climate change and resources scarcity is and will be another difficult chal¬lenge to global governance.
All those trends will be integrated by other vectors of change such as economic instability, efficiency of global governance, development and use of new technologies, regional instability and conflicts creation and resolution.
Now, taking into account the totality of those factors, the trajectory of a common upward sloping aggregate curve may be drown, insecurity will increase and, even more importantly, it will be com-posed by a basket of new and different threats.
These new trends and menaces will need to be detected, understood, prevented and ultimately engaged, and obviously old knowledge, tools and strategies will never fit the feat.
We live within a liquid reality, featured by the concept of constant evolution, hence, the security and defense cadre will have to bear the tough effort to adapt to new and complex environments, a pretty difficult task.
Within this framework the concept and meaning of conflict is changed as well. Warfare may no longer be intended as a pure matter of states, brought about by the physical engagement of official and opposing armies. Since the end of World War Two, the international Law of Armed Conflict
already started to regulate a new set of actors: insurgents, national liberation movements, lawful and unlawful combatants. However, the transformation is much wider, this is the era of Hybrid Warfare . This paper will present Human Dynamics and, more precisely, Sociocultural Intelligence (SO- CINT) as innovative and useful tools to face the new conflict scenario.
The need to deeply understand the field of operation, but more broadly the international environ¬ment with its different social and cultural contexts, political and legal features, economic conditions, groups composition and influence, is key, for the intelligence and the wider security and defense community. Not only to bring about successful operations in territories where military forces are engaged. The even greater advantage would be determined by the possibility to understand, control and dissolve threats before they turn into crisis.
This preventive effect, shows clearly how social sciences and the socio-cultural perspective must be applied not only to the military domain, rather, it is best suited for the most comprehensive intelli¬gence spectrum .
Following the guiding principles expressed above, this paper is going to explore the re-employment of Human Dynamics as a source of revolution for the international Intelligence Community and its methodological and analytical angle. The work will be developed starting from the intelligence history underlining the past role and space of employment of social sciences, the subsequent step will regard the description of socio-cultural intelligence as a discipline, what it is (scientific background), how it works (methodology), and why it is important. Furthermore, the main international examples of socio-cultural Intelligence application will be provided.
Concluding, socio-cultural Intelligence material application will be discussed.
Intelligence, human dynamics, counter-terrorism
The main objective of this paper is to understand why the Intelligence Community at time fails, taking in account several major intelligence failures starting from the most shocking one in the twentieth century – the 9/11 terrorist attack – to the most recent – France and Belgium multiple attacks.
Intelligence failures are not easy to study because there is not accepted single theory that ex¬plains why the intelligence community fails. This field of interest, which has his roots in the Pearl Harbor surprise attack, has always attracted interest. This interest is due because of the importance of the Intelligence Community role in the security field. The most studied intel¬ligence failure episode was the attack on Pearl Harbor, but a major interest arose when one of the most shocking, for the western world, surprise attack took place within the United States. The 9/11 terrorist attacks. What went wrong? Although surprise attacks are not the only types of intelligence failures, we will focus on them because of the sadly recent events.
This paper is structured as follow:
Paragraph 1. Takes in account the different definitions of the word “intelligence” which can be an organization, information, a process, a product. To better understand the intelligence failures we decided that the best definitions to rely on are intelligence as information and as a process. Intelligence as information is defined as a tangible product to collected and analyzed; and intelligence as a process (the intelligence cycle) is composed of five important steps, which are: requirements, collection, analysis, production and dissemination.
Paragraph 2. The aim of this paragraph is to explore the different theories of the intelligence failures and try to understand which one can be applied for our case studies. The traditional school believes that the problem of the intelligence failure lies in faulty analysis of the available information: the failures lies in the analysis stage. While for the contrarian school the problem rises in the collection stage: intelligence officials need to rely more on the use of the intelligence means (HUMNIT, TECHINT, SIGINT, IMINT) for a better information collection. The reformist school does not recognize the problem in the intelligence cycle but in the organizational structure of the intelligence agencies. Complex structures, hierarchies, specialization can limit the sharing of important information: the dots are not connected.
Paragraph 3. The third paragraph regards the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Is worth saying that intelligence as “information” matches perfectly for this specific case: the information regarding the attacks were present but the organizational structure of the American intelligence community failed to connect the dots. We can easily say that US intelligence community failed to prevent the 9/11 terrorist attacks because the American intelligence agencies did not share information due to their complex organizational structure. For the different nature, protocols, cultures, internal problems, and interest the FBI and CIA did not share several important information. Paragraph 4. After analyzing the different theories and the first case study we agree in recognizing that the problem of the intelligence agencies in non- sharing information is due because of their organizational structure (of course, this is not valid for all the intelligence failure events as the intelligence can fail for other reasons also). This last paragraph simply describes and analyzes two tragic events that took place in Europe between 2015 and 2016: the Paris attacks and Brussels attacks. Just like the 9/11 case study we agree in addressing the failure of the intelligence community of both countries in not sharing information.
Intelligence, Intelligence failure, Intelligence bias, Intelligence Community, Intelligence theories, Intelligence schools, terrorist attack.
The European Union is facing the trouble which the US, after 9/11, had to deal with. How much safety are we ready to sacrifice for freedom and how many privileges and civil liberties can we give away for common safety, and finally: when is enough, enough? Europe is not as lavish with freedom slogans as the US, but we can assume that Europe is going to put an end to limiting civil liberties faster than Americans are. Reaction to terrorist attacks might be „a way towards populism”. Populism is especially visible during turning points or times of political crisis. Often the reaction of the state is inadequate to a terrorist attack. Almost every act of terrorism results in a strong reaction from the state. Usually, the first decision made is a halt in current law and order. Special rules and regulations become more significant.
The article suggests that both authoritarianism and populism are part and parcel of political culture and they appear in the face of national danger. What is more, it is not clear which actions and repression used by the authorities could be considered anti-terrorism tactics, and which mere populist and authoritarian actions. This article analyzes whether there is a relation between democracy and terrorism. In other words, greater fear of the unknown results in an increase of authoritarian feeling and leads to looking for controversial and sometimes radical, solutions. Apparently, the more democratic a country, the more dissatisfied a society is, which contributes to lesser understanding of the complexity of the process and to making judgments as well.
This paper analyze the Anti-terrorism Law, passed by the Polish Parliament in June, 2016. The said regulation is a way of a showing the authorities’ will to manifest their consistent and uncompromising attitude towards threats. The Law intends to introduce: purchase of pre-paid cell phones only on presentation of an ID; holding in custody for 14 days those suspected of terrorism and also carrying out house searches at all times. However, some parts of this regulation seem to be colliding with the idea of a democratic state in which freedom is the superior value. The conflict, which has been caused while passing this Law, addresses two issues. The first one is a traditional conflict of values between security and liberty. The second one is a manifestation of a populist, and perhaps naive, belief that strict law will be an effective weapon against terrorism.
It is very difficult to eradicate populism. It is going to be present one way or the other in the public sphere. What is more, populism is so flexible that it can adjust to any doctrine and political conditions. It is worth to verify if do modern, democratic citizens of Europe need populist governments? The answer to this question lies in social behaviors, especially during election campaigns in which politicians present their fresh and pragmatic look. The remedy for populist slogans is knowledge; it is also an effective tool in understanding the complex socio-political events.
Counterterrorism, security, surveillance, Patriot Act, Freedom Act, freedom, privacy
Terrorism occurs in all parts of the world although most incidents occur in the Middle East, South Asia, and Africa. Terror is first of all the terror of the next attack. Killing dozens or hundreds people is not the ultimate goal of terrorism. These events achieve a broader goal of creating division, fear, and escalating racist and xenophobic trends. Populist, far-right groups may well fuel more hatred. What if terrorism contributes to political and social disruption, which in turn leads to even more grievances that inspire further campaigns of political violence? From Denmark to the Netherlands to Poland, a new wave of rightwing parties has emerged over the past decade-and-a-half, and they are casting a much wider net than Jean-Marie Le Pen ever attempted to. And by deftly appealing to fear, nostalgia and resentment of elites, they are rapidly broadening their base. Such organisations, just like other populist and anti-immigrant parties gaining support in the polls across Europe, have been quick to make political capital from the attacks, citing them as proof that all their fears about Islamism were true.
The aim of the thesis is to discuss recent acts of terrorism in Europe in 2015-2016 and their influence on both the social attitude and the political decisions of the ruling elites in Europe. Therefore, the thesis is trying to answer the question whether the rise of a terrorist threat entails an increased support for radical, populist and nationalist movements in Poland.
The questions asked to the two groups of people representing two opposing social groups, were quite a challenge. Both groups, despite being different from each other, take part in an ongoing public discussion about what could be done to limit the terrorists threat. The threat of terrorism in Poland is more serious now than in the previous years. It is worth examining how society perceives the problem of terrorism and whether the anxiety connected with it could have any impact on the shape of the political scene. Statistical data show that the sense of terrorist threat in society has been politicised and the differences between particular political circles run along the ideological divisions.
An important field of research, picturing social attitudes is an analysis of the society in the perspective of sociodemographic divisions.
Having to verify some correlations between terroristic attacks and an increase in the hostility towards refugees, it is worth confronting those tragic events with the data illustrating the current attitudes in society.
Terrorism, Escalation, Radicalization, Populism, Poland
FOCUS: FOREIGN FIGHTERS
Claudio Bertolotti, Intelligence e definizione della minaccia. Dal terrorismo convenzionale al “Nuovo Terrorismo Insurrezionale” di matrice islamica: Foreign Fighter e “lupi solitari come fattore di destabilizzazione interna agli Stati.
The 2015-2016 terrorist attacks in Europe confirm the effective operational capability of the “phenomenon” Islamic State (IS), that has shifted from the quasi-state nature with a territorial control, to a denationalized and without borders nature.
An evolution that shows, on the one hand, a “business approach” based on the four phases of marketing, premium-branding, franchising and outsourcing; on the other hand this evolution, represents the adaptation of the guerrilla and military approach to the “European urban operational warfare”, in particular because the suicide commandos and the tactical “team-raids”.Furthermore, the “phenomenon Islamic State” is growing its potential offensive capability because of four human elements: the return of the foreign fighters, the role played by the “lone-wolves” (“proximity” operational subjects) in their own countries, the women, in operational roles in para-military units or in “social roles” as mothers and wives and, finally, the child-soldiers – also known as “lion cubs” – employed also as suicide attackers.
Taking into consideration the changing nature of the threat and the approach to contrast it, what is still missing is a common definition of the new model of terrorism and its characteristics.
It lacks of a theoretical and legal approach that could influence the effectiveness of a strategy to contrast the phenomenon because of absence of a common and shared vision on the menace, in particular by the intelligence agencies, the national and international police and the strategic analysts.
In the current debate on what are the characteristics of the threat, its weaknesses and the possible solution, Author of the present article proposes a new methodological approach finalized to define, understand and analyze the phenomenon, starting from the specific nature of a terrorism that is fluid, dynamic and multidimensional: the “New Insurrectional Terrorism”.
Foreign Fighter, intelligence, Isis, Islamic State, New Insurrectional Terrorism, suicide commando, terrorism
Up to 30,000 foreign terrorist fighters are estimated to have joined the conflict in Syria under the ISIS flag. Although foreign fighters’ phenomenon is not new, its unprecedented numbers and its rapid evolution caught the whole International Community unprepared. Worried by the sophisticated radicalisation process through the Internet and social media platforms, the lack of borders’ control capacity, the evasive travel patterns, and fearing the so-called ‘blow- back effect’, the UN Security Council provided the first targeted response to foreign fighters with the adoption of Resolution 2178(2014), definitely turning the concept of ‘foreign fighters’ in ‘foreign terrorist fighters’. Totally overturning academics and scholars’ definitions, the UN Security Council identified foreign fighters as individuals travelling for purpose of terrorism, and called for Member States to criminalize such conduct. This article will analyse the main factors which lead to the evolution of foreign fighters’ concept, trying to figure out the consequences and the outcomes.
Foreign fighters, foreign terrorist fighters, ISIS, terrorism, UN Security Council, Resolution 2178(2014), combattenti stranieri, Consiglio di Sicurezza, terrorismo intemazionale, Stato Islamico, Risoluzione 2178(2014), Comunità Internazionale.
The Islamic State (IS) is one of the most deadly terrorist organizations completely different to the many ones existing nowadays. Its difference relies on the idea of achieving a worldwide “Caliphate”, meaning an organized self-productive institution ruled by Shar’ia Law as its political and religious code to govern, looking towards to be considered as a structured state. However, the purpose of this paper is to analyze the role of Foreign Fighters, which has developed into one of its most important elements in order to spread a new wave of terrorist attacks around the world.
The main idea of the article is an attempt to answer a particular question: by the analysis of the profile of Foreign Fighters and the modus operandi of the attacks, Does IS performs its terrorist attacks as organized cells, as self independent lone-wolfs or by the new procedure known as zombies supervised by a Command Control Body? Or the Islamic State’s propaganda is the only trigger needed to perform such violent outbreaks anywhere, at any time?
Islamic State, Foreign Fighters, Radicalization, Europe’s terrorist Attacks, IS Recruitment, IS Modus Operandi
The Italian jihadist scene with its fluid profile and features has been analyzed in different occa-sions by academics and experts. Their publications however, were conducted with a qualitative approach and, apart from some real cases description and analysis, there is a vacuum in the quantitative research that needs to be filled. This short paper is aimed at statistically analyzing data coming from some possible risk factors of violent jihadist radicalization proposed by the prevailing academic literature; the aim is to fill the abovementioned void in the research and promote a more thorough analysis to verify whether there are common denominators that can alert social workers and/or security services about individuals on the path of violent radicaliza- tion. The research is limited in sheer numbers and is related only to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) involved in the Syrian – Iraqi conflict. The data were collected by the author regarding individuals listed by the Italian government in the FTF national record, with information collected through open sources. The principal goal of this paper is to verify the subsistence of shared radicalization risk factors in the Italian FTFs milieu, highlighting the possible trajec¬tories exploited by jihadist recruiters and propagandists. However, it is necessary to highlight the fact that this work is only a theoretical hypothesis, which necessarily has to be validated by other studies with a broader analysis sample. Furthermore, validation results should not be tak¬en literally, being clear that a theoretical model remains disconnected from real case scenarios with their unique psychological, personal and societal dynamics.
Terrorism, Foreign Fighters, Italy, Radicalization
This article addresses the issue of jihadism in Yemen, framing jihadi networks’ territorial penetra-tion whether in the context of the ongoing Yemeni multilayered conflict, as in the chronic failure of Yemen’s state-building from the unification so far. Due to a gradual convergence in operation¬al areas and targets, the research article contends the occurrence of a rising intra-jihadi rivalry on Yemen’s soil between al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has deep tribal ties with some Yemeni tribes, and emerging cells of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Three factors that disempower IS’s mobilization capabilities are identified here, building the evidence of AQAP’S intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen. Firstly, AQAP was able to establish proto-emirates in the Abyan region (Jaar and Zinjibar provinces) in 2011, before the experience of the “Caliphate” between Syria and Iraq: that was a vanguard experiment in terms of identity, territoriality and language. Secondly, AQAP and its affiliates, as Ansar al-Shari’a, rely on a tribal wire of linkages and informal economy ties with local population, flourished in remote provinces out of state con¬trol. Thirdly, AQAP has elaborated jihadist narratives able to interact effectively with the Yemeni context, so rallying consensus (direct or tacit) among indigenous southern populations, where the shaykh plays a more prominent role if compared with the imam. To highlight similarities and differences within the jihadi galaxy, the article offers a comparison, in the first section, between AQAP and IS in Yemen, according to genealogy, structure of the organizations, targets and geog-raphy, narratives. In the second section, the article introduces a focus on AQAP’S shifting pattern of governance in the south of Yemen, where it has established fiefdoms and attracts recruits leveraging on tribal/regional discontent vis-à-vis the Sana’a-based system of power. As a matter of fact, the Abyan proto-emirates (2011-12) embodied a sharia-oriented approach: the implementa¬tion of Islamic law was prioritized in the relationship with local communities, since the aim was to win popular support through top-down measures predominantly based on coercion. On the contrary, the Mukalla’s mini-state in Hadhramaut (2015-16), founded on fuel smuggling, showed the adaptable, community-first face of jihadism: such a scheme is more difficult to counter for central authorities than the former because able to win local communities’ consensus through the interaction with local leaders, organized welfare and locally-tailored propaganda. It is not by chance that AQAP decided to rebrand itself in Mukalla as “Sons of Hadhramaut”. AQAP’S shift¬ing pattern of governance is going to enhance the resilience of jihadism in many Yemeni areas out of state’s control, especially in coastal southern regions. Moreover, as the last section of the es¬say analyzes, the widespread discontent of southern tribes about interim president Hadi’s federal reform (which was designed and approved by an appointed and not elected committee in 2014, but not implemented yet), could furtherly empower jihadists, given the historical mistrust and rivalries among populations that will be called to share resources and authority if the draft will enter into force (for instance, Abyan and Lahj, Hadhramaut and al-Mahra). Notwithstanding a Yemeni-focused lens of investigation, this article takes into account the current Middle Eastern scenario and its domestic implications (i.e. the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran), as the necessity to include Yemen’s instability into the broaden Gulf of Aden’s regional security complex, in order to analyze dynamics and sources of insecurity.
Yemen; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; jihadism; security; tribes; Mukalla
Il cubo di Rubik è un oggetto creato dal professore di architettura ungherese Ernó’ Rubik nel 1974. Pensato originariamente a scopo di studio tra matematici ungheresi, il cubo di Rubik presenta nella sua versione standard 9 quadrati su ognuna delle sue 6 facce, per un totale di 54 quadrati. Come per il cubo ungherese esistono diverse possibili strategie risolutive (es. per-mutazione spigoli, permutazione angoli), cosi anche per il dossier libico la Comunità Inter-nazionale sta cercando soluzioni che consentano di mettere a sistema un puzzle caratterizzato da un complesso paesaggio politico-tribale rispetto al quale è oltremodo difficile decifrare e ordinare i cromatismi esistenti.
Libia; Anthropology; Strategy; Asymmetric Warfare; Terrorism
ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES
SWF, geofinance, economic intelligence, public intervention
After the terrorist attacks in Paris, Bruxelles and Nice claimed by Islamic State (ISIS) the question that has been raised is if ISIS could use nuclear or radiological weapons in addition to firearms and suicide explosions. This paper has the goal of clarifying the threat’s scenario, an¬swering to the following question: Is there a concrete threat about the use of nuclear or radiolog¬ical weapons in Europe by ISIS? In order to this, the first part explains the strong political and divine motivation of attacking the apostates and the evidences in the interest of using CBRN weapons. Lastly, were described the different more likely smuggling routes and the states im¬plicated in the trafficking which a terrorist organization could use for acquiring the materials. The last part concerns the threat assessment. It has been described the two main facilitators of the nuclear and radiological attack by terrorists, in other words the jihadist infiltration in the Balkan and the link between terrorists and criminal groups. The conclusion is that the concrete threat concerns the use of the RDD (radiological dispersal device) in a hypothetical attack against European city, however for logistical and technical reasons it is very unlikely the use of a nuclear device for generating an atomic blast.
Terrorism, NBCR, Nuclear, Radiological
Negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l’Italia può considerarsi un paese “a rischio zero” e deve quindi predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia. Questo fatto stimola una riflessione sul ruolo che il sistema di Protezione civile (PC) potrebbe assumere di fronte al rischio terrorismo. È del tutto evidente che la PC non è chiamata a operare in prima linea. Anche all’interno del sistema di sicurezza civile italiano, disastri antropici come il terrorismo e il rilascio intenzionale di agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici e radiologici (NBCR) ricadono innanzitutto sotto la compe¬tenza della Difesa civile. Nondimeno anche la PC, forte delle sue capacità e delle esperienze ma¬turate sul campo, potrebbe offrire un contributo rilevante in caso di attacchi terroristici, per quanto sempre entro i limiti dei suoi compiti e delle sue competenze. Rimane da definire in che cosa possa consistere effettivamente tale contributo nel contesto attuale. Di fronte a una questione che non ha ancora ricevuto una risposta univoca, appare utile avanzare alcune considerazioni preliminari. Innanzitutto, è chiaro che eventi gravi come quelli di tipo terroristico devono essere gestiti dalle istituzioni ai massimi livelli di competenza, per evitare problemi di coordinamento e trarre il massimo beneficio dalle risorse e capacità disponibili. In questo contesto, l’intervento della PC deve essere richiesto dalle autorità competenti e non può che seguire le direttive da queste impartite, proprio per assicurare il massimo livello di coordinamento e sinergia.
Il ruolo della Protezione Civile potrebbe collocarsi prevalentemente nelle fasi della gestione del post-emergenza e, se possibile, della prevenzione. A seconda delle circostanze, la PC potrebbe essere coinvolta per svolgere una gamma di compiti specifici, come il salvataggio, lo sgombero e l’assistenza degli scampati dall’evento; il presidio degli spazi e il diradamento e sfollamento dei presenti; l’assistenza di supporto alle forze in prima linea; l’aiuto alla messa in sicurezza di edifici danneggiati. Di particolare interesse potrebbe essere la partecipazione attiva al processo di co-municazione dell’emergenza, grazie alla presenza capillare sul territorio che la PC può vantare. Queste attività di intervento presentano elementi diversi da quelli che caratterizzano l’operato tradizionale della PC e per questa ragione richiedono una formazione adeguata e mirata.
In conclusione, appare evidente che il tema del coinvolgimento della PC nell’ambito di disastri causati da attacchi terroristici merita attenzione, specialmente nella presente fase storica.
Terrorismo; Protezione civile; gestione della crisi; comunicazione del rischio; formazione; Italia
FOCUS: GRANDI EVENTI
Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique challenge and opportunity for any host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number of client groups. Athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators all have specific and de¬manding expectations, with distinctive desires and requirements. In addition, local residents and businesses’ requirements have to be attended too, with the aim of ensuring host cities continue to function properly during the event for all its citizens and visitors.
It is clear that each host city, in conjunction with relevant law enforcement agencies, has a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.
The aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies, of a sensible safety and security framework for major sport events, which identifies the strategic path to achieve a successful, well-managed and resilient event. The article also provides some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning com¬plex safety and security projects. Clearly, each event is different because of its specific idiosyn¬crasies related to the local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political and economic characteristics. However, the proposed framework, which would need to be tailor-maid in line with the specific local characteristics, is an effective blueprint for planning major events through a single set of documentations (e.g. risk assessment, strat¬egy, concept of operations) which cuts across different partners and directs the work of many role-players, assisting with the drafting of integrated operational plans. Such set up provides the necessary controls and reassurances locally, nationally and internationally, about the ability to deal effectively with public safety-related risks and to host a successful and peaceful event.
Safety and security, major sport events, risk assessment and management, security operations.
One of the characteristics of Saharan-Sahelian jihadism is its factionalism and the groups operating in the region establish frequently shifting relations of cooperation or competition making it difficult to understand alignments, alliances and rivalries. This paper tries to shed some light on the matter illustrating the different positions and arguments on the debate around the Boko Haram2-al Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb connection and its evolution. It covers the period of time that goes from the emergence of the Nigerian terrorist group in 2009 to its declaration of an Islamic caliphate in northern Nigeria in August 2014 and the establishment of the first contacts with the Islamic State that led to its official allegiance with the Iraqi/Syrian group in March 2015.
During the course of the years, there has been much speculation about Boko Haram’s links to the al Qa’ida network, in particular to its North African branch, al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb. Although the majority of the analysts, institutes of research and think-tanks agree on the existence of such a connection, different opinions persist on the time this link was established, its strength and its nature. This is due to the scarcity and the limited reliability of the available information, and also to the interests of the subjects.
The paper will illustrate the positions of different relevant subjects at the beginning of Boko Haram insurgence and their evolution during the course of the years, in conjunction with the evolution of the terrorist group and the main events that have influenced the conflict between the group and the armed forces of Nigeria and its neighbouring countries.
Between its emergence in 2009 and its allegiance to the Islamic State on 13 March 2015 and its consequent change of name in Wilayat Gharb Ifriqiyyah, Boko Haram together with its splinter group Ansaru3 have killed more than 13.0004 people, making it the deadliest terrorist group in 20145. One of the elements that is believed to have contributed to the strengthening of the group is its connection to al-Qa’ida in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM). This paper presents the different positions expressed by the main international institutes of research, think-tanks and analysts about the existence of links between Boko Haram and its splinter group Ansaru and AQIM. An extensive research in open sources resulted in finding that the majority of them agree that a relation between AQIM and Boko Haram existed and that its nature mainly involved the training of fighters, the exchange of weapons and funding. However, some differences emerged among the positions of the various subjects, for example, some distinguish between Boko Haram and Ansaru and affirm that only the latter has links to AQIM. Finally, some others express a more cautious stance or remain sceptical about the existence of such ties.
Boko Haram, AQIM, al-Qaeda, links, connection, ties
This paper analyses the effects and the social impacts of the current migration waves in Europe, with a specific focus on the German situation and the relations between Pegida movement – Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes and AfD – Alternative fuer Deutschland – political party.
Specifically, this piece of writing is the first to take a systematic approach from a sociological perspective to investigate what happened in Germany in the last few crucial month, where specific evidence of the role of the sociological framework have been demonstrated.
The aim of this analysis is the legitimateness of the the importance of social resilience at both methodological and operative levels, considering the interdependences that this concept has with the more general sociological framework and the migration issues.
The paper ends with an insight of the future of the migrants policies in Germany and the definition of the two sociological categories “resilience in transition and temporary resilience”.
In questi ultimi decenni, l’Europa sta affrontando una crisi umanitaria senza precedenti, testimoniata dalla sempre più visibile ondata migratoria e la pressione esistente ai confini degli Stati membri dell’Unione europea.
Una situazione cronica di caos si è andata sempre più delineando, in considerazione delle vulnerabilità di governance delle istituzioni attuali e dell’inefficacia delle politiche europee e internazionali rivolte alla possibile risoluzione dei conflitti in Medio oriente, delle politiche sulla sicurezza e alla lotta al terrorismo, delle politiche migratorie per la regolazione dell’accoglienza e dei flussi in ingresso.
Fino ad oggi il panorama è stato caratterizzato da una collezione di dati ed informazioni, che provenivano essenzialmente da fonti statistiche o giornalistiche: alcuni psicologi o attivisti sostenitori dei diritti umani hanno focalizzato l’attenzione sulle modalità di risposta resiliente da parte dei migranti, ma poco è stato analizzato in termini di una più generale resilienza istituzionale e sociale, che si concentri su un versante ovvero le modalità di risposta e gestione della situazione da parte delle comunità ospitanti e delle autorità locali.
Questa analisi avrà quindi come elemento cardine il ruolo della resilienza in Germania, uno dei Paesi europei dove le recenti ondate migratorie sembrano avere messo in crisi l’intero sistema sociale.
In particolare, la resilienza non verrà considerata unicamente nelle sue accezioni più positive, ma considerando anche finalità negative e distruttive quando per esempio il concetto viene utilizzato in funzione di aggregazione e polarizzazione estremiste, come per esempio lo sviluppo di partiti di estrema destra come AfD o NPD e movimenti politici come Pegida.
Nello specifico, alcune situazioni verranno considerate per le loro similarità: i fatti occorsi in Germania durante la vigilia di Capodanno a Colonia e in altre cittadine dove si sono verificati atti simili; l’attuale situazione migratoria e le conseguenze della crisi umanitaria in Germania; l’avanzare del partito AfD Alternative für Deutschland e del movimento di estrema destra Pegida – Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes.
Questo studio è quindi finalizzato alla presentazione e legittimazione della sociologia dei movimenti collettivi e di un più generale approccio sociologico, come lente interpretativa di fenomeni sociali, che per la loro complessità e interdipendenze stanno sfuggendo ad una efficace gestione e governance da parte delle istituzioni sia nazionali sia europee, non dimenticando il valore aggiunto espresso dalla relazione con i più ampi concetti di resilience in transition and temporary resilience considerati come drivers teorici e operativi, per una efficace e possibile gestione del fenomeno migratorio.
Security, resilience, migration, sociology, social movements
ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES
Alessandro Burato, SOCial Media INTelligence: l’impiego per l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica
Topics such as public security and intelligence are talked about almost everybody and are daily present on newspapers columns. The activities of secret services, always working on the evaluation of threat levels, are nowadays an highly interesting topic too as the international scenario is getting more complex because of issues such as terrorism and radicalization processes.
The attempt to use new tools to support public security activities has been analysed from different perspectives in order to give a solid base to the Digital Humint. From one side, the research intends to give an overview about the security and insecurity perception, introducing trust as a measuring factor, bringing in some of the theories and tools related to public security management.
However, it is likewise necessary to focus the attention to all the aspects that make SOCMINT not only a networks analysis discipline, but also a real rip-off instrument for targeting and understanding relevant information within them.
The peculiarity of risks related to the manifestation that took place the 1st of May in Milan has been monitored through a systematic press review and social media analysis, that is Open Source Intelligence and Social Media Intelligence.
The primary aim of the research was to investigate what kind of relevant information could be extracted by analysing networks, how those results could be used and to which extent they could be generalized to address other similar events. It is important to mention that the analysis was done being completely aware that Social Media Intelligence is not, and cannot be considered, as a per-se instrument but that it has to be brought within the wider intelligence cycle as a source of information otherwise inaccessible.
However, this research aims at testing this assumption by considering the possibility to use the gathered information for the evaluation, without any other source, of specific aspects, such as for example events or users that can have links with the population taken into account by the analysis.
Concetti ed attività come ordine e sicurezza pubblica e intelligence sono sulla bocca di tutti e nelle colonne di tutti i giornali. Si parla anche frequentemente del lavoro dei servizi di intelligence, costantemente all’opera per la valutazione dei rischi legati al contesto attuale, visto anche il panorama internazionale sempre più complesso, spesso chiamati in causa per questioni legate al terrorismo internazionale e ai processi di radicalizzazione.
Il tentativo di utilizzare nuovi metodi per supportare l’ordine e la sicurezza pubblica sulla base di informazioni rilevanti è stato analizzato per contribuire alla formalizzazione della Digital Humint esaminando diversi aspetti: da un lato, la ricerca intende fornire una panoramica circa la percezione di sicurezza e di insicurezza, introducendo come discriminante per la sua rilevazione il concetto di fiducia, prendendo in considerazione alcuni degli strumenti e delle teorie legate alla gestione dell’ordine pubblico.
Risulta però parimenti necessario focalizzare l’attenzione su tutti gli aspetti che fanno della SOCMINT non unicamente un’analisi delle reti, ma un vero e proprio strumento per la comprensione e l’individuazione di informazioni rilevanti in esse contenute.
Il delinearsi delle peculiarità e dei rischi della manifestazione del primo maggio 2015 a Milano sono stati seguiti attraverso una sistematica attività di rassegna stampa e di monitoraggio dei social network, ovvero di un’attività di Open Source Intelligence e di Social Media Intelligence.
L’obiettivo di tale analisi è stato primariamente quello di comprendere quale tipologia di informazioni aggiuntive potessero essere estratte tramite l’analisi delle reti, come potessero essere utilizzati i risultati ottenuti e quale grado di generalizzazione potesse essere applicato nei confronti di eventi correlati. È fondamentale sin da subito precisare che tale analisi si sia svolta nella piena consapevolezza che la Social Media Intelligence non sia, e non possa essere considerata, come uno strumento a sé stante ma debba essere ricompresa in quello che viene definito il circolo di intelligence e che quindi possa unicamente intervenire nel mettere a disposizione un bagaglio informativo altrimenti inaccessibile.
La presente ricerca vuole tuttavia anche testare tale assunto considerando la possibilità di utilizzo delle informazioni raccolte per la valutazione, in assenza di qualsiasi altra fonte, di aspetti specifici, quali ad esempio eventi o soggetti che possano avere legami con la popolazione presa in oggetto dall’analisi stessa.
SOCMINT, Social Media Intelligence, Information, Social Network, Intelligence, Facebook, Analysis.
Legislator has tried to address the new “entrepreneurial” nature and the grown power structure of mafia organizations, which are by now reaching their enrichment goal not only with criminal acts, but also by laundering money in licit or para-licit activities and influencing political system interfering with citizens’ freedom of vote. Art. 416 bis of italian penal code is an example of this awareness.
The need of countering more effectively the double phenomenon of laundering and reuse of money coming from criminal acts, has recently become one of the States’ priory, following the consciousness of its tight connections with organized crime and its serious repercussions on market organization and on the economy. The penal code, from this perspective, includes laundering crime, the use of money and goods coming from illicit activities.
Intelligence, from its viewpoint, has improved its penetration in terms of acquiring information in the Calabrian regional context and it has highlighted the subversive potential of the phenomenon, which represents on of the major threats for the national security. Likewise, from one side, the increase of tactical analyses that traced networks, power dynamics and conflicting tensions has been registered, form the other side, provisional studies, on a strategic level, have underlined possible ‘ndrangheta evolutions.
Given that today challenges are not won by the strongest, but by those who can know them and consequently adjust their behaviours, State’s authorities are provided with data to contrast organized crime: what is nowadays important is to link and coordinate them in an effective way and to promptly intervene, anticipating mafia’s moves. For these reasons, the intelligence, which has the capability to collect, integrate and use essential information, can be a winning tool to counter organized crime.
In Calabria the strongest criminal aggregation factor is given by parental links, which constitute the first cell on which the mafia organization is built: aiming at studying in depth the phenomenon cell, that is the family, genealogy is required.
However, it is not excluded that the new members of ‘ndrangheta use social media: from an intelligence perspective, the more our lives are connected to the net, the more our real and virtual identities are blended and relevant information are shared and thus traceable to elaborate broader analyses. The Social Media Intelligence, or Socmint, is the newest component of the intelligence cycle that focuses on gathering and analysing information that are produced and exchanged via social media.
Only and analysis freed from political, media and economical influences can prevent unfounded fears and useless expenses: independent intelligence from University is able to provide credible evaluations on the effective impact of Islamic, chemical, bacteriological and cyber terrorism. A bridge between intelligence and university is today necessary given the challenges posed by fight of terrorism and organized crime and the fact that Intelligence resources could not be enough to produce the needed knowledge to effectively counter new threats to human security. Universities and the research domain are always more security stakeholders.
Il Legislatore si è nel tempo sforzato di tipicizzare il nuovo volto «imprenditoriale» e l’accresciuta struttura di potere delle organizzazioni mafiose, le quali tendono ormai all’obiettivo dell’arricchimento non soltanto mediante la realizzazione di atti strettamente delittuosi, ma anche attraverso il reimpiego del denaro sporco in attività economico-produttive lecite o paralecite e l’influenza che riescono ad esercitare sul sistema politico, sino ad interferire sulla libertà di voto dei cittadini. L’art. 416 bis del Codice penale è un esempio di questa consapevolezza.
L’esigenza di fronteggiare più efficacemente il duplice fenomeno del riciclaggio e del reimpiego del denaro sporco, e cioè di provenienza delittuosa, è diventata di recente una delle priorità degli ordinamenti statuali, a seguito della definitiva presa di coscienza delle sue strettissime connessioni con la criminalità organizzata e delle sue gravissime ripercussioni sull’organizzazione del mercato e sul libero sviluppo dell’economia. Il Codice penale prevede, in quest’ottica, i reati di riciclaggio, di impiego di denaro, beni o utilità di provenienza illecita e di autoriciclaggio.
L’Intelligence, dal canto suo, ha affinato la penetrazione informativa nel contesto regionale calabrese e ha individuato la portata eversiva del fenomeno, che rappresenta una delle maggiori minacce alla sicurezza nazionale. Si è pure registrato il moltiplicarsi, da un lato, di analisi tattiche che hanno tracciato gli organigrammi, le dinamiche di potere e le tensioni conflittuali e, d’altro lato, di studi previsionali che, sul piano strategico, hanno evidenziato le possibili evoluzioni della ’ndrangheta.
Premesso che le sfide del nostro tempo non vengono vinte dal più forte, ma da chi per primo riesce a conoscerle e ad adeguarsi ai cambiamenti, i dati per contrastare la criminalità organizzata sono a disposizione degli organi dello Stato: ciò che diventa oggi indispensabile è legarli, coordinarli in modo efficace e intervenire con tempestività, anticipando le mosse delle consorterie mafiose, che operano ad ampio raggio, superando confini e legislazioni nazionali. Proprio per questo, l’Intelligence – per la capacità di raccogliere, integrare e utilizzare le informazioni essenziali – può costituire uno strumento vincente per la lotta alla malavita organizzata.
In Calabria il fattore di aggregazione criminale di maggiore intensità è dato dai vincoli parentali più stretti, che costituiscono di fatto la prima cellula a partire dalla quale si articola l’organizzazione mafiosa: volendo studiare in profondità la cellula del fenomeno, la famiglia, occorre procedere in modo scientifico, avvalendosi della genealogia.
Né va esclusa l’ipotesi che i nuovi ’ndranghetisti utilizzino i social media: da una prospettiva legata all’Intelligence, più le nostre vite si collegano alla rete, più le nostre identità reali e virtuali si fondono, più informazioni rilevanti vengono condivise e sono rintracciabili per elaborare analisi che siano le più complete possibili. La Social Media Intelligence, o Socmint, è la più recente componente del ciclo di Intelligence che si concentra sulla raccolta e sull’analisi delle informazioni che vengono prodotte e scambiate attraverso i social media.
Solo l’analisi libera da condizionamenti politici, mediatici ed economici può peraltro risparmiare paure infondate e spese senza senso: l’Intelligence indipendente dell’Università è in grado di offrire valutazioni credibili sull’impatto effettivo e sull’effettiva letalità del terrorismo islamico, chimico, batteriologico ed informatico. Il ponte fra Intelligence e Università è oggi necessario, date le sfide della lotta al terrorismo e alla criminalità organizzata: e le risorse dell’Intelligence potrebbero non essere sufficienti a produrre la conoscenza necessaria a combattere con efficacia le nuove minacce alla sicurezza umana. Quest’ultima fa sistema: le Università e il mondo della ricerca sono sempre più azionisti della sicurezza.
Laris Gaiser, Economic intelligence for a new world order
In a historical period characterized by the economic hyper-competition and the globalization process in which information is becoming increasingly important, the States are transforming their functions. They become Strategic States whose purpose is to promote their own economic power through the use of economic intelligence. The economic intelligence is the discipline studying information cycle needed by companies and States to make the right development decisions with the aim of fine-tuning their cognitive and decision-making capacities in the complex context of global competition. Because of that it ensures the prosperity and this in turn guarantees the state to influence skills internationally.
At the global level in recent decades we have witnessed the collapse of the system of governance established after World War II in Bretton Woods. The armed war has been largely replaced by the economic one and relations between international actors are increasingly based on economic assumptions. Different degrees of economic cooperation in different regions of the planet support the formation of a differentiated multipolarity, but at the same time also favor the use of economic intelligence. It becomes the States’ method of well-being and power maximization as well as the lowest common denominator of their relationships. For this reason, the economic intelligence could become the basis on which to build the new world order without passing once again through an armed conflict of devastating proportions.
In un periodo storico caratterizzato dall’ipercompetizione economica e dal processo della globalizzazione in cui il bene informazione diviene sempre più importante, lo Stato vede trasformate le proprie funzioni. Esso diviene uno Stato strategico il cui scopo è quello di favorire il proprio tessuto economico attraverso l’uso dell’intelligence economica. L’intelligence economica, ovvero la disciplina che, studiando il ciclo dell’informazione necessario alle imprese e agli Stati per effettuare scelte corrette di sviluppo, si prefigge di affinare le abilità cognitive e decisionali applicate alle complessità del contesto competitivo globale, garantisce benessere economico e questo a sua volta garantisce allo Stato capacità di influenza a livello internazionale.
A livello globale negli ultimi decenni si è assistito al crollo del sistema di governance definito in seguito alla seconda guerra mondiale a Bretton Woods. La guerra armata è stata in buona parte sostituita da quella economica e le relazioni tra soggetti internazionali si basano sempre più su postulati economici. Differenti gradi di collaborazione economica in diverse regioni del pianeta favoriscono il formarsi di una multipolarità differenziata, ma al contempo sostengono anche l’utilizzo dell’intelligence economica. Essa diventa così il metodo di massimizzazione del benessere e del potere degli Stati oltre che il minimo comun denominatore dei loro rapporti. Per tale ragione l’intelligence economica potrebbe divenire la base sulla quale costruire il nuovo ordine mondiale senza passare ancora una volta attraverso un conflitto armato di proporzioni devastanti.
Geopolicy – Geoeconomy – Economic intelligence – Differentiated multipolarity – Governance
FOCUS: ASPETTI LEGALI
In this article we observe the Islamic terrorism phenomenon through the lens of political conflict and therefore through the ones of jurisprudential conflict. We assume there is continuity between the first and the second ones: that depicts a perfect scenario for the juridical analysis in the center of the text. This analysis, regarding the latest criminal law on counterterrorism, shows worrying authoritarian aspects, a pre-modern and unconstitutional involution. These laws are on the one hand politically legitimated by the horrified execration of the islamic-fundamentalist enemy; on the other hand, they are juridically based on the universal, undisputed compulsoriness of ONU resolutions, which commit states to introduce these rules. The continuous link between the two aspects – the political and the juridical one – goes beyond the present moment and comes on the one hand to the political criminality role in the modern criminal culture, and to the practical jurisprudence that interested this criminality on the other hand, specifically during the XX century. Italy has a long tradition: as the last meaning, regarding the so known “years of lead”; as the previous meaning, regarding Francesco Carrara, founding father of the liberal criminal culture in Europe. Facing some, nevertheless worrying revival, there are many news: they are specific of the war on the Islamic Caliphate. The struggle against the foreign fighters carries laws to a repressive autism, condemned to the defeat since the theoretical premises. However, only if we put the phenomenon in a political perspective, we come to this conclusion: to this one we come up and from this one, circularly, we have begun. The reason of this choice was not a cultural leisure but, on the contrary, the prime interest to preserve prosecuted fundamental rights as well as the judge impartiality, the columns of European juridical tradition. In an attempt to offer an overall perspective, some hints go to military science and international law: where to put the terroristic attack within military science and how to consider the Islamic State, as regarding to the “state” designation, as regarding to the people self-determination principle.
Nel presente articolo s’intende leggere il fenomeno del terrorismo islamico con le lenti del conflitto politico e, dunque, con quelle del conflitto giuridico. La continuità che, infatti, si assume tra le prime e le seconde individua uno scenario perfettamente calzante su cui proiettare l’analisi normativa condotta nel corpo centrale del testo: l’esame della recente legislazione penale antiterrorismo mostra preoccupanti profili autoritari, di involuzione in senso premoderno e anticostituzionale. La legittimazione di tali norme si fonda, da un canto, politicamente, sull’esecrazione orrifica del nemico islamico-fondamentalista; dall’altro, giuridicamente, sull’universale, indiscussa cogenza delle risoluzioni ONU che impongono l’adozione della normativa in questione. Il continuo intrecciarsi di questi due piani – quello politico e quello giuridico – si espande dalla temperie specifica che oggi attraversiamo per giungere, da un lato, al ruolo assunto dalla criminalità politica nella cultura giuridico-penalistica moderna e, dall’altro, alle vicissitudini giurisprudenziali che tale criminalità ha vissuto, nel concreto dell’esperienza soprattutto novecentesca. L’Italia ha un importante bagaglio di esperienza: tanto, in quest’ultimo senso, con riguardo alla stagione degli anni di piombo, quanto, nel primo significato, con riguardo a Francesco Carrara, padre nobile della penalistica liberale europea. Dinanzi ad alcuni, pur sempre preoccupanti revival, molte sono le novità di questa stagione di guerra al Califfato: il contrasto ai foreign fighters induce la legislazione ad un autismo repressivo che è sin dalle premesse teoriche condannato a soccombere; tuttavia, solo una ri-politicizzazione del fenomeno consente l’affiorare di questa conclusione. A questa, dunque, si è pervenuti – e da questa, circolarmente, si sono prese le mosse – non per un vezzo culturale: interesse primario era, invero, quello di patrocinare la causa dei diritti fondamentali dell’imputato e il postulato di civiltà giuridica insito nella terzietà e imparzialità del giudice. Inevitabilmente, nel tentativo di offrire una prospettiva completa della lettura proposta, alcune considerazioni vanno ai temi della scienza bellica e del diritto internazionale: dove collocare – militarmente – l’atto terroristico e come considerare lo Stato islamico, e rispetto alla qualifica di “stato” e rispetto al principio di autodeterminazione dei popoli.
FOCUS: GRANDI EVENTI
Matteo Vergani, Ana-Maria Bliuc, The evolution of the ISIS’ language: a quantitative analysis
of the language of the first year of Dabiq magazine
In this article we investigate the evolution of ISIS by analysing the text contained in Dabiq, the official ISIS’ internet magazine in English. Specifically, we used a computerized text analysis pro-gram LIWC (Linguistic Inquiry and Word Count) to investigate the evolution of the language of the first 11 Issues of Dabiq. First, our analysis showed that affiliation seems to be an increasingly important psychological motive for the group. Secondly, ISIS has been increasingly using emotions, which are an important mobilizing factor in collective action literature, in a strategic manner. Thirdly, ISIS language presents an increasing concern with females. Last but not least, our analysis shows that ISIS has been increasingly using internet jargon (net-speak), which shows how the group tries to adapt itself to the internet environment and to connect with the identities of young individuals.
Claudio Bertolotti, Andrea Beccaro, Suicide Attacks: Strategy, from the Afghan War to Syraq
and Mediterranean region. A triple way to read the asymmetric threatsatteo Vergani
ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES
Laris Gaiser, Intelligence economica: una proposta per l’Italia
Giovanni Giacalone, Islamic extremism from the Balkans emerges in Italy
FOCUS: WEB INTELLIGENCE
Marco Lombardi, Alessandro Burato, Marco Maiolino, Dalla SOCMINT alla Digital HumInt.
Ricomprendere l’uso dei Social nel ciclo di intelligence
The paper aims to highlight the critical issues and vulnerabilities that can be exploited by terrorist organizations, which grow with increasing importance of cyberspace in all business processes and on the daylife of each of us. In the first part will be highlighted the convergence of the physical world with the cyber world, where the phenomenon of cyberspace is being analyzed, according to Clark’s Theory and providing some examples of recent cases of cyber attacks. The second part is dealing with a brief description of the Italian strategy on cyber security and introduce the concept of Critical Information Infrastructure, which means that we can no longer speak of merely physical infrastructure. In the last part, the paper will provide an analysis of terrorist activities conducted in cyberspace, according to Barry Collin’s Theory and introducing the concept of cyberterrorism, highlighting the latest offensive and defensive strategies implemented by the United States and Britain and offering insights reflection on the need to apply techniques of cultural intelligence.
FOCUS: GRANDI EVENTI
Sicurezza, Terrorismo e Società (Security, Terrorism and Society) is an online scientific journal published two times per year, which aims to promote the analysis of the numerous aspects that characterize the “security” dimension in the global world, with particular attention to terroristic drifts, without any cultural preclusion. The journal’s objective is the creation of a dialogue between academic, policy analysis and policy making domains on security and risk issues of contemporary society. Through a social science perspective, the journal combines anthropological, communicational, economical, legal, political, sociological and technological expertises. Thus, it is based on a multidisciplinary approach, which is thought to be necessary in order to face, both on a theoretical and empirical level, the XXI century new challenges.
Alessandro Cardazzone, Understanding Islamic State through Complex Systems Analysis
The aim of this article is to analyze the development capabilities of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS) in its different levels of projection, by means of System Thinking (ST). It is a Qualitative methodology that helps analyzing Complex Systems, characterized by feedback mechanisms between actions taken by a decision maker and the reactions that the system manifests over time. Considering IS as a multifaceted and self-sustainable phenomenon, completely de-structured, whose elements with different skills and culture interact and influence each other through the Web, it is possible to create a simulation model that takes into account the relationship between the different levels of development through which the threat is increasing its power. There are: the level of territorial expansion, the level of virtual projection and economic infrastructure on which the group evolves. After building a possible model accounting for the development dynamics of Islamic State, analysis will focus on the recognition of “attractive” variables, which in terms of complex analysis reinforce the growth of the whole system over time. Subsequently, these variables will be the target of the proposed policy of containment of the threat.
Matteo Vergani, La paura della morte rende estremisti?
L’estremismo è un tema molto dibattutto nella sfera pubblica globale. Tuttavia l’opinione pubblica è spesso esposta a dibattiti ideologizzati e basati su scarse evidenze empiriche. Questo articolo contribuisce al dibattito con i risultati di una ricerca sulle reazioni all’estremismo di alcuni giovani Australiani che hanno partecipato a un esperimento in cui è stata indotta la paura della morte. Questa, secondo la Teoria della Gestione del Terrore (Terror Management Theory) è un fattore che può determinare un mutamento significativo delle opinioni politiche. L’articolo presenta i dati dell’esperimento e ne discute le implicazioni relativamente al dibattito pubblico sull’estremismo. Inoltre l’articolo discute i risultati alla luce della Teoria della Gestione del Terrore, concludendo che questa non dovrebbe essere considerata come una teoria in grado di spiegare universalmente i cambiamenti delle attitudini politiche.
Kamil Yilmaz, M. Alper Sozer, 17/25 December Graft Probe in Turkey and Understanding Erdogan’s Invincibility: A Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA)
This article aims to shed light on contemporary Turkish politics vis-à-vis the corruption scandals of 2013 that came to be called as the “17/25 December Graft Probe.” Its specific goal is to understand and explicate how Erdogan’s continued success in local and presidential elections in 2014 came about despite grave allegations of corruption, an iota of which could, under normal circumstances, bring down any government in any country that occupies even an epigeal locus on the democracy indices. To achieve this task, we will first explain what the 17/25 December Graft Probe was all about. Then, we will embark on a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of various speeches of Erdogan, which he made before and after December 17/25. Finally, we will try to make an estimative analysis of where Turkey might be heading in the upcoming months and years in light of the December 17/25, which marks a turning point in Turkey’s contentious politics.
Everything probably stared with the death of a two years old child on the 6th of December, 2013, in Guéckédou, Guinea. The cause of the death was an infection with the Ebola virus. Since then, the spread of the pandemic has become “viral” with more than 22.495 suspected or confirmed cases and 8.981 deaths reported by the WHO on the 4th February 2015. Although the crisis had begun more than one year ago, international media agenda setting influenced the coverage of the issue, starting to give it more space only from July, 2014. So, that was when the “big public” knew about the pandemic. Nothing strange: filtering the news is how the information delivering apparatus works and an infectious outbreak, at least at the beginning, is not a new phenomenon to “deserve” journals’ front page. In this article the perception of Ebola is taken as the starting point for the analysis of conventional and unconventional risk communication campaigns in one of the States directly affected by the pandemic, namely Nigeria, and to have a broader picture of how the issue has been addressed both internationally, by International organizations such as the World Health Organization and by the U.S. Center for Disease Control and Prevention, and in relation to Italy.
Marco Lombardi, Islamic State Communication Project
IS has always stood out for its specific ways of communicating, particularly since the declaration of the caliphate on June 19, 2014. The Western reaction to the communication of Islamists has been one of surprise. However, such amazement is not justified at all. For historical reasons: for instance, the jihad – and Qaedism in particular – has always used communication as an instrument of war. And for specific reasons, suffice it to note the skillful and flexible use of the name of the Islamic State, as explained in other parts of this publication. In the following pages, we will try and explore the communication of IS by looking at its main products, so as to understand the categories that can explain them in the context of a complex communication project strategically aimed at establishing the caliphate, of which communication is a key pillar.
Per l’Italia, Expo Milano 2015 rappresenta una sfida in termini di gestione dei grandi eventi e una occasione di riflessione teorico – metodologica per la sociologia e le discipline di crisis management e pianificazione del rischio. Le questioni da considerare prima e durante l’organizzazione di un grande evento, in termini di sicurezza e procedure di risposte tempestive, efficaci ed efficienti in caso di crisi o evento critico sono molteplici e gli scenari metodologici che si aprono, in accordo ad una riflessione sociologica, interessano le capacità di gestione di una crisi da parte delle istituzioni preposte a tale compito, in considerazione degli elementi di vulnerabilità e resilienza, che le comunità sociali ospitanti presentano prima, durante e dopo il grande evento. La conclusione propone, nel solco di una ancora giovane tradizione di crisis management italiano, un quadro teorico sociologico e relativa applicabilità, nel contesto della gestione dei grandi eventi e del relativo crisis management.
La capacità di ospitare e garantire la sicurezza durante lo svolgimento dei Mondiali di calcio FIFA 2010 in Sud Africa, paese contraddistinto da un passato contrassegnato da un alto livello di violenza politica e un presente caratterizzato da numerosi crimini violenti, era una delle preoccupazioni principali sollevate sia a livello internazionale che locale. Questo articolo mette a fuoco nel dettaglio le attività sviluppate dal the Johannesburg Metropolitan Police Department (JMPD).
La folla che si accalca all’ingresso o all’uscita di un luogo o che si muove in modo incomprensibile lungo le strade di una città è l’immagine più comune con cui rappresentarsi una massa di persone. In queste situazioni i “Dispositivi di Protezione Relazionale” (DPR) descrivono delle modalità interpersonali utili al management e alla risoluzione delle criticità che coinvolgono uno o più individui contemporaneamente. Se il Supporto tra Pari è una modalità per sostenere gli appartenenti ad una squadra o i più generici colleghi in un rapporto diretto che rappresenta un primo DPR, la gestione altruistica, sociale o a-sociale, della crisi potrebbe essere un ulteriore strumento di aiuto orientato alla folla.
Francesca Zambelli, Videosorveglianza e grandi eventi: una questione di legacy
I grandi eventi (o mega events) sono definiti e percepiti quali potenziali catalizzatori di rischio, in quanto per il loro carattere di eccezionalità e di visibilità internazionale richiedono ai paesi organizzatori un dispiego di misure di sicurezza senza precedenti: in questa sede di riflessione, l’obiettivo è analizzare quale sia la risposta in materia di sicurezza e risk management dei contesti ospitanti un grande evento.
Paper in Italian: Executive Summary in English and vice-versa.