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Fascicolo 4 | 2016

RESEARCH ARTICLES

download-(buttons)Alessandro Boncio, Italian Foreign Terrorist Fighters: a quantitative analysis of radicalization risk factors

The Italian jihadist scene with its fluid profile and features has been analyzed in different occa-sions by academics and experts. Their publications however, were conducted with a qualitative approach and, apart from some real cases description and analysis, there is a vacuum in the quantitative research that needs to be filled. This short paper is aimed at statistically analyzing data coming from some possible risk factors of violent jihadist radicalization proposed by the prevailing academic literature; the aim is to fill the abovementioned void in the research and promote a more thorough analysis to verify whether there are common denominators that can alert social workers and/or security services about individuals on the path of violent radicaliza- tion. The research is limited in sheer numbers and is related only to foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs) involved in the Syrian – Iraqi conflict. The data were collected by the author regarding individuals listed by the Italian government in the FTF national record, with information collected through open sources. The principal goal of this paper is to verify the subsistence of shared radicalization risk factors in the Italian FTFs milieu, highlighting the possible trajec¬tories exploited by jihadist recruiters and propagandists. However, it is necessary to highlight the fact that this work is only a theoretical hypothesis, which necessarily has to be validated by other studies with a broader analysis sample. Furthermore, validation results should not be tak¬en literally, being clear that a theoretical model remains disconnected from real case scenarios with their unique psychological, personal and societal dynamics.

Key-Words:
Terrorism, Foreign Fighters, Italy, Radicalization

download-(buttons)Eleonora Ardemagni, Framing AQAP’s intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen: shifting patterns of governance and the importance of being local

This article addresses the issue of jihadism in Yemen, framing jihadi networks’ territorial penetra-tion whether in the context of the ongoing Yemeni multilayered conflict, as in the chronic failure of Yemen’s state-building from the unification so far. Due to a gradual convergence in operation¬al areas and targets, the research article contends the occurrence of a rising intra-jihadi rivalry on Yemen’s soil between al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), which has deep tribal ties with some Yemeni tribes, and emerging cells of the self-proclaimed Islamic State (IS). Three factors that disempower IS’s mobilization capabilities are identified here, building the evidence of AQAP’S intra-jihadi hegemony in Yemen. Firstly, AQAP was able to establish proto-emirates in the Abyan region (Jaar and Zinjibar provinces) in 2011, before the experience of the “Caliphate” between Syria and Iraq: that was a vanguard experiment in terms of identity, territoriality and language. Secondly, AQAP and its affiliates, as Ansar al-Shari’a, rely on a tribal wire of linkages and informal economy ties with local population, flourished in remote provinces out of state con¬trol. Thirdly, AQAP has elaborated jihadist narratives able to interact effectively with the Yemeni context, so rallying consensus (direct or tacit) among indigenous southern populations, where the shaykh plays a more prominent role if compared with the imam. To highlight similarities and differences within the jihadi galaxy, the article offers a comparison, in the first section, between AQAP and IS in Yemen, according to genealogy, structure of the organizations, targets and geog-raphy, narratives. In the second section, the article introduces a focus on AQAP’S shifting pattern of governance in the south of Yemen, where it has established fiefdoms and attracts recruits leveraging on tribal/regional discontent vis-à-vis the Sana’a-based system of power. As a matter of fact, the Abyan proto-emirates (2011-12) embodied a sharia-oriented approach: the implementa¬tion of Islamic law was prioritized in the relationship with local communities, since the aim was to win popular support through top-down measures predominantly based on coercion. On the contrary, the Mukalla’s mini-state in Hadhramaut (2015-16), founded on fuel smuggling, showed the adaptable, community-first face of jihadism: such a scheme is more difficult to counter for central authorities than the former because able to win local communities’ consensus through the interaction with local leaders, organized welfare and locally-tailored propaganda. It is not by chance that AQAP decided to rebrand itself in Mukalla as “Sons of Hadhramaut”. AQAP’S shift¬ing pattern of governance is going to enhance the resilience of jihadism in many Yemeni areas out of state’s control, especially in coastal southern regions. Moreover, as the last section of the es¬say analyzes, the widespread discontent of southern tribes about interim president Hadi’s federal reform (which was designed and approved by an appointed and not elected committee in 2014, but not implemented yet), could furtherly empower jihadists, given the historical mistrust and rivalries among populations that will be called to share resources and authority if the draft will enter into force (for instance, Abyan and Lahj, Hadhramaut and al-Mahra). Notwithstanding a Yemeni-focused lens of investigation, this article takes into account the current Middle Eastern scenario and its domestic implications (i.e. the geopolitical competition between Saudi Arabia and Iran), as the necessity to include Yemen’s instability into the broaden Gulf of Aden’s regional security complex, in order to analyze dynamics and sources of insecurity.

Key-words
Yemen; al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula; jihadism; security; tribes; Mukalla

download-(buttons)Diego Bolchini, Le mille e una Libia del passato calate nella realtà del presente: quale direzione?

Il cubo di Rubik è un oggetto creato dal professore di architettura ungherese Ernó’ Rubik nel 1974. Pensato originariamente a scopo di studio tra matematici ungheresi, il cubo di Rubik presenta nella sua versione standard 9 quadrati su ognuna delle sue 6 facce, per un totale di 54 quadrati. Come per il cubo ungherese esistono diverse possibili strategie risolutive (es. per-mutazione spigoli, permutazione angoli), cosi anche per il dossier libico la Comunità Inter-nazionale sta cercando soluzioni che consentano di mettere a sistema un puzzle caratterizzato da un complesso paesaggio politico-tribale rispetto al quale è oltremodo difficile decifrare e ordinare i cromatismi esistenti.

Key-Words
Libia; Anthropology; Strategy; Asymmetric Warfare; Terrorism

 

ANALYSES AND COMMENTARIES

 

download-(buttons)Laris Gaiser, Pietro Schioppetto, Sovereign Wealth Funds and the Italian Case

Key-Words

SWF, geofinance, economic intelligence, public intervention

download-(buttons)Nicolò Giuseppe Spagna, Understanding the threat to the European cities

After the terrorist attacks in Paris, Bruxelles and Nice claimed by Islamic State (ISIS) the question that has been raised is if ISIS could use nuclear or radiological weapons in addition to firearms and suicide explosions. This paper has the goal of clarifying the threat’s scenario, an¬swering to the following question: Is there a concrete threat about the use of nuclear or radiolog¬ical weapons in Europe by ISIS? In order to this, the first part explains the strong political and divine motivation of attacking the apostates and the evidences in the interest of using CBRN weapons. Lastly, were described the different more likely smuggling routes and the states im¬plicated in the trafficking which a terrorist organization could use for acquiring the materials. The last part concerns the threat assessment. It has been described the two main facilitators of the nuclear and radiological attack by terrorists, in other words the jihadist infiltration in the Balkan and the link between terrorists and criminal groups. The conclusion is that the concrete threat concerns the use of the RDD (radiological dispersal device) in a hypothetical attack against European city, however for logistical and technical reasons it is very unlikely the use of a nuclear device for generating an atomic blast.


Key-Words
Terrorism, NBCR, Nuclear, Radiological

download-(buttons)Carla Castelli, Francesco Marone, Protezione civile e rischio terrorismo: quale coinvolgimento?

Negli ultimi anni la minaccia del terrorismo, specialmente di matrice jihadista, si è fatta pressante anche in Europa. Sotto questo profilo, nemmeno l’Italia può considerarsi un paese “a rischio zero” e deve quindi predisporre misure adeguate per fronteggiare la minaccia. Questo fatto stimola una riflessione sul ruolo che il sistema di Protezione civile (PC) potrebbe assumere di fronte al rischio terrorismo. È del tutto evidente che la PC non è chiamata a operare in prima linea. Anche all’interno del sistema di sicurezza civile italiano, disastri antropici come il terrorismo e il rilascio intenzionale di agenti nucleari, biologici, chimici e radiologici (NBCR) ricadono innanzitutto sotto la compe¬tenza della Difesa civile. Nondimeno anche la PC, forte delle sue capacità e delle esperienze ma¬turate sul campo, potrebbe offrire un contributo rilevante in caso di attacchi terroristici, per quanto sempre entro i limiti dei suoi compiti e delle sue competenze. Rimane da definire in che cosa possa consistere effettivamente tale contributo nel contesto attuale. Di fronte a una questione che non ha ancora ricevuto una risposta univoca, appare utile avanzare alcune considerazioni preliminari. Innanzitutto, è chiaro che eventi gravi come quelli di tipo terroristico devono essere gestiti dalle istituzioni ai massimi livelli di competenza, per evitare problemi di coordinamento e trarre il massimo beneficio dalle risorse e capacità disponibili. In questo contesto, l’intervento della PC deve essere richiesto dalle autorità competenti e non può che seguire le direttive da queste impartite, proprio per assicurare il massimo livello di coordinamento e sinergia.

Il ruolo della Protezione Civile potrebbe collocarsi prevalentemente nelle fasi della gestione del post-emergenza e, se possibile, della prevenzione. A seconda delle circostanze, la PC potrebbe essere coinvolta per svolgere una gamma di compiti specifici, come il salvataggio, lo sgombero e l’assistenza degli scampati dall’evento; il presidio degli spazi e il diradamento e sfollamento dei presenti; l’assistenza di supporto alle forze in prima linea; l’aiuto alla messa in sicurezza di edifici danneggiati. Di particolare interesse potrebbe essere la partecipazione attiva al processo di co-municazione dell’emergenza, grazie alla presenza capillare sul territorio che la PC può vantare. Queste attività di intervento presentano elementi diversi da quelli che caratterizzano l’operato tradizionale della PC e per questa ragione richiedono una formazione adeguata e mirata.
In conclusione, appare evidente che il tema del coinvolgimento della PC nell’ambito di disastri causati da attacchi terroristici merita attenzione, specialmente nella presente fase storica.

Key-words
Terrorismo; Protezione civile; gestione della crisi; comunicazione del rischio; formazione; Italia

FOCUS: GRANDI EVENTI

download-(buttons)Giovanni Pisapia, Major Sport Events Safety and Security Framework’s Core Elements

Hosting a major sport event such as the FIFA World Cup, the Olympic and Paralympic Games or the Commonwealth Games, is a unique challenge and opportunity for any host city due to the sheer scale and complexity of a multiday, multi-sport mega event with a large number of client groups. Athletes, team officials, media, VIPs and spectators all have specific and de¬manding expectations, with distinctive desires and requirements. In addition, local residents and businesses’ requirements have to be attended too, with the aim of ensuring host cities continue to function properly during the event for all its citizens and visitors.
It is clear that each host city, in conjunction with relevant law enforcement agencies, has a daunting task to assess risks, set-up a comprehensive strategy, define an efficient organizational structure, and identify, source and make available resources to support the planning and the delivery of an effective safety and security operation during a major sport events.
The aim of this article is to detail the main elements, and their inherently interdependencies, of a sensible safety and security framework for major sport events, which identifies the strategic path to achieve a successful, well-managed and resilient event. The article also provides some insights on the most relevant lessons stemming from the practical experience of planning com¬plex safety and security projects. Clearly, each event is different because of its specific idiosyn¬crasies related to the local legal system, roles and responsibilities, government set-up and the socio, political and economic characteristics. However, the proposed framework, which would need to be tailor-maid in line with the specific local characteristics, is an effective blueprint for planning major events through a single set of documentations (e.g. risk assessment, strat¬egy, concept of operations) which cuts across different partners and directs the work of many role-players, assisting with the drafting of integrated operational plans. Such set up provides the necessary controls and reassurances locally, nationally and internationally, about the ability to deal effectively with public safety-related risks and to host a successful and peaceful event.

Key-Words
Safety and security, major sport events, risk assessment and management, security operations.

download-(buttons)Executive Summary

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1 commento

  1. Massimo stroppa ha detto:

    Mi piacerebbe approfondire il tema: protezione civile e rischio terrorismo. Credo che seppur un sistema come quello della Protezione Civile è un sistema aperto che deve vedere un pieno e consapevole coinvolgimento delle popolazioni e in generale della comunità con un approccio olistico dell’attività di valutazione dei rischi e di pianificazione delle misure di prevenzione e di protezione fai rischi naturali e antropici, la difesa civile è un sistema chiuso. Tuttavia i due sistemi hanno un un forte intreccio, ovvero attività comuni proprio nella fase dell’emergenza, nel soccorso e nella fase post emergenza per l’assistenza alle popolazioni colpite e per la messa in sicurezza delle infrastrutture tecnologiche, il sistema urbano e l’ambiente. Comunque se possibile un contributo al dibattito ben volentieri partecipo

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